

CONFIDENTIAL

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
1 OCT 1915  
No 48

*Part I*

# THE RESIDENCY — CAIRO

FO 141/735/2

TURKISH POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION

MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TURKEY



No 48/1	<del>KEEP WITH NO.</del>
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-5 JAN 1915

The Residency,

Cairo.

January 5th. 1914.

No. 4.

Sir,

*Copy wanted  
for action*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith  
copy of a Memorandum prepared by the Director of  
the Intelligence Department on the subject of  
military operations against Turkey, with special  
reference to the question of a possible offensive  
movement on the part of the British Forces.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) M. CHEETHAM

The Right Honourable,

Sir Edward Grey, Bart., K.G., M.P.,

cc. cc. cc.

8. 3. '15

Dear Sir.

Clayton says

he has already sent  
you over 3 copies of  
this ~~copy~~ document -  
and as we now have  
only one office copy  
left. We will take  
a little time to copy,  
but if you could let  
me have it back I can



send you over our  
copy. Perhaps  
Chatham has kept  
one of the copies that  
Clayton gave him.  
Call me up at 6 p.m.  
this evening & I'll  
send along the copy  
from my files if you  
want it.

Yours  
R. C. Butler.



**SECRET**

*FILE*  
*OFF 5.1.15*

Intelligence Department,  
War Office, Cairo,  
3rd January, 1915.



Although ignorant of the eventual policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Syria and Palestine it may be of use to record a few notes on the present situation as it appears from such information as it has been possible to obtain since the outbreak of war with Turkey.

A careful comparison of all information obtained hitherto leads to the conclusion that the Turkish forces available in Syria amount to about 80,000 so called regular troops, to which must be added 1st Line Reserves to about 60% of the regular strength, giving a total of approximately 130,000 men.

It is possible that some of these troops may be diverted towards Bagdad in order to reinforce against the British advance in that direction; also a certain number must be left in garrisons and on lines of communication, though it is probable that recruits and Kurdish irregulars might be used to a considerable extent for this purpose. We cannot reckon on the campaign in the Caucasus drawing off any great number of troops at present as the state of the roads and climatic conditions prevent the possibility of moving large numbers of troops in that district. We must therefore reckon on the possibility of Djemal Pasha being able to collect something approaching 100,000 men for the invasion of Egypt.

That the invasion of Egypt is still seriously contemplated appears certain and recent information leads to the conclusion that the forward movement will not be long delayed, especially as the Winter months, while unfavourable



to operations on the Caucasian frontier, are more suitable for a campaign in the waterless country of Sinai.

Our plan of operations up to the present has consisted of adopting a purely defensive attitude on the Canal, which has been dictated partly by ignorance of the actual intentions of the Turkish authorities, and partly by some uncertainty in regard to the attitude of the Senussi and the Western Arabs, and the internal situation in Egypt.

As the situation becomes more clear it is conceivable that a more offensive military policy might have to be adopted. A considerable force is available and it might be considered necessary to create a diversion in order to assist the operations on the other theatres in addition to ensuring the protection of Egypt; further, the vital importance of a swift and determined offensive against Orientals has been proved beyond question in the past.

Information received during the past few months shows that a large proportion of the population of Syria and Palestine would welcome the advent of a British force and it is probable that such a force would encounter but slight resistance from inhabitants and might even be actively assisted. On the other hand, there is evidence that similar feelings are by no means entertained in regard to the advent of French or Russian forces which would be received with disfavour in many quarters. Furthermore, any occupation of districts in Syria or Palestine by British troops will have to be permanent at least until the conclusion of the war, for anything in the nature of a raid would probably be supported by many of the inhabitants and an early withdrawal would mean leaving them at the mercy of the Turkish forces.

The above are important factors to be kept in mind in considering any attack in Syria or Palestine, and an early understanding with our Allies in regard to the eventual policy



to be adopted in Syria would appear a necessary prelude to any serious military action in that country.

It would be sufficient to obtain their acquiescence in the undertaking of military operations in Syria on the understanding that any occupation must be maintained until the conclusion of hostilities, but without prejudice to any arrangements which may be found necessary in the future in order to safeguard Syria from any return to Turkish rule.

There are three schemes which present themselves as possible means of assisting to combat the Turkish invasion of Egypt and, while holding the invading force on the Canal, to create a serious diversion by striking on its flank or lines of communication. They are as follows : -

1. To land a strong force at Haifa and thus strike the Haifa - El Fule railway on the right flank of the Turkish advance. This plan has the advantage that it would mean the occupation of a district which it is quite conceivable Great Britain might eventually desire to control as securing the "All Red " route to the Persian Gulf through Bagdad and securing the only possible port, except Jeddah, for the Hedjaz Railway. At the same time it has serious military disadvantages in that it would mean attacking the Turks at the point where, according to present information, they are in considerable strength and where it would not be difficult for them to concentrate a considerable force by means of their railway system; furthermore, our forces would be operating with indifferent lines of communication and from a port which possesses somewhat poor landing facilities. Any reverse sustained by a force operating from Haifa would probably be attended by very serious consequences.
2. To land a force at Alexandretta and cut the Turkish lines of communication behind Aleppo. This is a far more



attractive proposition. It strikes at a most vital point and would cut the only line of communication, not only with Syria, but also with Bagdad and even the Caucasus provided the Black Sea route is closed. Both railway and road to Alexandretta from the North are shut in on to the sea by impassable mountains and for a distance of some 15 miles would be completely commanded by gun fire from the sea. Furthermore, the Gulf of Alexandretta furnishes a safe harbour in bad weather so that the Communications of an invading force could be maintained without difficulty. Successful operations in this district would completely cut off the Syrian Army from its base and the scheme from a military point of view is attractive. From a political point of view Alexandretta, with the facilities which it possesses for the establishment of a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean, offers very obvious advantages to the Power by which it may be eventually occupied.

3. To advance against Maan and cut the Hedjas Railway. The advantages of this scheme are not obvious. It does not strike the flank of the Turkish advance from which troops could be diverted without difficulty along the Maan - Akaba line. It does not cut the lines of communication but merely isolates the garrison of the Hedjas which, according to our information, does not amount to more than 12,000 to 15,000 men. Furthermore, the Hedjas Railway was constructed largely with funds collected from Mohammedans ostensibly for religious purposes and its destruction or injury would inevitably be used by German and Turkish agencies against us in the same manner as was the seizure of the two Turkish Dreadnoughts at the commencement of the war.

The naval control of Akaba itself would appear for the present to be a sufficient menace to the left flank of the



Turkish advance and any action against the Hedjaz Railway would be better delayed until the attitude of the Sherif of Mecca and the Arabian Chiefs is more pronounced. Should they throw in their lot with us and take action against the Turks it might be advisable to assist them by cutting the Hedjaz Railway at some suitable point and thus prevent any reinforcement of the Turkish Army in Yemen and the Hedjaz. In this latter connection the paramount importance should be emphasised of carrying out to the letter the assurances given by His Majesty's Government in regard to the Holy Places (in which must be included the ports of Yembo and Jeddah) and Arabia in general. The action taken at Basra and Sheikh Said has already caused some apprehension and active operations against Red Sea ports would inevitably give rise to the idea that Great Britain does not mean to keep her promises.

The wholesale stoppage of imports and trade cannot greatly affect the Turkish garrisons but would certainly hit the Arab population hard and give rise to grave suspicion and discontent; thus any slight advantage from a purely military point of view would be gained at the expense of the friendly attitude of the Arabs.

The question of the Khaliphate is one which requires very delicate treatment and it seems essential that any proposal as regards an Arab Khalifa should come from the Arabs themselves. The line which has been taken up here has been to point out that Great Britain, as the greatest Mohammedan Power, is prepared to guarantee the integrity of the Khalifate and of the Holy Places against all external aggression, and desires to see the Khalifate occupied by one who is fully entitled to that high office and who would command the reverence and support of the Mohammedan world, but it has always been made very clear that there is no intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to make



any attempt to set up or even suggest any particular candidate.

(sd) G.F. Clayton, Lieut. Colonel,

Director of Intelligence.



**TELEGRAM.**

Code E  
 Cypher  
 Clear

**HIGH COMMISSIONER  
 EGYPT**  
 7 - JAN. 1915  
 No: 48/2

*See also despatch to F.O.  
 No 23 of Feb 15*

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
 From ~~His Britannic Majesty's Agent and~~  
~~Consul-General in Egypt~~  
 Station **CAIRO**  
 Despatched (date) Jan. 7 1915 (time)

To F.O.

Station

No. 10.

Possible future action in Syria and Palestine.

Following are views of the Intelligence Dept.

Information received since the outbreak of war indicates that large proportion of population of Syria and Palestine would welcome advent of a British force and might even afford active assistance provided they were assured that occupation of their country would be permanent and that there was no danger of such a force being withdrawn and their being left at the mercy of the Turks. On the other hand there is evidence that similar feelings are not entertained with regard to advent of the French or Russians, except among the Maronites of the Lebanon, who are pro-French.

Some definite understanding with our allies appears therefore desirable as a prelude to any <sup>military</sup> operations in Syria, and occupation should be permanent at least until all possibility of a return of Turkish domination is eliminated.

From a military point of view Alexandretta appears to be the ~~main~~ spot at which a decisive stroke at the Turkish lines of communication could be most effectively dealt; further the extreme importance of Alexandretta is obvious both as the port for the Bagdad Railway and as a possible

naval



**TELEGRAM.**

Code

Cypher \_\_\_\_\_

Clear

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

From

~~His Britannic Majesty's Agent and  
Consul General in Egypt~~

To \_\_\_\_\_

Station \_\_\_\_\_

CAIRO

Station \_\_\_\_\_

Despatched (date) \_\_\_\_\_

(time) \_\_\_\_\_

( 2 )

naval base commanding the Eastern Mediterranean and the entrance to the Suez Canal; thus Alexandria is a most prominent factor in the situation, both military, political and commercial.

Note explaining the situation more fully from the local point of view left by bag on Jan. 5. *no 4.*



# TELEGRAM.

HIGH COMMISSIONER, EGYPT

RECEIVED - 4 JAN 1915

No. ~~311~~

KEPT WITH NO.

48

Code  
Cypher  
Clear

C

Go to see  
Varaphan to Col Clayton

From Sir F. Elliot,

Station Athens.

Despatched (date) 2 pm, Jan. 4 (time)

To His Britannic Majesty's Agent and  
Consul-General in Egypt

Station CAIRO

Received (date) 7 pm, Jan. 4 (time)

Following sent to the F.O. today no.7.

Confidential.

Greek Minister at C'ple reports that, since the departure of Enver, Talaat is allpowerful. He directs the departments of the Interior, Finance, War and Marine, and is supported by the President of the Chamber. He has had long interview with the German Ambassador, at which agreement between German and Turkish policy was confirmed. But discontent with the party in power and with the German officers is growing. The Italian Ambassador has called the serious attention of the German ambassador to the possibility of disorders at C'ple and to the responsibility of Germany for the danger to foreigners.

Sent to Petrograd and Cairo.





Prince Sabah Eddine, son of Damad Mahmoud Pasha, and of Adbul Hamid's sister, now in exile at Athens, has lately been in communication with Talaat Bey in Constantinople. His father having quarrelled with Adbul Hamid, settled in Paris, where Sabah Eddine, who had liberal sympathies, posed as an injured patriot, wrote much for the newspapers and joined the Party of Liberty and Concentration, which preceded the Committee of Union and Progress. His Chief Agent was a Bulgarian Jew, who somewhat compromised his master. The Prince quarrelled with the C.U.P., who pointed out with justice that while he was speechifying in Paris they were working in Macedonia; however, after the revolution of 1908, he went to Constantinople and continued his speeches there, but his connection with members of the Liberal Union brought him under the suspicion of the C.U.P.

After the counter-revolution of 1909, he was arrested by the Committee, but thanks to his connection with the Sultan and his prestige in Europe, no proceedings were taken against him, and he was allowed to return to France. Since that he has visited Turkey only once or twice, and has grown more and more hostile to the C.U.P. In the earlier part of 1913 he was approached by Talaat Bey, who wished him to assist in forming a coalition government; he declined this. His name was mixed up (perhaps unjustly) with the conspiracy that resulted in the assassination of Mahmoud Shefkat Pasha in 1913, and he was condemned to death in his absence, together with Sherif Pasha and other leaders of the opposition. Later on he quarrelled with Sherif Pasha.

Talaat Bey has been prompted by the Germans to pretend that he is on the side of Sabah Eddine, and against Enver Pasha, and to propose to Sabah Eddine that he should assume the position of Grand Vizier with Talaat as Minister of the Interior, while Sherif Pasha should, if possible, be induced to return to Constantinople, and to take a post in the



Government. Talaat wrote to say that in case Sabah Eddine and Sherif Pasha return and form a new Ministry, then Rumania has undertaken to lend them a political adviser, so as to prevent the occupation of Constantinople by the Allies - an event which Rumania regards with great apprehension.

Sabah Eddine communicated these proposals to Sherif Pasha, who wrote and advised him not to listen to Talaat, nor to go to Constantinople.

Sabah Eddine, however, seems to have been persuaded, and (it is said) has received from the French Government a subsidy of 50.000 or 100.000 francs. to enable him to return to Constantinople, and start there a new party to overthrow Enver and the Germans. ( N.B. The Prince has before had dealings with the French Government and enjoys in France greater reputation than the facts warrant.)

The Prince invited Sherif Pasha to send an agent to him in Athens to continue negotiations. Sherif Pasha sent one of his usual agents, Abdul Rahman, and Ghalib Bey, his first secretary, with the message that he would on no account join Talaat Bey and Sabah Eddine. Ghalib Bey delivered this message in Athens last week, reached Cairo last Monday, 8th. March, and left for Paris ( via Alexandria ) on 11th. March.

The above was communicated by Ghalib Bey to Nureddin Pasha, late principal physician to Abdul Hamid, now resident in Cairo.

Cairo. 13th. March 1915.



Code Cypher, **E**  
or clear? \_\_\_\_\_

## TELEGRAM.

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT

5 MAY 1915

No. 243

48

From Foreign Office.

To  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT  
Cairo

Despatched (date and time) May 8th. 12.7am

Received (date and time) 7.30am

No. 2 1 2.

Following received from SOFIA, May 2nd, No.193:-

Following from Mr FitzMaurice:-

Prince Sabaheddin, nephew of Sultan and opponent of young Turks is reliably reported to have been poisoned by the latter. Prince Burhaneddin, favourite son of Ex-Sultan fearing a like fate has managed to escape in disguise from Constantinople. As a result of alleged Armenian plot, in coalition with British, wholesale arrest of leading Armenians have taken place at Constantinople. While it is reported that this incident has been the signal for extensive massacres of Armenians in Asia Minor.

Italian Ambassador and United States Ambassador and Bulgarian Representative have made representations to the Porte.

Bridge over Euphrates at <sup>Jerablus</sup> ~~Hastabulus~~ is completed and trains crossed on it on April 24th..

Title of Ghazi was conferred on Sultan last Friday in San Sofia Mosque, with great pomp, and ~~was~~ ordered by him as Caliph to be added to his titles in Friday prayer throughout Moslem world, Idea being to foment Pan-Islamic disaffection in Entente possessions.



Secret

Telegraphic Address:  
"MUKHABARAT"

The High Commissioner  
Sir M. Chestham  
W. Storm

INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,

LIGHT COMMISSIONER  
WAR OFFICE, T

4 MAR 1915

CAIRO, March 4th 1915

N2 48/3

Dear Chestham.

The attached ~~memo~~ which I asked Doughty Wylie to write is of interest. I do not agree with everything that he says but, in the main I think that the conclusions that he draws are correct.

It looks very much ~~as if~~ if we should in the end be drawn into Syria, but my own feeling is that if ~~we~~ have to go there, let us be so to speak dragged there.

If ~~we~~ make any declarations of policy now which the pro-British Syrians can construe into assurances ~~we~~ shall I ~~am~~ sure have our hands forced prematurely. This would handicap ~~us~~ in the settlement at the end of the war and lay us open to the charge of having grabbed Egypt, Mesopotamia and Syria before the war was half through, and the French will make the most of the claims they have to Syria and ask for compensation elsewhere. On the other hand, I fancy from what I hear that the practical party in France fully realize the difficulties they would have in Syria & the responsibilities which a French Syria would entail-- they are therefore not really ~~very~~ keen on it and if we hold our hand a bit now, Syria is likely to fall to us anyhow, even "malgré nous". On the other hand a descent on Alexandretta is a military move which can be fully justified on military grounds, and which is at the same time a good political ~~move~~ card in our hands later.

Yours sincerely  
G. F. Clayton.



10th February 1915.

Note on a possible descent on Alexandretta.

The Director of Intelligence in Cairo asked for my views on this subject, as set out in certain papers which he gave me to consider, namely a note and summary by himself, a note by Capt. George Lloyd M.P., and two memoranda of the opinions held by the Syrian, Christian and Pan Arab parties.

The Military Question.

I agree entirely that Alexandretta offers facilities for something like a decisive blow over half Turkey, and that neither Haifa nor Maan can be considered beside it.

A comparatively small force, from 10,000 to 20,000 men, depending on the opposition, could hold the line Payas - Alexandretta - Beilan. But the Germans, who have had for some years a special concession in Alexandretta, are certain to have foreseen and prepared against such an attack and there may be formidable positions to carry on the Beilan Pass and the hills North of it commanding the Bay.

Granting that we take and hold from the Beilan to Payas including the mountains, the military effect of such a stroke, undoubtedly great, may be over estimated. It does not by itself cut the Turkish communications with Syria, the Hejaz and Mesopotamia, which communications pass now North and East of the Amanus, and could be diverted still further North and East if necessary. To cut these communications the force from Alexandretta must push either North past Baghshe to cut the line leading to the spot on the Euphrates where the bridge is building or built - or else West to Adana to block the Cilician gates - this would be a decisive blow.

It is true that if our force went to neither of these places but remained 'en potence' at Alexandretta, it would be still so dangerous to either of them that the Turks would



probably be obliged to destroy or contain it - a costly operation.

Of the position Northwards along the Amanus towards Baghshe I know nearly nothing; only a very little of the mountains between Alexandretta and Payas (which I should say were not impassable but difficult) and the road to Payas. The position would be long and might be narrow; with the present lines of supply outside it.

The Adana positions might be two, depending on the size of the force. The ideal one is in the famous Cicilian Gates, which are well known. These, with the sea, give the Mersina, Adana Railway. <sup>Tarsus</sup> But if the gates position was found to be too extended the line of Turkish communications can also be cut by a position covering Adana, from the gorge of the Chakit Su to the river above and below the town. The Mersina railway would be abandoned, a sea base at Yamartahk established, the Adana river held, supplementary bridges constructed, and possibly supplies carried by it. It would scarcely be possible to pass North of Adana - the Payas road would give ~~means~~ for reciprocal defence of the positions. Adana town itself is worth having for political effect, supplies and auxiliaries. The town is the wrong side of the river and the position has certain drawbacks, but it does cut communication.

also suggested by Boghos Nubar

Whatever scheme is adopted, it includes the raising of a corps of Armenian auxiliaries - opinions may differ as to their fighting value, but I have seen them fight desperately for their homes -. Under a guarantee they would have great enthusiasm and a perfect local knowledge. In my day there were Armenians everywhere but about 16,000 men and boys were killed in the massacres of some five years ago and all arms were confiscated. There are certain difficulties; that the Armenians are very scattered; that it would be impossible to warn them beforehand so that many of them would be murdered by



their armed neighbours before they could join us; that it would take time to collect, organise and arm them; that with the men would probably arrive a crowd of destitute women and children who would be murdered if they stayed at home. Numbers are hard to estimate but as a rough guide, after the massacres in Adana town alone some 20,000 people a day had to be fed and housed for three weeks. Possibly the military commander could clear his hands by disentangling as many men as possible and deporting the rest temporarily to Cyprus. Cavalry could bring in many safely if the surprise were complete. The killers would be mobs of Turkish villagers, easily dispersed in the open. Some Armenian villages in the mountains are too far off to reach and would be defended by the inhabitants, such as Hajin, Zeitun, and Sis the seat of the Catholics; but they could not be held for long by Armenians alone against regular troops, except perhaps Zeitun.

There may be Syrians also in the North who would be useful. Antioch is by situation an important place and contains many Christians who may be in part Armenians.

If some political announcement were made to Syria, not only should we have many sympathisers and spies but possibly useful auxiliaries from there also :- from the Lebanon for instance.

The best season for action in the Adana plain is the middle of March to the end of May. I have been driven out of the Amanus by snow in March, but about then the plain begins to dry and become passable. June, July, August and September are hot and rather feverish. The Cilician gates are always passable.

Details of the roads, transport, bridges, etc. will be in the military report.



The Political Question.

A protectorate over Syria, as pointed out by Colonel Clayton and Capt. George Lloyd, is very undesirable, if it can be avoided. I cannot however share their opinion that a descent at Alexandretta will give us less political responsibility than a descent at Haifa or elsewhere. Alexandretta is the gate of Syria and of Mesopotamia, and the holder of it cannot hope to be free of the Syrian and Arab questions. In addition he will also have to deal with Armenia and Turkey. Alexandretta is the border between them all.

The important thing to make clear is that whether we go to Alexandretta or elsewhere, or whether we remain stationary in Egypt, we cannot avoid the Syrian and Arab questions. The Turkish attack and retreat from the Canal, the imminent Russian conquest of Armenia at least, the capture by ourselves of Basra and I hope Bagdad, have caused a movement among Arabs and Syrians which will oblige us to move with it. The only thing we have to do is to decide where it is going and how best to guide it.

Arabia East of the Syrian part of the Hejaz railway and West of the Euphrates Valley is the more distant, and for us the simpler part of the problem. There are and will be very important questions of the Khalifate, the Holy Places, pilgrimage, railway and roads, Yemen, the Gulf, Trans-border forays, trade and quarantine. But though we shall have to deal with them, we can remain outside them. But what of Syria? Not Mecca, nor Riyadh, can rule Jerusalem, Haifa, Damascus and the Lebanon. Aleppo goes with Alexandretta.

There is no comfort at present in that blessed word autonomy in Syria. There is no head to crown or Government to govern.

The work has to be done. We cannot destroy the Turkish Government and leave the country empty, swept and garnished. Putting aside Germany and Turkey it must be done by France, Russia or England.

To France I think we have already declared ourselves disinterested in Syria. But it is true, as Capt. George Lloyd



says, that France does not want Syria, can we force her to have it to suit ourselves? If we ever divide with them I hope we shall keep the North of Syria in view of Mesopotamia.

Russia's principal present interest in Syria would be said to be religious, seeing the mass and marvellous devotion of her pilgrims to Jerusalem. They would give an ostensible reason for a protectorate. But to get to Syria she must first take the two Armenias and Alexandretta.

Of Greater Armenia Russia will soon be permanent mistress. Armenian sympathies are turning naturally to Russia, motherland already to many of their people. The Czar's manifesto to Armenia, the Armenian auxiliaries with the Russians near Van and Erzerum, the weight of the Catholics at Etchmiadzin, the widespread Russia agents, the great Armenian revolutionary society, the Darbnagrtutyrian, which is entirely pro-Russian - all these things must be remembered. It is likely that the Catholics at Sis and the Cilician Armenians are already in touch with Russia. They may well have received conditional promises already.

Unless we go to Alexandretta Russia will go there and from there command Syria and the Euphrates Valley. Colonel Clayton says that Russia is unpopular in Syria but as regards Armenia there are some reasons for her rule being preferred to our own. If Russia is suzerain in Cilicia both Armenias will be united. If we are suzerain there the Armenias must remain separate, as indeed historically and geographically they are separate.

RS If Russia is to have Constantinople she would be content without Alexandretta. In that case the future Turkey will form a convenient buffer state between us. without dwelling on the point it is plain that there are many political arguments for an immediate occupation of Alexandretta in accord with Russia and in consideration



of Constantinople.

In reckoning roughly what political obligations are involved in a military descent on Alexandretta it is plain that one must be some guarantee to the Armenians, such as is set out in a note to Sir John Maxwell by Nubar Pasha Boghos, that under no circumstances shall Armenia in future be ruled by the Turks. This should surely be accompanied by some Geographical limit. It is little good to the Armenians if we guarantee from Beilan to Payas, and equally we cannot guarantee all Armenian villages wheresoever.

As to the necessity of the guarantee, we want to employ Armenian auxiliaries who thereby earn our protection. But even if we did not want to employ them, even if we used every diplomatic safeguard and disclaimer, nothing can be said before the landing. British soldiers at Alexandretta will mean to every Armenian England and freedom. Unless they actively opposed us our landing in that country leaves them nothing but our protection sine die, or a death and ruin blacker than most Englishmen can picture. Guarantee or no, it is impossible to land at Alexandretta and be disinterested in the Armenians. As well might the ruler of Cairo say he cared nothing for a massacre of the Copts.

We do not want to hold the country and at the peace negotiations we shall have to guarantee the existence and maintenance of a state which died in the time of the Crusades, and which it may take us a generation to set firm. However, if Russia holds Constantinople the Turks between us will be quiescent while the new state grows. No great military force would be required. Armenian militia would be already in existence. Financially the country is potentially rich and the Armenians are industrious and capable. There are many rich Armenians in England, America, Egypt and Turkey who would return.



There would be difficulties as to the expatriation of Turks, finance and customs. The frontiers inevitably must be the Cilician gates and the mountains round the Adana plain.

In Syria the position would be more difficult and the political responsibility greater. The Armenians are more or less homogeneous and it would be easier to create an Armenian state than a Syrian. Colonel Clayton and Captain George Lloyd seem to think that we can take Alexandretta and say nothing to the Syrians and Arabs. There seem to me to be more difficulties than advantages in such a course. I admit it gives us time but time for what? Among other things, for the Arab world to turn against us. Alexandretta is a frontier. We cannot hide the guarantee we give the Armenians on one side. There are still more Christians on the other side to whom our landing may be the signal for massacre. What of Beirut? There would be a great cry in England and America if anything happened there. What of Antioch, even Jerusalem?

But with the greatest respect to the Cairo experts I urge that it is also impossible to say nothing to the Arabs. Aleppo for instance, an Arab city whose mouth is at Alexandretta, Damascus and many more. An English invasion upheaves their whole world. Will not every Pan-Islamist cry that England, who calls herself a Moslem Power, guarantees to the Christians life and liberty, but for Islam nothing, never a word. The Jews, the Syrians, the Armenians are to reign over them. The Turks were bad but they were of the faith, and better than such a vile thing as that. Surely we shall precipitate the very disorder we wish to avoid, which will make a military occupation of points in Syria inevitable.

*is it*

We gain time by silence, but ~~some~~ thought that the



little time gained can alter the independence of Arabia or the driving uncertainties of Islam about the Holy Places ? Can anybody rule there except the Sherif ? Can we not say so and that Syria shall have a future assured like that of the Lebanon, that the Turk shall never rule there again ? Such a statement would make us friends. It might even take us to Bagdad, which is vastly important to us. In the new world coming upon us the good will of the Arabs is a factor of immense value. With ~~it~~ it our position for some time at any rate will not be very difficult or very costly. Without it our task is colossal.

Why not  
PS

There is surely nothing in such a statement which our Allies can take exception. It does not shut France out of Syria, and all else could be settled afterwards. As for Russia we can of course ask her to come in and hold some of the main roads to India. We can give her Alexandretta. Russian friendship may be vital to us, but it is better to sacrifice to it at Constantinople.

There may be people who like myself will regret to see the Turk depart. Bad he certainly ~~was~~ but he saved us ~~an~~ infinity of trouble. It is not ~~we~~ who drive him out. It is Russia athwart his line at Alexandretta. It is every Arab hand against him. In Syria and Arabia he has committed suicide.

There is one other point but allowing hope. It is that America by sentiment, for the sake also of the permanent peace of the World, will administer Syria and Cilicia.

To sum up on the actual state of affairs, England cannot avoid the weight of ~~new~~ burdens in Syria, Armenia, Arabia and Turkey. Whether ~~we~~ go to Alexandretta or not, ~~we~~ cannot escape them.



A successful blow at Alexandretta brings peace appreciably nearer, frees troops for France, from Egypt and the Caucasus, and gives us the necessary foothold to shoulder the new task.

(sd). C.H.M. Doughty Wylie.



we have had this  
before, but didn't know it  
was  
Cairo. by Graves.

✓ 13 Aug. 1945

Dear Sir Henry

I think the attached  
will interest you, if you  
have not seen it. It is  
written by Graves (Philip  
Graves)

Yours sincerely  
G.F. Clayton.



**Memo. re the Turkish Campaign.**

1411 S.  
(with 1086/1)

Now that the arrival of large British reinforcements **48** makes it possible to look forward with a certain confidence to an early and extensive advance by the Allied Forces operating on the Dardanelles, it is time to consider what should be the policy of the Allies in dealing with the constituted authority in Turkey and what methods should be adopted not only to scotch but to kill the Turkish snake. It must be clear to all who know Turkey and the Turks that no sooner has any really important success, such as the capture of the Narrows, been won by the Allied Forces, than the Turkish authorities will do their utmost to delay the rapid advance of the Naval and Military forces of their foes by all the Byzantine expedients which were first recommended to unsuccessful rulers of the Eastern Empire by Leo the Tactician, and have been resorted to by the Moslem masters of Constantinople, whenever they have been placed in danger through military reverses. The opening of negotiations, designed only to gain time while positions are strengthened or prepared, the despatch to the Enemy Headquarters of these "semi-official" negotiators and intermediaries, who are so extensively used in the Near East and whose credentials are never in order, threats of "fanatical outbreaks", "Massacre", and what not, will certainly be among the weapons employed by the enemy to save him from the unpleasant necessity of "dying in the last ditch" or in plainer language of being caught in Constantinople, by the Allies and losing his line of retreat to Asia. The case of Admiral Duckworth, who was in this way tricked into the belief that the Turks intended to surrender, while all the time batteries were mounted and troops hurried to the capital, is a standing and apposite example of the danger of any negotiations with the Porte, save such as are based on the principles that inspired "Unconditional surrender" Grant in the American Civil War.



It must here be noted that the theory that the appearance of the Allied Fleets before Constantinople will lead to the instant collapse of the existing Turkish Government, and an immediate cessation of Ottoman resistance followed by surrender, a theory which seems to be wide spread in British circles, is by no means necessarily correct.

The reasons for supposing that it may be based on inaccurate reasoning are the following : -

1. Although Constantinople is dear to the "Old Turks" and is regarded as the centre not only of the Caliphate, but of the Ottoman Sultanate by the average Ottoman Turk and though its fall would arouse great indignation among all the many Turkish critics of the present Military and Revolutionary Government, yet that Government by ruthless measures has crushed all Turkish Moslem opposition (which alone counts in the mind of any well-informed student of the present Near Eastern situation) and controls all the Departments of State through its agents or nominees.

Non-Military opposition to its interests is therefore unthinkable in any of the populous and more or less policed parts of Anatolia and Thrace and outbreaks in out-of-the-way regions are of small importance. Moreover the (sometimes self-styled) leaders of the Ottoman opposition are as a rule on bad terms with one another.

Colonel Bedik has no belief in Sherif Pasha, and Habis El Din, a man of words, continues to plow a lonely furrow.

Is a military revolution possible ? Without denying that such a movement may occur when disaster has overtaken the Turkish armies, which is not yet, the student of the Turkish situation should pay the Turkish Army the compliment of believing, till proof to the contrary, that it will perhaps take a great reverse without breaking up; that having gone 9 months without murdering its officers despite several "incidents" at Barykanish and elsewhere, it may still continue to spare their lives, and that Islamic feeling will keep a



good proportion of Turkish soldiers with the Celours however slight their interest in the war. Till now, since we have elected to fight the Turks in the only species of warfare in which they can be efficient, Turkish prisoners have been few indeed, as few as they were many in the Balkan War. In the latter conflict there were ~~hand-to-hand~~ battles in which the large proportion of half trained men who have always been found in modern Turkish armies, either surrendered when turned, or short of ammunition, or ran away. In the trench warfare in Gallipoli the untrained men do not have to ~~manoeuvre~~; their business is only as a rule to live naturally as Turks, i.e. to sit still, and attempts to surrender must be rare by reason of the strict orders issued to units in rear of the front line to fire upon men attempting to go over to the enemy.

If this state of things continues we can only count on success by attrition. Turkish losses are no doubt very heavy in the "pounding match" but a Government which controls the Press, has a largely illiterate army, and "fakes" victories whenever the public seems depressed, need not be anxious as to the moral effect of a heavy but unpublished casualty list.

Harves in Constantinople and Smyrna may be upset by the arrival of long trains of wounded, but as long as these trains are held by troops, who are well fed and commanded by members of the Committee of Union and Progress, the discontent of sections of the army is of small importance. Even should Constantinople be lost the Army may continue its resistance in Anatolia.

2. After the great reverse of the Balkan War, and before the recapture of Adrianople, a movement having for its object the withdrawal from Constantinople of the Turkish Government, and its establishment at Bursa or Konia, had made some way. Among its principal supporters were Tassef Eshetwan Bey, M.P. for Tripoli, Sami Bey and other prominent Committee men, and



it may therefore be supposed that the proposals which they made in pamphlets and speeches were looked upon with favour by those in authority. It may be argued that the Committee of Union and Progress had fewer adherents in Asia and would not risk transferring itself thither.

In the humble opinion of the writer, as long as the Committee of Union and Progress controls the Central Govt., which it will strive to do by all means in its power, has its nominees in the War Office and can pay the troops and the Gendarmerie, which it will do by requisitions, "benevolences" and paper issues, it need not fear much from the Anatolians, who cheerfully put up with the abuses of Abdul Hamid's rule for 30 years, and in many cases regretted his departure, without, however, lifting a finger to prevent it.

Assuming the Dardanelles to be forced it is therefore improbable that the Turkish Government will instantly collapse. It would be hazardous indeed to prophesy what it will do; but in the writer's opinion which he puts forward with the utmost diffidence, it may attempt to hold Constantinople as long as possible, pending the removal of military stores, machinery, etc. to Asia, the while attempting to cover its retreat by negotiations, threats of massacre and arson in Constantinople, which can best be met by counter threats to hang all responsible persons, and deliver the city to military execution, and appeals to the "ancient friendship" between Turkey and Great Britain of which we have seen so few results during the last generation. "Once in Anatolia and the girl is ours" will probably be the watchword of the Committee leaders, and though their optimism may seem insane to British observers, these last must remember that an arrogant fatuity has always marked the mental processes of the "educated" Turk, whose power of believing what he wishes to believe surpasses that of the German, and who has learned nothing and forgotten everything from the political lessons



lessons of the Balkan War. They must also remember that German invincibility is still an article of faith with a great number of Turkish officers and politicians, and that the foreign or rather non-Turkish influences which have carried so much weight in Turkey of late years, are committed to the support of the Teuton. The Ottoman Army, lead by chiefs who are as much the Kaiser's men as Marshal von Hindenberg, and the Ottoman Government, German bought and hypnotised by its belief in the German superman, may continue the war from Konia in the hope that Germany will eventually defeat the Allies, or at least make a draw of the present struggle, in which case Turkey might count on "something turning up" to her advantage.

Again every nerve is being strained and will continue to be strained by the cosmopolitan agents of Germany, Austria Hungary, and the Committee of Union and Progress to cause dissension among the Allies. The Japanese saying "Victor tighten the strings of thy helmet" will never be more applicable than when Constantinople has fallen to the Anglo-French expeditionary force. One can foresee what the Committee leaders will seek to do - the formation of a "moderate" Government composed of "positivists", pacifists, "liberals" and what not, marionettes in the hands of the Ahmed Riza & Co, Daisiman Bustani, etc. men behind the scenes, and then, if a favourable chance presents itself, if the Allies quarrel, or Greeks and Bulgars confuse the situation by their claims and higgings, hey presto, the scene changes, the "liberals" are overturned by indignant patriots who will have arranged the whole comedy, and the Extremists will be back again, threatening and clamouring, doing their best to play the game they so boldly played in 1913 with the help of the India Office, Austria Hungary and the demented Bulgars. But if we are to have any peace in the Near and Middle East the Committee of Union and Progress must be killed, not merely scotched. The reasons for this will now be set forth:



(a) Simple persons who speak of the Committee "Party" as they speak of the Conservatives in England or the Democrats in the United States do not understand the A.B.C. of Turkish politics. In Turkey the common man does not count and never has counted for much. The country has been governed by autocrats, or by small groups, or by an autocrat influenced by a particular and restricted group as was the case in the later days of Abdul Hamid. When Abdul Hamid fell an oligarchy took his place. This oligarchy was less Turkish in many respects than any such body had previously been.

On the other hand many of its leaders were Turks, and Turks of a class which could stir up the passions of the mob more successfully than the portly and dignified Pashas and Excellencies of the Old School, who living in a Court atmosphere, mixing much with Europeans and maintaining an air of dignified calm on all occasions, seemed more powerful than they were.

When the Sultan fell, the importance of the Old Turks passed away. Men who, whatever their religious beliefs might be, could make Chauvinistic speeches from tubs at short notice, were experts with the revolver, and were unrestrained by any gentlemanly scruples concerning the use of bombs or mud as missiles took their place, and thanks to the sheepishness of the decent elements in the country and the predatory instincts of the mob, were finally able to make themselves masters of Turkey. Their political opponents, who carried weight in Paris and outside Turkey, were mostly unto them, politicians "on the make". The difference was that the Committee leaders being mostly Rumelists, i.e. "Turks" of mixed, largely Balkan, origin from the European provinces of Albania and Macedonia, were more resolute than the "Liberal Union" party, which was drawn from apathetic Anatolia, or futile and untrustworthy Constantinople. The Committee was, and is, therefore, a comparatively small body governed by an



oath-bound oligarchy of revolutionaries. "Moderates" appear among the Committee parliamentarians, and occasionally in Committee Cabinets, but one does not find them in the Central Executive Committee.

Rumiliot "Turks", Pan-Islamic agitators, and Jews of Salonika and Smyrna are masters of the hour in Turkey, and will probably remain so, unless the Allies take William the Conqueror's methods as described in the Saga - "Hard heart and bloody hand, New rule England" as their watchword, not in dealing with the inoffensive mass of Turks, but with the Committee oligarchy and its Counsellors.

"But", the British Liberal may urge "you cannot show severity to civilian politicians, or the vanquished leaders of the enemy's army".

(b) The massacres of Armenians, undoubtedly effected by the Central Government's orders, for spontaneous massacre does not happen in Turkey where every man waits for orders from an official or officer, have given the Allies the weapon and the justification for its use. This the Russian Government has plainly understood, and it is to be hoped that the British and French Governments in threatening the persons responsible for recent massacres with condign punishment, do not intend to do as did the British Government when Adrianople was recaptured.

Threatening Orientals is a foolish proceeding when you do not intend to carry out your threats.

Even if the Committee leaders were not personally responsible for these massacres, which is unthinkable, their past amply justifies the adoption of severe measures towards them, measures that will prevent them from doing harm in the future. They abetted and condoned the Adana massacres, they murdered some 250 unarmisted Bulgars, Serbs and Greeks, in Macedonia, thus doing much to make the Balkan League inevitable; they murdered the Metropolitan of Creven, Nazim Pasha, and many other political opponents. Talaat Bey was



photographed in the company of Wardani, the assassin of Butros Pasha, before that worthy left for Egypt. The Jews of Salonika may have inspired the murder of King George, whose slayer was permitted by the Greek Government to commit suicide. There is evidence to prove that Salonika Jews, over the brains of the Committee, and Bessarabian Moslems who had been under Committee influence, had some connection with the Sarajevo murder, which was the particular cause of the Great War. The attempt on the Buxton brothers, and that on the Khedive may also be instanced. It is in vain that the defenders of the C.U.P. urge that the Khedive's would-be murderer was promptly slain, and that the Khedive afterwards threw in his lot with the Turkish Government. What else could the intimidated Abbas Hilmi do but join the Turks ?

What better way of preventing unfortunate disclosures than to slay the tool, a witless Egyptian student ? Why did that youth's chief friend and adviser, Dr. Ahmed Fuad, remain in a high position in the Ottoman Political Intelligence Department ? Simply because on the eve of the Great War, which the inner ring of the Committee expected in 1914, an attempt on the Khedive would either frighten him into submission, or eliminate a possible source of trouble.

In any case it would do no harm.

(c) Finally the Committee oligarchy which was preaching Pan-Islamism in 1910, has of late been recruited largely from convinced Pan-Islamists. One has only to study the Jewish-Turkish Press of Constantinople and, before the Balkan War, of Salonika to see how the Jews of Salonika, the Balkans, Turkey and Hungary (was it not de Bismarck who found the money for the coup d'etat of 23rd January, 1913, and Svinchov who tried to get up massacres in Anatolia that year ?) were the intermediaries between the financiers, journalists and politicians of Central Europe and the Committee. Germano-Magyar and Turk acted and reacted on one another. The former



wished to use the Turk, the Head of Islam, against Russian and Briton; the latter hoped to be saved from the Slav by German victory, and to terrify the Englishman into concessions in Egypt and the Gulf region. The Jew hoped to ride on the German to the economic conquest of Russia and Asia Minor. He cherished a hearty hatred for the Czarism, and hoped to eliminate his Greek and Armenian commercial rivals in Asia.

His control of the Austro-Hungarian and German Press, and Finance, made him invaluable to German expansionists and Turkish extremists, and his influence through his cosmopolitan religionists in the West enabled him through the Press, through Anglo-Ottoman Societies, through cosmopolitan financiers, civil and military devotees of the "Bosnian Johnny Turk" tradition of 1854, through the alarmists of the India Office, through Free Masons who at first imagined that Ottoman "Free Masonry" was identical with the British Craft, through all sorts of cranks, faddists and alarmists, to create an impression that Turkey was very necessary to England. Hence a certain amount of timidity on the part of the British Foreign Office in dealing with Turkish pretensions<sup>s</sup> in the Persian Gulf and intrigues in Egypt and elsewhere. The naïf but predatory Turk consequently thought that Great Britain could be blackmailed. The Caliphate represented by a good natured dastard was exploited by Jewish journalist, Turkish revolutionary, and German absolutist for Pan-Islamic ends, and our interest in the future tranquility of the Near East and of Europe makes it incumbent on us to break the Kaiser, Caliph, and Committee ~~we~~<sup>as</sup> thoroughly as we can break them.

Even so we shall not have seen the last of the C.U.P.

There are too many heads to be lepped; too many prizes for the politician in the Near East to make it probable that we can altogether destroy a movement, which if exploited<sup>d</sup> by professional revolutionaries, was based on the growing



impatience of old forms which is beginning to manifest itself in Moslem countries and India. But if we can cause the Shawishes, Kivers, Talaats, Carassos, and Agayeffs to cease from troubling we have at least a chance of canalizing the movement.

Otherwise if we show an unwise magnanimity these persons will either continue to make Turkey a nuisance to the world in general, for one cannot count upon a popular reaction as a certainty, or will migrate to Syria, Egypt, or some other Moslem centre, there to cause infinite trouble.

It therefore follows that we must do our utmost to inflict not merely a defeat but a disaster on the Turkish Army: something that will resound through Asia. The mere expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople may not be enough: better if by leaving the last vine to the end, and striking at once, after we have forced the Straits, at the Imdid Peninsula, by which Constantinople is fed, we are able, perhaps with Russian aid, to starve the Turk on the Bosphorus, and force him to choose between starvation and unconditional surrender. That the enemy will do his best to "argue, bargain & protest" is certain, and it would therefore seem necessary to strengthen our military negotiators, if negotiations there must be, by the adjunction of "political officers" who are acquainted with the mistakes made by diplomatists in the past, understand something of the doubleness of things Turkish, how, for example, the Turk can at one moment demand a concession as a member of the "great family of Nations", and on the next occasion attempt blackmail by threats of fanaticism and massacres, how Ministerial responsibility, Parliamentary institutions, and a Constitutional Monarchy can co-exist with a permanent and Secret Court Martial of Unlimited Powers, and Government by the unpublished Decree of the Central Executive of an Oath-bound Secret Society, and kindred mysteries, and above all, realize that the East, politically



speaking, can no more be divided up into water tight compartments.

Whoever negotiates on the field must remember that Persia, India, Afghanistan, and Egypt with of course Arabia will be watching with intent interest for any sign of weakness on his part; that the greater the humiliation of the Turk, the greater the probability of the creation of the Arab Caliphate based on Mecca, out of the reach of foreign intrigue, which should be our ideal in the re-settlement of the Near East.

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Code Cypher, or, clear? K.

# TELEGRAM.

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
24 SEP 1915  
No 48/4

From  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT

Ramleh

To FOREIGN OFFICE

Despatched (date and time) September 24, 1915.

No. 557.

MOST SECRET.

*In the absence of information to the contrary there appears to be a*  
~~In view of the~~ growing probability of the suspension of serious offensive military action in the Dardanelles during the winter. I feel bound to point out the danger to the political situation in Egypt and throughout the East of so prolonged a continuance of the present situation.

Propagandists are increasingly active and the absence of any offensive action on our part during the winter ~~months~~ will give them every assistance in their attempts to fan pan-islamic feeling.

Many Moslems have been reconciled to our action against the Khalifa of Islam by the conviction that Turkey had lost her place in the world as a military power. The longer Turkey successfully resists the Allied Forces the more doubtful do they become of the correctness of this view.

Further, a relaxation of pressure in the Dardanelles might well enable the Turks to reinforce the Syrian Army and renew the threat of the invasion of Egypt, a scheme which they have evidently by no means relinquished, and which if renewed may cause us considerable political anxiety.



Code Cypher,  
or clear? \_\_\_\_\_

# TELEGRAM.

From  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT  
Ramleh

To \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Despatched (date and time) \_\_\_\_\_

-2-

I therefore venture to suggest that, if <sup>offensive</sup> ~~the~~ activity in the Dardanelles is to be suspended, and failing a change in the Balkan situation or collapse of the Turkish resistance, offensive action should be undertaken elsewhere and a sudden and entirely unexpected descent upon Alexandretta appears the most suitable operation.

From Alexandretta a force could seize or threaten the only line of communication not only with Syria but with Bagdad and even the Caucasus, if the Black Sea route is closed. Road and branch railway to Alexandretta from the North are completely commanded by gunfire from the sea.

The Gulf of Alexandretta furnishes a safe harbour and communicationa are secured.

Successful operations in this district would completely isolate the enemy forces in Mesopotamia and Arabia and also in Syria, a country containing many elements hostile to Turkish rule and well disposed towards the Allies. Much desired support and encouragement would be given to those Armenians in the neighbourhood, who are already in revolt against the Turks. Above all British prestige which is undoubtedly suffering in the East, even in the eyes of our friends, would be restored. ( This of course will depend on extent to which British troops participate in the operations.)

The present Turkish garrison in or near neighbourhood is small and of inferior standard. Reinforcements would ~~be~~

reduce



Code Cypher,  
or clear? \_\_\_\_\_

## TELEGRAM.

From  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT  
Ramleh

To \_\_\_\_\_

Despatched (date and time) \_\_\_\_\_

-3-

*against allies*

reduce enemies! pressure in the Dardanelles or elsewhere and could move but slowly owing to lack of coal and railway facilities.

Everything would tend to indicate that a timely diversion of this nature would attain important political and military results with comparatively little effort or risk. Political results in Moslem World would be further promoted moreover if these particular operations could for the present be treated by all concerned as a purely military measure without prejudice to settlement of question of territorial possession.



File 100-1  
100-40/4

The Presidency,

Morileh.

Oct. 11th, 1915.

Paraphrase of wire, "most secret", telegram  
5.557 of September 24th, 1915, in Cypher "I".

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It appears increasingly probable, in the  
absence of information to the contrary, that serious  
offensive military action in the Gardanellas will  
be suspended during the winter. I consider it my  
duty to point out that so prolonged a continuance  
of the present situation must entail danger to the  
political situation in Egypt and throughout the  
East generally.

The activity of propagandists is increasing,  
and their attempts to fan pan-Islamic feeling will  
derive great assistance from the abstention on our  
part from any offensive action during the winter.

The conviction that Turkey no longer held  
the same position as a military power in the world  
had reconciled many Moslems to the action taken by us  
against the Khaliph of Islam. Their faith in the  
correctness of this view cannot but be shaken in  
proportion as Turkey continues successfully to resist  
the forces of the Allies.

Further, the Turks have never abandoned their  
ideas concerning the invasion of Egypt, and, if press-  
ure in the Gardanellas were relaxed, they might well

be



be able to reinforce their army in Syria and renew their threat of invasion, - an event which may cause considerable political anxiety.

If therefore the Balkan situation remains unchanged, and if there is to be no renewal of offensive activity in the Dardanelles on our part, or collapse on the part of the Turks, I venture to suggest that offensive action should be undertaken elsewhere, and the most suitable operation would, in that case, appear to be a sudden and entirely unexpected descent upon Alexandretta.

Communications would be secured, as a safe harbour is provided by the Gulf of Alexandretta. Gunfire from the sea would command the road and the branch line from the North to Alexandretta, and from that town it would be possible for a military force to hold or threaten the one line of communication, not only with Syria, but with Bagdad, and even, were the Black Sea route to be closed, with the Caucasus itself.

The results of successful military operations in this region would be most beneficial. Neighbouring Armenians, who are already in revolt against the Turks, would be supported and encouraged. In Syria, where many elements of the population are well-disposed towards the Allies and hostile to the Turks, in Arabia and in Mesopotamia the enemy forces would find themselves completely isolated. They would, above all, lead to a restoration of British prestige in the East, which, even where our friends are concerned, is certainly suffering.

Cwing



Owing to lack of coal and railway facilities, Turkish troops coming to reinforce the present garrison of the town and neighbouring country, which is small in numbers and inferior in quality, could only move slowly; and further such movements would tend to relieve pressure against the Allies in the Cardanelles.

A comparatively small effort, attended by little risk, would attain political and military results, which, according to all present indications, would be important and opportune.

The treatment of these operations by all concerned as a purely military measure, without prejudice to the solution of the problem of territorial possession, would enhance the importance of these political results in the Moslem world.



7.6.15  
HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
24 SEP 1915  
with  
No 48/4

The garrison of CILICIA and North SYRIA is composed of two divisions - the 41st and 42nd - with some Corps troops of the old MOSUL Division.

These Divisions are second or third class troops, armed with a few Mausers, Martini-Henry, Peabody and Remington rifles. These all need different ammunition, and they are probably ill-supplied with any sort. They have no transport and very few officers. Those that are there, are mostly gendarmerie officers and "dugups." The men are gendarmes, old men and young recruits. The gendarmes are excellent material, the others bad. The strength is about 400 men per battalion, which gives a total of 4000 per division. Their distribution is as shown on the map attached. One regiment is engaged in holding down MARASH and ZEITOUN - for while all Armenian women and children have been deported, the Armenian men of military age are either outlaws in the hills or making roads and railways and trenches in Workmen Battalions near their homes. The regiment encamped at BOZANTI is probably the largest concentrated force in CILICIA or SYRIA.

We have few details about guns. There are four batteries at BOZANTI, and some near TARSUS in the CILICIAN Plain. The battery which was near ALEXANDRETTA was removed in May. It may have been sent back since.

Reinforcements can be sent to CILICIA from --

(1) Syria - In Central and South SYRIA are about 8000 men of the 23rd Division, in garrison in SINAI and the LEBANON. They are the only complete division in the country, and very necessary where they are. Recruits are now (September) being raised to form new units ; these will be worse armed even than the 41st and 42nd Divisions, and will take some time to organise and officer.



The DAMASCUS - ALEPPO - <sup>RAJOU</sup>~~RAJOU~~ Railway can deliver after two days about 600 men per day to railhead (RAJOU). From RAJOU to ALEXANDRETTA is two days.

There are many 3-inch guns in DAMASCUS and near JERUSALEM.

(ii) Caucasus - When the weather breaks (October), the ERZEROUM - SIVAS - EREGLI Road will be closed. Troops from the CAUCASUS will then have to come via BITLIS and DIAR-BEKIR to ALEPPO. This is nearly two months' difficult march through rather barren country. The troops in the CAUCASUS are about 70,000 men, and can just contain the Russian attacks. (The 3rd Division of about 6000 very good troops seems to have left ERZEROUM early in September for SIVAS and CONSTANTINOPLE. It should arrive at EREGLI in a few days' time.)

(iii) ADALIA and SMYRNA - At ADALIA on 12th September were three battalions of reservists. These could march to ADANA in a fortnight, if they had their transport ready. At KONIA are some recruits; at SMYRNA are the 20th and (new) 35th Divisions. These are at full strength (i.e., about 9000 each) with some field artillery and a good deal of heavy artillery in position. The gendarmes and mustahfiz in patrol along the coast are not mobile, and need not be considered. The two SMYRNA Divisions can be railed to BOZANTI. There is plenty of rolling stock, bad fuel, and a heavy upgrade to AFIUM KARA HISSAR, which necessitates light trains. They have, however, usually been able to deliver 1000 men per day by this line, and this rate could perhaps be doubled under pressure. The journey SMYRNA - BOZANTI takes three days. From BOZANTI to TARSUS is a 14-hour march over a good, but steep road (extra gun-teams would be required).

(iv) Constantinople - Conditions from CONSTANTINOPLE are as from SMYRNA, except that there are no formed divisions or spare



3.


field artillery at CONSTANTINOPLE, and no troops that could be sent to reinforce CILICIA. Divisions could be withdrawn from GALLIPOLI, or from its strategic reserve in South THRACE, sent to CONSTANTINOPLE (five days) and thence to BOZANTI. From AFIUM KARA HISSAR, they use the same line as from SMYRNA, and so the rate of delivery at BOZANTI would not be likely to increase beyond 2000 a day for the two places combined.

\*\*\*\*\*



At Bozanti are  
2500 men and  
4 batteries of  
12 pounder guns

o Zeita  
In this  
some 15  
hold do  
Armenia





In this area are some 1500 men to hold down the Armenians.

[illegible]

Distribution of troops  
Sept. 19. 1915.  
TEL.



With  
48/4

ARMY HEAD QUARTERS,  
CAIRO.

I concur.

We have however nothing  
definite that inactivity at the  
Suddanella during the winter is  
contemplated.

J. G. Maxwell

Lieut. - General,  
Commanding the Force in Egypt.

23/9/15



Code Cypher,  
or clear? \_\_\_\_\_

# TELEGRAM.

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
24 SEP 1915  
No 43/5

From  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT

*and Kitchener*  
To ~~Secretary of State for~~  
~~War.~~

Despatched (date and time) September 24<sup>th</sup> 1915

LONDON.

PERSONAL and SECRET.

~~I have sent the following telegram to the Foreign  
Office:~~

~~BEGINS.~~

*Please see my tel  
No 557 of today to F.O.*

~~(Tel to F.O. No. of Sept. 1915)~~

~~ENDS.~~

As far as I can ascertain from information obtained by our Military Intelligence Branch here the garrison of Alexandretta and immediate neighbourhood, including Adana Plain cannot much exceed 5,000 men.

Garrison of Cilicia and North Syria consists of little more than 2 divisions of second class troops with but few guns. In central and Southern Syria are some 8,000 to 10,000 men distributed chiefly on Sinai frontier and in the Lebanon.

At Smyrna and Adalia Turkish forces are estimated at 20,000 to 25,000, but threat against Smyrna would probably retain a large proportion there.

Operations on our part at Alexandretta might perhaps afford opportunity of employing mounted troops.



HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT.

Date 19 Nov. 1915

No. 48/6

For this paper, see No. 70/125



Code, Cypher  
or clear? Cypher

## TELEGRAM.

48/7

From  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT  
Cairo

To Foreign Office

Despatched (date and time) Nov. 10th 1915

Secret.

Please see Lord Kitchener's telegram of to-day to Prime Minister.

I am completely in accord with the proposals arrived at. A withdrawal from Gallipoli without some vigorous and preceding counterstroke that would appeal to Mahomedan and Arab mind would, I feel certain, render our position in Egypt and East one of extreme difficulty and danger of far reaching effect. The proposed counterstroke near Alexandretta besides its military advantages in regard to Mesopotamia and Egypt will have a much desired effect on the Arab mind and should go far to provide that practical encouragement and inducement without which we may fail to bring the Arabs openly and actively on our side.

It will also rally the remnant of Armenians still holding out against Turks and increase the difficulties of an enemy against us. Somewhat similar remarks apply to Syrians who will be encouraged to harass Turkish communications and garrisons in South.



Code, Cypher  
or clear? Cypher

# TELEGRAM.

27

48/8

*From*  
**HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT**  
**Cairo**

*To* Foreign Office

*Despatched* (date and time) Nov. 13th 1915

Please see Lord Kitchener's telegram of to-day to Prime Minister. In addition to what has been said in above and preceding telegrams on political aspect of proposal to defend Egypt from Egypt I would like to point out that Germany would ~~abtain~~ obtain the desired moral effect of her menace to Egypt long before enemies' forces ~~approach~~ approached Egypt or shot is fired. I cannot emphasize too strongly the disastrous consequences to us of that moral effect not only in and around Egypt but throughout Eastern world.

On the other hand the moral and political effect in Egypt and East of our cutting enemies line of approach to Egypt and to Mesopotamia near Alexandretta would be so important and far-reaching as to justify the very greatest effort in our power.



Cypher  
or clear? \_\_\_\_\_

# TELEGRAM.

From  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT

Cairo

Despatched (date and time)

Nov. 28 8.30 a.m.

To Foreign Office  
& Lord Titchener.

No. 733

Secret.

Since my return to Egypt, the more I learn the feeling of the country and the anxiety now growing in all classes of Egyptians, the more convinced I am of the danger we will incur in restricting measures for meeting the Turco-German menace to the defence of Egypt itself.

If we allow enemy to advance beyond Cilicia we must be prepared for the following results:

(1) The alienation of Arabs to German side. In place of their assistance whether active or passive, we will meet active hostility. Turks will at once replace the present Sherif of Mecca by a man hostile to us and the whole position in Arabia will turn to our disadvantage for indefinite period.

*undisputed to*  
(2) Syria must propitiate the enemy and this will alienate a large element in Egypt.

(3) New life will be given to the Ottoman Government and Empire which must henceforth be largely German.

(4) The Bagdad Railway will remain in German hands.

(5) Serious loss of prestige throughout the East.

The effect of (1) coupled with Senoussi hostility puts against us all the important religious influences to which Egypt is subject and will create a situation here

which



(Code, Cypher  
or clear? \_\_\_\_\_)

## TELEGRAM.

From

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT

Cairo

To \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Despatched (date and time) \_\_\_\_\_

which may endanger the success of defensive operations. The combined effect of above results will prejudice our position throughout the East in a very dangerous and even vital manner.

Very similar remarks apply to French possessions and interests in the East.

Incidentally I may point out the relative advantages of giving or denying to the enemy (1) the trade and supplies of so large an area and (2) a long coast line suitable for submarine bases on our flank.

In view of the vital issues at stake I feel it my duty to urge most strongly that the alternative policy of meeting the Turco-German advance in Cilicia may be reconsidered.

Success will depend on the rapidity of decision and action, as time left is very short. In this respect also I fear that the time available will render preparation of strong defences which new conditions now demand for defence of Canal and Egypt an extremely difficult matter.

Repeated privately to Lord Kitchener.



S.S.KHYBER.

Red Sea

November 15th 1915

No 23.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you (by favour of Mr S. Waterfield Political Agent Haraoiti and Tonk, Rajputana, who is proceeding to London by this mail) under this cover a memorandum resuming the impressions I have received on various points as the result of my tour of the Eastern theatre.

I have dated it October 28th as that is the last date on which I was in touch with situation. I observations regarding would therefore point out that my despatch of reinforcements to Mesopotamia are based on the forces actually in Mesopotamia at the end of October, I heard at Karachi that a division less certain minor units was under orders but I have not presumed this in the memorandum.

I have made no observations with regard to Persia or the Persian side of the Gulf as that region did not come within the scope of my instructions, and my previous experience gives me no assistance with regard to those parts. However my personal opinion is that the occupation of Ahwaz is and has been a source of great weakness to us, but I ~~pres~~sume that the necessities of the Admiralty and the maintenance of our prestige in Persia, makes its retention essential, if it was merely a question of the interests of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, I should believe it would be best to abandon Ahwaz and compensate the Company for any damage that might ensue.

I do



I do not believe that even if the Bakhtiaries turned against us they could venture far afield, or cooperate with the Turks in Mesopotamia.

I would also point out that my assumption of 30,000 Turks in Syria in my note on the general military situation is based on information of about October 18th, from rumours I have since heard I imagine it is possible that this number has greatly increased, from which I infer that the release of Constantinople troops began with the entrance of Bulgaria into the field. However I still believe that the blocking of the Galician Gates is important to us, and that we cannot afford to let the Turks assume a constant offensive against Egypt and Mesopotamia and that we should take advantage of the snow barrier which cuts off Syria and Mesopotamia from Armenia and Anatolia to improve our position for the opening of the spring campaign.

I think that the Mesopotamian operations demonstrate very clearly the superiority of our troops over the Turks in manoeuvre and show that where open fighting and flanking movement is possible that we can beat them on a proportion of ten British led troops to fifteen Turks, however I must qualify this by pointing out that whatever the individual merit of the soldiers of the Mesopotamian force ( a large proportion of which is Indian) they are led by regular officers and perhaps more accustomed to manoeuvre than the newly raised divisions of British and Colonial troops which must be of better individual quality but perhaps collectively less mobile.

I should also like to reinforce what I have said on the general political situation, with regard to the necessity of cooperation and coodination, as regards our various theatres in the East, and also the  
*of urging*



of urging the importance of a clear understanding among the Entente Powers, which would enable available troops to be used at available points. If my tour has impressed me with one thing above another it is the advantage which the enemy gains by using every available local asset as a part of one harmonious scheme.

I should also take this opportunity of saying that no matter how dark things may look, we must never forget that Turkey is undoubtedly getting exhausted in men, and that the poverty and distress in the provincial capitals of Syria and Mesopotamia is always an advantage to us, the advent of Entente troops meaning trade and payment in lieu of requisition and extortion.

In conclusion I mention that I saw the Resident at Aden and Colonel Jacobs. I believe that the Commandant of the Turkish forces outside Aden might not be beyond the reach of financial influence; he is isolated and cannot attack us and doubtless dare not retire for fear of punishment, his Turkish soldiers are also deserting to us pretty freely about 29 Anatolian Turks and 3 Syrian having come in in the last three weeks.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

your obedient servant

Major General C.E.Callwell C.B. &c,&c,

Director of Military Operations

War Office, Whitehall, S.W.



CONSTANTINOPLE.

By Mr.V.B.Metta, Bar.- at - Law.

Constantinople was captured in the year 1453 of the Christian era by the mighty Sultan Mahmoud II when the Conqueror, on the day of his greatest and most memorable triumph, espied from a distance the palace of a hundred Caesars on entering proudly the city of Constantine which he captured that day, he, like a true Oriental felt the transitoriness of all human grandeur and glory, and then recited the following lines from Firdausi:-

Now the spider draws the curtain across Caesar's  
palace-hall

And the owl proclaims the watch beneath Afrasiyab's - vaulted dome.

Time makes the young old, kills the old, and brings new beings into existence. Some four centuries and a half ago, the young Empire of the descendants of Osman looked invincible, and made the whole of Europe and half of Asia tremble. But to-day what is the spectacle we see before us ? The Empire of the Ottomans in Europe is not only old and shorn of all its splendour, but it is perhaps coming to an end: The spider and the owl might soon find themselves in undisturbed possession of the palace of the Turkish Sultans in Stamboul, and a new palace for emperors of another race and creed might be built there. For, is not the breath of rumour passing through the world that if the Turk is defeated, Constantinople might be given to Russia - the ally of England in the present war ? That Russia wants it -  
we



we have not the slightest doubt. She wants it for strategic and commercial purposes we have been told by many newspapers. She wants it also for theatrical purposes - for the niece of the last of the Byzantine Emperors was married to a Czar, and so she wants to 'revive' the Roman Empire by ruling at Constantinople and thus impressing the world with the idea that her Emperors are the Caesars of present - day Europe:

Does Turkey deserve to be deprived of the city of Osman's dream ?

Is the whole Ottoman race to be blamed for Turkey's participation in the present war ?

Enver Pasha is not a representative of the whole Turkish race, but of a section of it <sup>perhaps of a very small section of it</sup>. In that case should England, the ruler of so many millions of Moslems in India and elsewhere allow Russia to take possession of Constantinople ?

There are many reasons why Constantinople should not become Russian. Firstly, because it will mean an insult to the Ottoman race - still a proud and imperial race. Secondly, it will be looked upon as an affront to Islam from Macedonia to India by the followers of the Religion of the Arabian Prophet. The Sultans of Turkey since the days of Selim (the father of Suleyman the magnificent) have been looked upon as the spiritual heads of Islam. They styled themselves for nearly four centuries as 'the commanders of the Faithful, The Vice-~~G~~egents of Allah upon earth, and the Guardians of the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina 'like the Ommeyade and the Abbaside Caliphs before them. It may be said that they have no right to call themselves 'Caliphs' as they do not belong

to



to the Arab race. It has been repeated ad nauseam ~~over and over~~ that the Arabs hate the Turks. We need not discuss these points here. In spite of every argument brought forward by the enemies of the Turks we know and believe that all the Islamic nations, even the Shiite of Persia included, will look upon the handing over of Constantinople to the Russians as an insult to their Faith. Finally, the act will be a humiliation for Asia. For the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople will mean the expulsion of Asia from Europe. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Asia had been degenerating whilst Europe had been becoming more powerful. If the Ottomans, the last of the great conquering races of Asia in Europe are expelled from Europe, not only the Moslem Persia and Afghanistan, but even the Buddhist, China and Japan will feel a shock to their continental pride - for, Asia is one, in spite of the races which inhabit it, and the different creeds which these races have adopted.

Then again will Greece, Bulgaria, Servia and other young states of Eastern Europe feel quite comfortable when the Ottoman is succeeded by the Russian at Constantinople ? The Russian may not keep quiet after he has turned the Santa Sofia into a Christian place of worship again. He, like the Osmanli in former times, might like to extend his Empire by force of arms. And if he does make up his mind to do so, which is not at all unlikely, is there much possibility of these petty states being able to defy him successfully ? And when the Russian 'civilization' spreads in these Eastern European States, <sup>then only with these states</sup> remember the many advantages which they once enjoyed under the rule of Osmanli.



The British people, in these exciting times, ~~must~~ should not forget that the Turks have looked upon them as their friends on many occasions before in history. England and France helped Turkey against Russia in the Crimean War. Most Englishmen sympathized with Turkey in her war against Russia in 1876. The English people were among the most sincere sympathizers of the movement which brought the 'young Turks' into prominence, and gave Turkey a constitution in 1908. To say that the Turks have proved failures is hardly fair. For, was Turkey given a chance to set her own house in order? What can any nation do in six years? More so, when even during those six years, she is not left in peace by outsiders; In 1911, that is, three years after her new regime, Turkey was forced to fight with Italy. In less than two years, she was again obliged to unsheathe her scimitar in the Balkan War. Where then has she had the opportunity of learning all that she needs to learn from First Class Powers? Could Japan, looked upon with respect by the whole world now, have been what she is today, if she had not had peace at home and abroad for at least a quarter of a century?

Historians like Freeman blinded by their prejudices and their invincible spirit of intolerance could see nothing good in the Ottoman Turks. But if Turkey disappears from Europe now, any sane Christian historian of the future will admit that the Turks were tolerant and most paternal rulers, and that any man of whatever race or creed could hope to rise to the highest position in their Empire. If they have been occasionally cruel to the subject races, ~~over whom they ruled~~ ~~was~~



~~REDACTED~~

was it always their fault, and not that of the races over whom they ruled or still rule ? Can any man with any knowledge of history aver that the Byzantine Emperors treated, say, the Armenians better than the Turks have done ? If anything, they treated them much worse, History will say in a clear, unfaltering voice. Above all, it must not be forgotten that had the Turks not captured Constantinople, no Greek scholars would have fled to Italy, and consequently there would have been no Renaissance:- And without the 'Renaissance' with its humanism and sensuousness there would have been no Modern Europe:

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The Hindustan Review.

July 1915.



# MEMORANDUM.

## SECTION 1.

### Military situation in Mesopotamia.

With regard to the situation in Mesopotamia there are two aspects the one political the other military.

From the military point of view I think the reinforcement of the army and the occupation of Bagdad are the two most important considerations. As matters now stand our army is weak in numbers and grows proportionately weaker as the enemy gradually recovers and reinforces at Bagdad, until he is strong enough to advance in force. It cannot be too strongly urged that a single defeat is sufficient to procure the destruction of our whole force, the population would undoubtedly rise en masse to plunder and harass our retirement if once they imagined we had turned our backs and I personally doubt whether we should be able to withdraw to Basra under such circumstances. Whether we decide to occupy Bagdad or not I am certain that the reinforcement of a full division is the least that the situation demands.

If we occupy Bagdad I think that the military situation is much easier than before and that we should feel the strain less for the following reasons. Once Bagdad is ours the enemy's facilities for concentration previous to attack are reduced. Thus so long as he holds Bagdad he can dribble his reinforcements simultaneously into Bagdad by the Euphrates, Tigris and by the Kifri road, he can concentrate at Bagdad and with



and with the help of steamers and current advance with a fairly large force.

If we hold Bagdad the enemy must either disperse his forces or concentrate at a point on one of the three lines and use that line only for supply with the result that the concentration of a large force will be more difficult for him to accomplish, and his subsequent advance easier to check.


If one makes a deduction of 2000 men for the maintenance of order in Bagdad, the number of troops required to meet the enemy, if he is based north of Bagdad, would be less than if we and he maintain our present respective positions.

I visited the dockyard at Aberdeen and saw the work in progress. One boat is ready and five more are in course of construction and should be able to take the water at intervals of 5 weeks from November 1st. There are many difficulties in the way of construction which appear irremediable - shortage of labour, difficulties of ground and climate conspire to make the work slow and difficult.

From what I saw of the operations up stream I should imagine that the gunboats should be very valuable, but I think that they should have a larger ammunition supply, 200 rounds for the 4 inch being quite inadequate when it is remembered how many shots are inevitably wasted in a country where targets are so doubtful and scattered as in Mesopotamia. The low trajectory of the 4 inch gun presents certain grave disadvantages when the gunboat has to be used in narrow waters and between high banks against enemies at medium ranges. I suggest that the inventions department might



might consider the problem of devising a suitable weapon, or mounting for an existing weapon, which could enable a shell to be landed accurately on a given point A on a plain about 1500 yards from a gun X fired from the deck of a vessel at point B in river C 30 yards from a bank D 15 feet in height above the water line - see diagram.





## Political situation in Mesopotamia.

The political situation in Mesopotamia is influenced to our detriment by the element of doubt which subsists in the minds of the people as to our actual intentions.

### NOTABLES

I have interviewed several notables of Basra namely the brother of the Nakib, several senior members of the Bashayan family, the shaykh of Zabeyr and the notable Shaykh Abu Talib, one and all obviously desire certainty and particularly that we should occupy Bagdad, the fear in their minds is that we should retire or let the Turks in again.

### PEOPLE.

The people whether nomads, cultivators or semi-nomads, Sunnis or Shias, are ready to accept our rule, but equally ready to turn against us in the event of any mishap. In many villages between Amara and Kurna demonstrations of sympathy are made by the Arab women when barge loads of Turkish prisoners pass by, villages it may be said whose inhabitants did not hesitate to plunder the Turks in their retreat. This should be a sufficient indication of what we ourselves might expect under similar circumstances.

The Shia shrines require especial consideration and treatment but it is not necessary to make a great parade of the matter. Again with the people as with the notables it is desirable that there should be some certainty as to their future.

Future



## FUTURE POLICY.

There is one point which I feel requires careful consideration and that is the connection between India and Mesopotamia. Indian and Arab civilisation and mentality are poles asunder and I am<sup>o</sup> of opinion that the introduction of Indian methods and Indian personnel should be merely temporary and should form no part of our future scheme.

Indian administration has grown up in the course of years and is based on traditions and social customs which have no counterpart in Irak. The introduction of Anglo-Indian and native Indian officials directed from India will mean inevitably that Irak will develop on Indian lines.

There can be no doubt that the native social standards of Egypt and Syria are far higher than those of India and owing to language and racial affinity it is from those regions that the civilisation of Irak would naturally be drawn. I feel it is my duty to say therefore that in my opinion it would be a great mishap, if at the outset any action of ours should do anything to impose artificially an alien and lower grade of civilisation upon a people who have a natural tendency to a higher and more progressive social state.

The Indian currency, Indian officials in the police, the posts, telegraphs and clerical bureaus, and the introduction of Indian law, Indian moneylenders and merchants will influence the whole country and set a permanent barrier of alien administration between ourselves and the people. Doubtless we shall sooner or later begin to employ natives of the country, but the first traditions will be moulded on Indian lines

with



with the result that we shall not be able at a later date to develop the spiritual and national mental resources of the urban and rural population to such advantage as we otherwise might.

### COLONIZATION

In saying this I am raising no objection to bona fide colonization by Indians, provided that the administrative personnel is purely British and Arab. There can be no objection to the allotment of lands to Indian cultivators in districts (where local inhabitants are insufficient and where there is no prospect of nomads being induced to settle) to develop the country provided that the colonists will not have the pull of the administration. They will under such circumstances either remain in separate communities or mingle with the people and so become a part of Irak. If however the Indian peoples permeate the administrative personnel and the mercantile and financial classes, the colonists will only be another element in the Indianization of the country. The Indianization of Irak is not only to be avoided for the above reasons but also because as time goes on and intercommunication grows easy between Irak and Syria, we shall be confronted with the tendency of the Arab to reassert himself once more and in that tendency we shall find the seeds of much political difficulty.

There is also one other point which should not be lost sight of. At present no matter what the feelings of Indian Moslems may be, nor what the extent of the ramifications of Indian seditionism, such influences find at present no equivalent among the Arabs of Irak  
either



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either urban or rural and since the best elements look to us for good and firm government, it would be a mistake to put them at the very outset within the scope of action of subtle and powerful forces which will begin spreading unrest and disaffection at the first available opportunity.

## SECTION 11.

### Indian Moslems and the War.

With regard to the attitude of Indian Moslems in the present war, it is very difficult to generalise owing to the diversities of sect race and avocation among Indian Mohammedans, however it is impossible to talk to Indian Mohammedans and British civil and military officers in the Indian service about Islam in India without getting certain impressions. In the first place basing ones acquaintance with Islam on experience in Turkey, Arabia, the Caucasus, Egypt, Tunis and Algeria, there is one factor in the situation with which one cannot fail to be impressed and that is the extreme ignorance of Indian Mohammedans of the whole of Islamic theological doctrine as taught in the schools and universities of the Al Azhar, Damascus, Constantinople and Kairawan. Indian Mohammedans as far as theological learning is concerned appears to be at a low ebb, at first this would appear to be a matter of slight importance, however on examination it will be found to be a considerable disadvantage to us as rulers and to open an avenue for our enemies.

In the first place it makes it easy for any charl-

latan

latan to



to impose on Indian Moslems the most absurd ideas, as for instance that the city of Bagdad is a holy city, that Adrianople is the site of Holy shrines, that Constantinople is the ancient capital of Islam, ideas which not the rudest Anatolian would entertain. Further it makes it very difficult to impress on Indian Moslems the absolutely hypocritical attitude of the Committee of Union and Progress the enmity of the Turkish clerical party for the Committee and the sordid motives which compelled the Turks to war.

From all I heard it was impossible not to feel that the bulk of Indian Moslems sympathised with the Turks more or less, the educated because they have been affected by Young Turkish propaganda, the uneducated because they have no learned theological body to keep them straight. For this state of affairs ( although it is presumptuous for me to say so) I think want of touch between the Indian Government and the real tendency of developement in the Near East is partly responsible. Thus the Red Crescent Society which is neither more or less than a revolutionary anti-theological pan-Islamic machine was suffered to work on the fertile soil of Indian educated Mohammedan seditionism and Indian uneducated Mohammedan ignorance for sometime before the war. On the score of avoiding wounding religious susceptibilities we have never taken the field in the British Indian press against the Committee of Union and Progress, and a certain remoteness from the scene has produced an atmosphere of acquiescence and tolerance for things dangerous to our peace. As an example I enclose a small pamphlet I bought on a bookstall and a cutting from a British Indian newspaper, each containing the seeds of immense mischief,

while



while it may be incidentally mentioned that one may meet at Simla or Delhi young students wearing a crescent and star badge on a Turkish military cap, in itself a deliberate challenge to our authority.

Our attitude is one of fear, of apology, of nervous consideration, while our enemies are working against us with weapons which if the truth were known in India would fall from their grasp. A very strong factor to my mind in the maintenance of this situation is the fact that British Indian officials, particularly military officers have not at their disposal the knowledge of the Turkish politics and the real actions and composition of the Committee, to enable them to act with confidence and to speak with certainty in conversation. I have met several young officers who were devoted to and interested in their men, and who with true English good nature said that it was only natural that being Moslems their men should feel in a difficult position, and who were astonished when I explained the real nature of the Committee of Union and Progress. It may be objected that no matter what Englishman may say in the course of conversation with Indians, it will have no effect as Indians will not believe them, personally I agree that this will be so at first, but as the truth is on our side sooner or later we shall produce a better atmosphere and at least put hostile influences on the defensive.

British civil and military officials are trained in India to have a great regard for religious susceptibilities of natives, they roughly conceive that the young Turks are the leaders of



an united people, and that Turkey is a real Islamis power as it was in the days of Abdul Hamid, consequently they are handicapped by the sense that in Indian Moslem feeling we are confronting a popular feeling based on a logical foundation, did they realise that they are merely <sup>facing</sup> the unwitting dupes of cosmopolitan knaves of the Committee of Union and Progress who believe neither in Allah or the Koran, they would be heartened and stiffened by a sense of right which is at present lacking.

British, especially Englishmen, are notoriously bad actors and nothing puts an Englishman in a worse position, than the feeling that there is something to be said for the <sup>other</sup> side. I feel that it is very important that steps should be taken to make it quite clear to British military and civil officials that from the Mohammendan point of view there is nothing to be said for the Young Turks. A brief history of the young Turkish movement circulated as a confidential paper to all British officers either civil or military in contact with Moslems would at least rectify this deleterious influence.

The above was written before I had an opportunity of reading the following memorandum prepared by the Political and Foreign Department, Simla, for my information, its date is October the 28th - however I do not feel that it contains any information contrary to the opinion I have expressed. Section IV is to my mind exceedingly interesting and indicates a new danger. The attitude of the "intellectuals" towards education, and the so-called revolt against "old school" teaching, is identical with the attitude of the young Turks towards the Ulema, save with this difference, that the <sup>Turkish</sup> Ulema are



are a learned and cultivated body of well trained clergy with considerable prestige, whereas the Indian old school Moslems are disorganised, atrophied, and feeble so far as learning is concerned.

The "Intellectuals" of India are evidently trying the same game as the Committee of Union and Progress, that is to engross all political power in the hands of a clique of journalists, pleaders, and functionaries, to oust the clerical element, but to retain its power to excite an ignorant mob to massacre or rebellion when necessary. I feel that this is a time when those responsible for our policy should face facts, and not allow themselves to be blinded by catchwords - An old school Moslem may be fanatical, but his fanaticism has a logical basis, and may be tempered or assuaged, or even reasoned with, there is in his mind an element of righteousness which can be appealed to, and an element of love of justice which makes him sooner or later amenable. An "Intellectual" with an imitation European training, with envy of the European surging in his heart, who is an agnostic and has no belief whatever in religion but sees in Islam a political engine whereby immense masses of men can be moved to riot and disorder is far more dangerous.

The fanatic is sincere and is moved by a direct impulse, the intellectual is insincere and moved by policy. It is absolutely vain to expect less brutality from a Mahomedan "intellectual" revolutionary than from a Ghazi. - The latest Armenian massacres prove this, as every action of the committee of Union and Progress proves this.

Furthermore



Furthermore I would submit that our greatest danger lies in British statesmen and officials confusing the ideals of "Intellectuals" with those of European revolutionaries and liberals, and therefore according them a certain respect. The Moslem "Intellectual" uses the clothes of Europe, and he has lost ~~his~~ belief in his creed, but the hatred of Christendom and lust for the dominion of Islam as a supreme political power remains, and he knows how to use the weapon of fanaticism among a population whose percentage of literates is as low as shown in the Table on page 4.

If one may suggest a policy in words, I feel that our education policy in regard to Islam should be among the upper class, to foster the study of the Moslem classic authors, historians, logicians, and theologians, and to combine with modern education the study of the history of the greater Moslem Dynasties, and the development of Mohhamedan Sheri Law. While among the poorer endeavour to impart with elementary education a real understanding of the outlines of Islamic history.

This policy would do much to introduce a real patriotic religious feeling among the poor and do something to infuse the upper classes with a comprehension of the true greatness of their forefathers. By such a policy we should be at the root of the difficulty, by disentangling the confusion of thought at present arising in the minds of the upper classes through the collision of the mass of ill assimilated European education on the mass of Asiatic tendency, tradition, and prejudice. Similarly among the masses we should be preparing the way for the



the raising of a reasonable Moslem people from the ignorance and superstition of to-day. It might even be hoped that between the two would be produced a frugal and learned clergy capable of giving the people such good as the Mohammedan religion can offer.



## SECTION 111.

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### GENERAL SITUATION.

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#### POLITICAL.

The general political situation arising out of the war between the Entente powers and the Ottoman Empire is really evolved out of the efforts of Germany and Turkey to mobilise Islam against Great Britain and Russia. It is necessary briefly to recapitulate in brief the methods our enemies pursue.

(1) Fomentation of Indian Moslem discontent and fanaticism.

(2) In Persia the working up of tribesmen and nationalists to rebellion along the coast, private murder in the provincial capitals, pressure on the government at the capital.

(3) In Egypt the working of sympathy with the ex-Khedive and nationalist revolutionarism.

(4) In Arabia:

A. Yemen alliance with the Imam of Sana

B. Nejd subventioning of Ibn Reshid.

C. In the Kerbella area playing on Shia fanaticism.

D. In Muscat the fomentation of the rebellion against the Sultan by means of native agents from East Africa.

This policy is worked by highly efficient agents on a well co-ordinated plan as may be judged from results.

As against this we have certain strong positive factors



factors and influences in our favour which may be enumerated as follows:

- (1) Discontent with committee rule in Turkey itself.
- (2) The dislike of the clergy for the young Turks.
- (3) Arab dislike of Turks.
- (4) Disunion between Sunnis and Shias.

To take full advantage of these influences it is necessary that we should adopt a definite policy and pursue it with a co-ordinated plan as do our enemies. Our task is the more difficult inasmuch as our successes in the field are negative and defensive and our policy must be constructive rather than destructive as is our enemies, however there is nothing to prevent us taking advantage of our valuable assets.

To achieve our purpose it is first necessary to have a clear understanding with our allies, particularly France and Russia, and to obtain their acquiescence in our policy and when possible their co-operation. The main point at present is to defeat the enemy and to reduce his power so that his voice at least will not be heard in the settling of war and middle Eastern problems after the war is over.

To defeat the enemy the destruction of the Ottoman Empire would be a decisive step, it would paralyse once and for all the enemies activities in Persia, Afghanistan, and India, and thus deprive him of a source of diversions and menaces with which he amuses and distracts not only us but Russia. Further the Ottoman Empire in Asia still remains the enemies most vulnerable position.

From a political point of view our policy  
might



might well run on the following lines.

Line 1. To back the Arabic speaking peoples against the Turkish Government on one consistent and logical plan.

Line 2. (a) To support the anti-committee Turkish parties and (b) the influence of the Sunni Mohammedan clergy, wherever it is antagonistic to the Committee.

Line 3. To propagandise Islam in a definite and offensive manner, not making apology for our acts but attacking the enemy on the score of injustice crime, unorthodoxy, and hypocrisy, in our own press, in the native press, and by means of leaflets.

#### Line 1.

To achieve the first of these objects it is necessary to obtain the sanction of France and Italy to an agreement as to the future treatment of the Arab peoples in the present Ottoman Empire, and to obtain from France guarantees compatible with Arab national aspirations,

To settle with France Italy and Russia the status of Jerusalem. Once this is done we can, the moment we take action, make proclamation of our intentions, and solidify the Arabs of Irak, Palestine, Syria, and Northern Mesopotamia against the Turks. At present the Arabs are paralysed by the fear that the Turks will return in any event owing to dissensions among the entente powers; if we can make<sup>so</sup>/clear a statement that dependant on our success the Arabic speaking people will be under French protection in one area, and English protection in another



another, with the recognition of Arab nationality and of Arab participation in the official administration in both areas, we shall have a clear situation and a definite backing to our success; our primal success must however be derived from military action which I deal with under the military situation.

I suggest that our ultimate goal should be:  
In Arabia.

- (1) Recognition of the independance of Hejaz under the Sherif.
- (2) The conclusion of peace between Idris and Imam Yahyah, and the fixing of their territories, compensating Yahyah in the Aden hinterland and Hadhramaut if necessary, in return for the expulsion of the Turks from Yemen.
- (3) Declaration of an external protectorate over the Arabian littoral from Koweyt to Hodeidah.
- (4) Declaration of a British internal and external protectorate over an area in Southern Syria and Mesopotamia to be agreed upon with France and Russia.

Declaration of a French internal and external protectorate in an area north of the British area.

- (5) An agreement between the entente powers which would ensure political and military co-operation without prejudice to the future status of certain territories thus permitting the use of British, French, Italian or Russian troops in any area.
- (6) If possible to stimulate an Arab demand for the Caliphate of the Sherif.



A. The second of these lines of policy requires careful management as we are here making use of Turks against Turks, and consequently run the risk of compromising our Arab<sup>ian</sup> nationalist asset, since the Arabs are almost as hostile to the Turkish liberals as they are to the young Turks themselves. However this is to be avoided by stimulating amongst the liberals (1) the hope of revenge, and (11) by working on the idea that only to them will we accord any Ottoman independence at all, at the conclusion of the war. Thus if we can make it clear to Turkish liberals that so long as the committee holds office we will give no peace or quarter to the Ottoman Empire, but that if they work a successful revolution we shall be prepared to negotiate with them at once as regards the independence of such regions where Ottoman Turks are in the majority. It is also possible, though I hesitate to suggest it, that the Russian Government might be prepared to make concessions to the Turkish liberals with regard to the status of Constantinople. This however ~~should~~ be a matter which should lie between Russia and the liberals alone.

(B). As regards the second portion of this line it consists in being prepared with a policy whereby the Ottoman Ulema shall continue to enjoy their present properties and privileges in all the ancient provinces of the Ottoman Empire no matter under whose jurisdiction or protection it may fall. And by the guaranteeing of all shrines and Wakfs in Constantinople and the provinces, with the exception  
of



of Santa Sofia, for which compensation shall be allowed. This in itself is a great asset against the Committee, as the Ulema know full well that their revenues will be lost if the Committee prosecute the war to a successful issue.

To encourage Arab Ulema to get Turkish Ulema to fall in with the idea of a Sherifian Caliphate would be profitable if carefully handled.

LINE 3.

This is merely a matter of co-ordination and organisation. It requires an expert political and literary staff in touch with all quarters of the Islamic area, and with local agencies at various centres.

The system should be for the central staff to give the general line to the local agencies, and for the local agencies to pursue that line in the manner most suitable.

The general purpose is to produce atmosphere favourable to us among Moslems generally, and to combat the propaganda direct and indirect of our enemies. As a general rule it will be found that educated conservatism and orthodoxy is on our side and modernism and ignorant fanaticism is against us for reasons explained in my despatch No.17, and already dealt with under section 2 of this memo.

(A) To mobilise our full force we must make<sup>the</sup> a situation clear to all British officers engaged in the Islamic area, we must as far as possible work our own press both at home and in India and Egypt, by supplying paragraphs, articles and private memoranda, and by checking the publication of unsatisfactory or dangerous matter. It may be mentioned here that

The



the attuning and education of our own people is quite as important as the influencing of our Mohammedan subjects.

(B) We should be ready to squash without hesitation any article, paragraph or observation in any native newspaper which was of a philo-committee nature, particularly the kind of contribution which is subtle and indirect, as in the enclosed article in the Hindustan Review.

(C) We should promote the spread of rumours, prophecies, saws, rhymes, cry<sup>pt</sup>ograms, and anagrams favourable to our side, by means of native agents, and especially by letting them drop on sincere ground to run their<sup>own</sup>/course.

(D) We should co-ordinate most carefully our own issue of pamphlets and in them always be aggressive, demonstrative, and unapologetic; all our apologies and explanations should be by inference rather than direct. For this work we require an erudite Moslem staff as well as an English observation and control.

#### MILITARY SITUATION.

(1) The whole military situation has been dominated by the Dardanelles operations. Should these operations be regarded as having been unfruitful hitherto, the following considerations should be remembered.

Since March about 500,000 Turkish troops and necessary reinforcements have been immobilised and subject to heavy loss. Had the Dardanelles operations not been in progress, it may be assumed that the Turks would have had approximately 130,000 ~~approximately 130,000~~ men in Syria, 80,000 at Baghdad, and 100,000 additional troops in the Caucasus.

Such



Such dispositions would have immobilised a larger garrison in Egypt, have forbidden any advance in Mesopotamia, and menaced the Caucasus and the Russian sphere in Persia.

The influence on the Moslem world of a constant Ottoman offensive would have given the German and committee of Union and Progress agents a far wider scope in the Caucasus, Persia, the Persian Gulf, Egypt, India, and Arabia. As it is these gentry have had some success but they have been heavily handicapped by lack of moral support, the minor successes they have obtained are indications of what their power would have been had the Ottoman forces not been concentrated around the Marmora.

(2) The entrance of Bulgaria into the field indicates the possible release of Ottoman forces from the Constantinople area and their despatch elsewhere<sup>-ere</sup>~~elsewhere~~, consideration suggests that it would be profitable to consider certain geographical and climatic factors affecting the movement of large bodies of troops in the Ottoman Empire in Asia. The appended map shows by a hatched line the limit of permanent winter snow enduring from about the 10th of Nov. to the 15th of March, which makes mobile operations practically impossible in Armenia and Anatolia during that period.

From the same map it will also be seen that there are practically only 3 lines along which an army can advance from Anatolia or Armenia into SYRIA, MESOPOTAMIA, or Southern KURDISTAN.

To



To wit via the Cilician Gates, via the Sivas-Kharput road, or via Ezerum and ~~Bitlis~~ Bitlis. The advance of an army with a fighting head of two divisions along the latter two may be ruled out until the middle of March. Thus while it is conceivable that an existing army of 50,000 men in North Mesopotamia could be reinforced along these roads during the winter yet it would be impossible for an army to come down them as an independant fighting force.

As regards the Cilician Gates road, if the Southern end be blocked at the opening of the defiles during the winter a force of 40,000 men could deny the enemy access to Syria or Mesopotamia along this road for the duration of the war provided that the enemy was prevented from raising an army in Syria.

If the enemy dispositions are as follows:

- 30,000 men in Syria.
- 20,000 men at Baghdad
- 10,000 men in North Mesopotamia
- 100,000 men on the Russian frontier
- 500,000 men at Constantinople.

and presuming that the participation of Bulgaria, eventually releases 400,000 men from Constantinople, the enemy will have certain courses open to him.

He has three fronts to consider & he may therefore decide either to

(1) Concentrate during the winter at Ezerum for a late Spring or early summer effort of a decisive nature against the Caucasus and let matters rest in Syria and Mesopotamia.

(2) To



(2) To remain on the defensive in Armenia and devote his attention to winning back Mesopotamia and to attacking Egypt from Syria.

(3) To assuming the offensive in all three regions.

Whichever of these courses the enemy adopts, he has certain factors which militate in his disfavour.

(1) The difficulty of approaching Egypt after he has passed rail head.

(2) The length of communication between Baghdad and RAS-ul-AIN where his railway ceases to be of real use to him.

(3) The separation of his forces in Armenia from those in Syria and Mesopotamia.

(4) The badness of the Eastward roads from the Angora rail head to the Caucasus.

I think it is probable that (1) if he adopts course one he will send 300,000 men Armenia, ~~in~~ 50,000 to Syria, and 50,000 to Mesopotamia. (2) If he adopts course two he will send 100,000 men to Armenia, 200,000 to Syria, and ~~100~~ 100,000 to Mesopotamia. (3) If he adopts course three he will send 150,000 men to Armenia, 150,000 to Syria, and 100,000 to Mesopotamia.

The movement and supply of such large forces will naturally be slow, and 10% losses from desertion and sickness per quarter may be anticipated. In any event it would appear advisable if it were possible for the allies to spare the men, to block the exit from the Cilician gates. If this be accomplished before the enemy's troops are released the enemy will have relatively



relatively small forces at his disposal in Syria and Mesopotamia and no means of greatly increasing their numbers before the month of April.

As the Syrian and Mesopotamia winter is comparatively mild this should give the allies an opportunity of occupying practically the whole of the Arab speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and of cutting off the enemy from his indirect activities in Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia.

If by the 16th of March the allies could dispose of their forces as shown on Map 2 in the following strengths with lines of communication as marked

ADANA.	50,000
AIN TAB.	20,000
DIARBEEKIR.	50,000
ALEPPO.	10,000
ACRE-JERUSALEM.	14,000
BAGHDAD.	20,000
	<hr/> 164,000
Line of Communications	30,000
	<hr/> 194,000
	<hr/>
	<hr/>

The Turkish forces would be unable to reconquer their Arabian Empire owing to the difficulty of concentrating and deploying at the decisive points.

(1) Communication with the Russian army could be established through the Bitlis pass.

(2) The two small Turkish armies presumably at Damascus and Mosul could be dealt with at leisure.

(3) A provisional native government could be established in Syria and trade re-opened with the whole of the Syrian ports.

(4) Enemy



(4) Enemy activities in Persia, Afghanistan, and Arabia would naturally come to an end.

(5) The Aleppo-Deir-Zor-Baghdad trade route could be reopened.

(6) Direct negotiations for the recognition of the independence of the Sherif could be begun.

(7) The allies could in event of the European situation proving favourable, envisage a peace conference with the certainty that the Ottoman Empire would be reduced to Anatolia although Constantinople might still remain in Ottoman hands.

N.B. A modification of the above scheme would consist in eliminating the force destined for Diarbekir and holding the line Marash - Birejik - Meskene. Under these circumstances a large Turkish army might be built up at Diarbekir but its mobility would be much impeded and its ammunition supply feeble.

The main objection to this course is that the Turks would have a better position at a peace conference, since the attack of a large Turkish army acting on the defensive with flanks secure would be a costly undertaking.

The initial steps in either case would possibly be as follows:

1st Step. Land Forces A.B.C.D. in the Gulf of Alexandretta.

2nd Step. Secure the exit of the Cilician Gates.

3rd Step. Land at Haifa Force E. and begin operations in North Syria.

Notes on above.

(1) The population South of Aintab may be regarded



as a negligible quantity.

(2) In North Mesopotamia the nomads and chieftains both Kurd and Arab may be dealt with and subventioned the promise to them of the plunder of Diarbekir in retaliation for the Armenian massacres would probably bring them in on our side provided we are successful.

(3) Hypothetically the forces for such an expedition should be provided with ample horse transport though the railways could be got into working ~~within~~ three months, with the exception of the Euphrates bridge at Jerablus which must be assumed to be destroyed.

(4) A strong proportion of cavalry is required with forces <sup>D</sup> E&F.

#### FINAL OBSERVATIONS.

In conclusion it is perhaps worth considering ■ certain psychological idiosyncracies of Ottoman armies, which both present and past operations appear to demonstrate as a permanent factor in war-fare in which they are engaged. For some reason Ottoman armies appear to be formidable in a direct offensive or in a direct defensive, but on the other hand seem to be feeble in manoeuvre, or in face of mobile troops.

(1) Thus Ottoman troops will hold an entrenched position the flanks of which are secure in the face of heavy losses.

(2) Will resist when surrounded beyond expectation.

(3) Will deliver unexpectedly strong attacks over open country on a known objective if the enemy assumes a passive defensive.

(4) Are



- (4) Are quickly disorganised by an unexpected development in the open, and fail to accomodate to a new situation.
- (5) Frequently fail in operations necessitating combined manoeuvres.
- (6) Are bad at partizan or mountain warfare.

As examples of the first may be cited

Omar Pashas operations on the Danube 1852.

The battle of the Shipka pass 1877.

The holding of the Chatalja lines 1912.

The Dardanelles operations 1915.

As examples of the second

Kars 1852 - 3

Kars - Ezerum - Plevna 1877 - 8

Adrianople 1912.

As examples of the third

The campaign in Thessaly 1897

The Italian campaign in Tripoli 1911.

The battle of Shaiba 1915.

The attack on the Suez Canal 1914.

As examples of the fourth

The battle of Nezib 1840 (?)

The battle of Kirk Killise 1912.

The battles of Nasirie, Amara, and Kut 1915.

As examples of the fifth

Mukhtar's campaign in the Caucasus 1877.

The Macedonian campaign against the Greeks and Serbs 1912.

Envers campaign in the Caucasus 1914.

As examples of the sixth

The various operations of the Turks in the areas Macedonia, Zeitun, Dersim, Hauran, and Yemen at various dates since 1894.

These




These characteristics which, as will be seen, appear to survive German training, would suggest that we should (a) endeavour to fight the Turks in the open on the offensive by mobile <sup>manoeuvre</sup> ~~attack~~, (b) where we assume a pure defensive, ~~endeavour~~ endeavour to confine them to broken or mountainous country, and ~~avoid~~ (c) avoid attacking them in secure positions.

The key to these characteristics lies probably in the following. Turkish commanders~~have~~, owing to tradition and jealousy, little confidence in one another or their subordinates, consequently they hesitate to entrust anyone with an independent action such as an outflanking march combined with a holding attack.

The backbone of the Turkish army is composed of Anatolians who are extremely brave but very slow thinkers and movers, a preconceived notion of the enemies position gets in their heads and an unexpected development puts them in a panic. Turkish armies once away from railhead are weak in transport organisation and supplies are liable to be lost and plundered. These factors are beyond the control of German organisation.





Red  
Road

Black  
railways

W = Southern  
limit of snow



48/10  
S.S.KHYBER.

Red Sea

November 15th 1915

No 23.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward to you (by favours of Mr S. Waterfield Political Agent Harauti and Tonk, Rajputana, who is proceeding to London by this mail) under this cover a memorandum resuming the impressions I have received on various points as the result of my tour of the Eastern theatre.

I have dated it October 28th as that is the last date on which I was in touch with situation. I would therefore point out that my observations regarding ~~despatch~~ of reinforcements to Mesopotamia are based on the forces actually in Mesopotamia at the end of October. I heard at Karachi that a division less certain minor units was under orders but I have not presumed this in the memorandum.

I have made no observations with regard to Persia or the Persian side of the Gulf as that region did not come within the scope of my instructions, and my previous experience gives me no assistance with regard to those parts. However my personal opinion is that the occupation of Ahwas is and has been a source of great weakness to us, but I <sup>do</sup> ~~presume~~ that the necessities of the Admiralty and the maintenance of our prestige in Persia, makes its retention essential, if it was merely a question of the interests of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, I should believe it would be best to abandon Ahwas and compensate the Company for any damage that might ensue.

Y do



I do not believe that even if the Bakhtiaries turned against us they could venture far afield, or cooperate with the Turks in Mesopotamia.

I would also point out that my assumption of 30,000 Turks in Syria in my note on the general military situation is based on information of about October 18th, from rumours I have since heard I imagine it is possible that this number has greatly increased, from which I infer that the release of Constantinople troops began with the entrance of Bulgaria into the field. However I still believe that the blocking of the Cilician Gates is important to us, and that we cannot afford to let the Turks assume a constant offensive against Egypt and Mesopotamia and that we should take advantage of the snow barrier which cuts off Syria and Mesopotamia from Armenia and Anatolia to improve our position for the opening of the spring campaign.

I think that the Mesopotamian operations demonstrate very clearly the superiority of our troops over the Turks in manoeuvre and show that where open fighting and flanking movement is possible that we can beat them on a proportion of ten British led troops to fifteen Turks, however I must qualify this by pointing out that whatever the individual merit of the soldiers of the Mesopotamian force ( a large proportion of which is Indian) they are led by regular officers and perhaps more accustomed to manoeuvre than the newly raised divisions of British and Colonial troops which must be of better individual quality but perhaps collectively less mobile.

I should also like to reinforce what I have said on the general political situation, with regard to the necessity of cooperation and coodination, as regards our various theatres in the East, and also the *of urging*



of urging the importance of a clear understanding among the Entente Powers, which would enable available troops to be used at available points. If my tour has impressed me with one thing above another it is the advantage which the enemy gains by using every available local asset as a part of one harmonious scheme.

I should also take this opportunity of saying that no matter how dark things may look, we must never forget that Turkey is undoubtedly getting exhausted in men, and that the poverty and distress in the provincial capitals of Syria and Mesopotamia is always an advantage to us, the advent of Entente troops meaning trade and payment in lieu of requisition and extortion.

In conclusion I mention that I saw the Resident at Aden and Colonel Jacobs. I believe that the Commandant of the Turkish forces outside Aden might not be beyond the reach of financial influence; he is isolated and cannot attack us and doubtless dare not retire for fear of punishment, his Turkish soldiers are also deserting to us pretty freely about 29 Anatolian Turks and 3 Syrian having come in in the last three weeks.

I have the honour to be

Sir,

your obedient servant

Major General C.E.Callwell C.B. &c,&c,

Director of Military Operations

War Office, Whitehall, S.W.



CONSTANTINOPLE.

By Mr.V.B.Metta, Bar.- at - Law.

Constantinople was captured in the year 1453 of the Christian era by the mighty Sultan Mahmoud II when the Conqueror, on the day of his greatest and most memorable triumph, espied from a distance the palace of a hundred Caesars on entering proudly the city of Constantine which he captured that day, he, like a true Oriental felt the transitoriness of all human grandeur and glory, and then recited the following lines from Firdausi:-

Now the spider draws the curtain across Caesar's  
palace-hall

And the owl proclaims the watch beneath Afrasiyab's - vaulted dome.

Time makes the young old, kills the old, and brings new beings into existence. Some four centuries and a half ago, the young Empire of the descendants of Osman looked invincible, and made the whole of Europe and half of Asia tremble. But to-day what is the spectacle we see before us? The Empire of the Ottomans in Europe is not only old and shorn of all its splendour, but it is perhaps coming to an end: The spider and the owl might soon find themselves in undisturbed possession of the palace of the Turkish Sultans in Stamboul, and a new palace for emperors of another race and creed might be built there. For, is not the breath of rumour passing through the world that if the Turk is defeated, Constantinople might be given to Russia - the ally of England in the present war? That Russia wants it -



we have not the slightest doubt. She wants it for strategic and commercial purposes we have been told by many newspapers. She wants it also for theatrical purposes → for the niece of the last of the Byzantine Emperors was married to a Czar, and so she wants to 'revive' the Roman Empire by ruling at Constantinople and thus impressing the world with the idea that her Emperors are the Caesars of present - day Europe:

Does Turkey deserve to be deprived of the city of Osman's dream ?

Is the whole Ottoman race to be blamed for Turkey's participation in the present war ?

Enver Pasha is not a representative of the whole Turkish race, but of a section of it. <sup>perhaps of a very small section of it</sup> In that case should England, the ruler of so many millions of Moslems in India and elsewhere allow Russia to take possession of Constantinople ?

There are many reasons why Constantinople should not become Russian. Firstly, because it will mean an insult to the Ottoman race - still a proud and imperial race. Secondly, it will be looked upon as an affront to Islam from Macedonia to India by the followers of the Religion of the Arabian Prophet. The Sultans of Turkey since the days of Selim (the father of Suleyman the magnificent) have been looked upon as the spiritual heads of Islam. They styled themselves for nearly four centuries as 'the commanders of the Faithful, The Vice-~~Leg~~ents of Allah upon earth, and the Guardians of the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina 'like the Omeiyade and the Abbaside Caliphs before them. It may be said that they have no right to call themselves 'Caliphs' as they do not belong



to the Arab race. It has been repeated ad nauseam ~~that~~ that the Arabs hate the Turks. We need not discuss these points here. In spite of every argument brought forward by the enemies of the Turks we know and believe that all the Islamic nations, even the Shiite of Persia included, will look upon the handing over of Constantinople to the Russians as an insult to their Faith. Finally, the act will be a humiliation for Asia. For the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople will mean the expulsion of Asia from Europe. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Asia had been degenerating whilst Europe had been becoming more powerful. If the Ottomans, the last of the great conquering races of Asia in Europe are expelled from Europe, not only the Moslem Persia and Afghanistan, but even the Buddhist, China and Japan will feel a shock to their continental pride - for, Asia is one, in spite of the <sup>different</sup> races which inhabit it, and the different creeds which these races have adopted.

Then again will Greece, Bulgaria, Servia and other young states of Eastern Europe feel quite comfortable when the Ottoman is succeeded by the Russian at Constantinople? The Russian may not ~~keep~~ keep quiet after he has turned the Santa Sofia into a Christian place of worship again. He, like the Osmanli in former times, might like to extend his Empire by force of arms. And if he does make up his mind to do so, which is not at all unlikely, is there much possibility of these petty states being able to defy him successfully? And when the Russian 'civilization' spreads in these Eastern European States, <sup>then only will these states</sup> remember the many advantages which they once enjoyed under the rule of Osmanli.



The British people, in these exciting times, should not forget that the Turks have looked upon them as their friends on many occasions before in history. England and France helped Turkey against Russia in the Crimean War. Most Englishmen sympathized with Turkey in her war against Russia in 1876. The English people were among the most sincere sympathizers of the movement which brought the 'young Turks' into prominence, and gave Turkey a constitution in 1908. To say that the Turks have proved failures is hardly fair. For, was Turkey given a chance to set her own house in order? What can any nation do in six years? More so, when even during those six years, she is not left in peace by outsiders; In 1911, that is, three years after her new regime, Turkey was forced to fight with Italy. In less than two years, she was again obliged to unsheathe her scimitar in the Balkan War. Where then has she had the opportunity of learning all that she needs to learn from First Class Powers? Could Japan, looked upon with respect by the whole world now, have been what she is today, if she had not had peace at home and abroad for at least a quarter of a century?

Historians like Freeman blinded by their prejudices and their invincible spirit of intolerance could see nothing good in the Ottoman Turks. But if Turkey disappears from Europe now, any sane Christian historian of the future will admit that the Turks were tolerant and most paternal rulers, and that any man of whatever race or creed could hope to rise to the highest position in their Empire. If they have been occasionally cruel to the subject races, ~~over whom they~~ <sup>was</sup>



~~REDACTED~~

was it always their fault, and not that of the races over whom they ruled or still rule ? Can any man with any knowledge of history aver that the Byzantine Emperors treated, say, the Armenians better than the Turks have done ? If anything, they treated them much worse. History will say in a clear, unfaltering voice. Above all, it must not be forgotten that had the Turks not captured Constantinople, no Greek scholars would have fled to Italy, and consequently there would have been no Renaissance:- And without the 'Renaissance' with its humanism and sensuousness there would have been no Modern Europe:

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The Hindustan Review.

July 1915.



Code, Cypher  
or clear? 0

# TELEGRAM.

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
3 DEC 1915  
No 4

From  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT  
Cairo

To F.O.

Despatched (date and time) Dec. 2nd, 1 pm.

No. 744

Following for D.M.O. from Sir Mark  
Sykes No. 22 :-

I have had interview with Baird. S of S, for War might be interested in his opinion. He expressed belief that although Egypt is quite tranquil at present that presence of large enemy army in Syria would provoke considerable excitement and unrest. I had interview with Sheikh Mohidin Kurdi, of the Azhar. He informs me that the pro-English members of the University are losing confidence and that the pro-Turkish party is gaining ground. I had interview with Faris Nimr - he believes that the Armenian massacres will be repeated in Lebanon, if Turks re-occupy country in strong force - he states that lists of notables, both Moslem and Christian have been prepared and that Turks will take the opportunity to destroy heads of Arab party and then proceed to set the ignorant Moslems <sup>on</sup> ~~against~~ the Christians. I had interview with the Sultan - he is anxious about the future situation in Syria and its subsequent effect on Arabia as a whole. Personally with memory of my journey fresh in my mind I feel exceedingly anxious as to effect of a passive Canal defensive on whole Near Eastern and Arabian ~~question~~ situation. It appears to me that its moral effect will be cumulative.

If



Code, Cypher  
or clear? \_\_\_\_\_

## TELEGRAM.

From

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT

Cairo

To \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Despatched (date and time) \_\_\_\_\_

If Turks re-occupy Syria I anticipate that they will capture Arabs, destroy Christians and establish themselves permanently in the Holy Places with a puppet Sherif. Even if they do not attack Canal, a menace will suffice to produce unrest in Egypt. They will further be able to oblige us without any trouble to themselves to maintain an additional force in Mesopotamia, where wastage from sickness increases with size of the army. Under these circumstances, an otherwise desirable peace might be dangerous to us. Thus if Germany made liberal offers in France, Belgium, Servia, Italy and Russia, she might be in a position to keep Ottoman Empire <sup>in ASIA</sup> intact, owing to general hunger for peace among masses of Allies. In this event our position in the East becomes precarious. We could not retain Mesopotamia except with a large army and we should be obliged either to evacuate it as a result of peace, or hold it at the subsequent mercy of the Turks. Bagdad railway would be completed under German auspices. Permanent garrison of Egypt would have to be larger than before. Influence of Turks on Indian pilgrims would be a permanent factor in Indian Moslem politics. In the eyes of all Moslems we should have been beaten by the Turks if not by the Germans. For G.B. to have to face such a situation in condition of exhaustion and reaction succeeding on the war would in my opinion be most dangerous to our future  
in



Code, Cypher  
or clear? \_\_\_\_\_

**TELEGRAM.**

*From*

**HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT**

**Cairo**

*To* \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

*Despatched* (date and time) \_\_\_\_\_

in the East. I suggest that French may possibly not appreciate ~~the~~ our position, owing to the fact that their hold on North Africa is that of out-and-out conquerors, backed by policy of colonisation and denationalisation of conquered, whereas we control purely by prestige and geographical position.



Telegraphic Address:  
"MUKHABARAT"

INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT,  
WAR OFFICE,

CAIRO, 2/12/15

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT

4 DEC 1915

No 48/12

The following are the views of the Sirdar  
communicated to me by telegram;

1. Every effort should be made by the Franco-British troops in the Balkans to join up with the Russians in Bulgaria and block the advance there whilst the Italians cut the communications from Montenegro or Albania.
2. That the Alexandretta plan should be adopted but that on no account should Gallipoli be evacuated.
3. Measures on the Canal indicated in G.O.C.'s telegram should be put into effect forthwith both as a necessary precaution for us and as a blind for the enemy.
4. That the supreme military and political direction in the Near East should be delegated to Lord Kitchener forthwith.

I realize there may be now insuperable difficulties in carrying out the policy indicated above, but I would urge with all the force I can that at least a delaying effort may be made in the Balkans in order to give time for the policy indicated in the other three paragraphs being given immediate effect to with the utmost vigour and resolution.

It might do good, if Maxwell has not already expressed his views- opinion on that point, to telegraph my views home and give them his support if he agrees with them.



Cairo.

AMM

2 Dec. 1915.

✓  
Dear Sir Henry

I have received  
the attached from the  
Sirdar. I have sent  
a copy to the General.

Yours sincerely

G. F. Clayton.



Code Cypher,  
or clear?

0

**TELEGRAM.**

*Col. Clayton*

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT

7 DEC 1915

48/13

From

Foreign Office

To

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT

Cairo.

Despatched (date and time) Dec 6 3 35 pm

Received (date and time) 7 1 56 am

PRIVATE. I have submitted arguments urged with so much force in your telegrams and private letters about defence of Egypt to War Committee and you may be sure that Lord Kitchener will get for them utmost consideration that military possibilities allow but difficulties of giving effect to them are very great.



GENERAL STAFF — INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

Telegrams: "INTRUSIVE CAIRO."

Telephone: CAIRO 5547.

~~44-3778/1~~  
HEADQUARTERS.

SAVOY HOTEL, 48

CAIRO.

J3438 B.

Chancery,  
Residency.

Re attached. We have no trace of the original, but the attached copy of a document in our file may be of assistance.

E. J. Colson  
him!

I (6)

30/4/4.



COPY.

BERNE, September 11th 1916.

No. 29.

M.I.I.C.

War Office, London.

TURKEY AND EGYPT.

1)

The Turkish Opposition in Switzerland.

I have been in touch with several members of the opposition, and in my report No. 28 of the 7th August, I gave some details as to the ideas of these people and their proposals, as to the methods of dealing with the situation. No further actions has been taken with regard to their suggestions, but I have been in touch with them with the object of using them for information from Turkey.

From time to time representatives of the French Embassy and Russian Legation have had interviews with several members, with the same object in view. The Opposition have recently suggested that they would be prepared to send emissaries to Turkey; via Berlin and Sofia, also possibly via Salonika and Mitylene, or one of the Greek Islands, close to the Turkish mainland, the last with the object of trying to get in touch with RAHMI BEY, of SKYRNA. Their estimate of the cost of the above organization is 22,000 francs. The French Ambassador and the representative of the Russian Legation, interested in Eastern affairs, are both in favour of accepting this scheme as they consider it advisable to endeavour to find out the exact state of the political situation in Turkey, and especially to obtain particulars of the Turkish Opposition to the present Government, both among the political and military elements in Constantinople. The French Ambassador has seen H.B.M. Minister in Berne, with



with regard to this question, and authority has been asked by the Minister, of the Foreign Office to participate in the above-mentioned expense. The French Ambassador and the Russian Legation, have also telegraphically submitted this proposal to their respective Governments.

If all three Governments are in favour of making use of the  
of the Opposition  
proposal, the suggestion is that the cost of the scheme should be equally divided between the three powers.

I shall advise you in due course of the replies received should the suggestion be carried out, the emissaries will be instructed as to what military, as well as political information is required.

From a traveller recently arrived from Constantinople I learn that two or more official missions, in charge of German Officers, were recently sent to Syria and Arabia to meet and endeavour to persuade the turbulent tribes to come to terms with the Turks. It is said that none of the members of these missions ever returned; and it is presumed that they were all massacred.

(Signed) C.E. Binns.

Captain R.M.

Copy to Egypt.



HE

Gen. Clayton  
for Arthur  
Amm

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN  
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU.  
ALEXANDRIA.

14898  
HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
19 OCT 1916  
NO 3778/2

17th October 1916.

B/14898.

48

My dear HERBERT,

I send you herewith two reports  
which may possibly interest the High Commissioner.

That marked (A) is furnished by  
the Secretary of Prince Sabah-Eldin, whilst Report  
(B) is from our representative in SWITZERLAND,

Yours sincerely,

R

The Hon. Mervyn Herbert  
The Residency  
CAIRO



En Suisse, notamment à Genève, tous les Etats ont des représentants s'occupant du mouvement politique des Nationalités.

Monsieur Alph. Ledoulx ancien premier drogoman de l'Ambassade de France à Constantinople, s'occupant de toute question ayant trait à l'Orient y comprise celle de Syrie et de Palestine, se rencontre très souvent avec les Libéraux Ottomans pour suivre le mouvement libéral en Turquie.

Monsieur A.N. Mandelstam, ancien drogoman de l'Ambassade de Russie à Constantinople, celui qui participant au Congrès Zioniste, tenu à Bâle en 1898, déclara que "les Juifs ont une espérance commune que leur conscience nationale a gardée à travers toute leur histoire", s'occupe également de toute question ayant trait à l'Orient.

La question de Syrie, notamment celle de Palestine, le passionne. Il croit pouvoir soulever utilement la question des ports de Mersine et d'Alexandrette, se basant sur les populations grecques orthodoxes qui se trouvent dans la région du Patriarcat d'Antioche, Patriarcat arraché aux Grecs. Il croit aussi pouvoir soulever la question de Palestine, en faisant valoir les droits (! ? !) de la Russie sur les Lieux Saints et sur le Patriarcat de Jérusalem; mais ces droits n'existent pas, puisque les Russes n'y figurent que comme protecteurs de l'orthodoxie



grecque, malgré la dénonciation de cette ingérence par le traité de Paris du 1856, et puisque le Patriarcat de Jérusalem est Grec. Cependant il soutient et défend ces droits inexistants, croyant pouvoir obtenir des compensations en faveur de la Russie dans la Syrie et dans la Palestine, ainsi qu'un néoplasme politique judaïco-international !

Monsieur Mandelstam s'occupe aussi avec beaucoup d'intérêt de la question turque ou ottomane, se montrant très sensible et très favorable au maintien de la Turquie, laquelle, d'après son expression, est l'ami et l'allié naturel de la Russie. C'est son ancien jeu, lors de la proclamation de la Constitution en Turquie, jeu qui lui avait réussi avec les Unionistes et qui, tendant à renforcer les idées nationalistes et tyranniques des Unionistes avait beaucoup contribué à l'explosion de tous ces événements qui, aboutissant à la guerre des Balkans, ensanglantèrent l'Orient. Monsieur Mandelstam est déjà parvenu à capter la confiance de Kémal Midhat Bey, petit-fils de feu Médhat Pacha, et à entrer, par son entremise, en contact avec les Libéraux ottomanes qui, heureusement, ont compris son jeu

Monsieur Mandelstam s'occupe en dernier lieu de la question Finlandaise et de la question Polonaise, lesquelles, notamment la dernière, provoquent des polémiques très vives dans la presse suisse, polémiques critiquant l'attitude des



réactionnaires russes de Saint Pétersbourg, qui ne veulent pas une Pologne autonome et indépendante. De même la question Yougoslave, liée à celle de l'Adriatique, question discutée délibérément en Suisse par Hinko Hinkovitch, Frances Supilo, Jovan Cvijitch, Mic. Jovitchitch etc. attire son attention.

La propagande austro-allemande fait ravage en Suisse.

Les Légations respectives de Berne, les Consulats, l'Agence Wolff, le frère du maréchal Hindenburg et toute une armée d'agents travaillent d'une manière méthodique et systématique. On pourrait dire, sans exagérer, que non seulement la Suisse Allemande est sympathique ~~aux~~ Austro-Allemands, mais aussi, en partie, la Suisse Française et Italienne. Les Finlandaise et les Polonaise qui s'y trouvent, sont travaillés. En ~~ces~~ derniers temps - il y a deux mois - les Allemands ont voulu se ~~mettre~~<sup>mettre</sup> en contact même ~~avec~~ les Libéraux Ottomans, par l'entremise de Fazil Pacha Teptany, cousin germain d'Essad Pacha, qui est subitement mort à la suite d'une attaque d'apoplexie. Ils ont soutenu que l'Allemagne est disposée, vu le mouvement d'opposition intransigeante contre les Unionistes, non seulement à imposer à ~~ces~~ derniers la collaboration avec le Prince Sabaheddine et les autres Libéraux, pour que le pays, en des moments aussi critiques, ~~se~~ présente uni, mais aussi, si le Prince n'acceptait point cette collaboration, à faire avancer ~~la~~ cause. Le Prince a repoussé toutes ces propositions, disant qu'il ne peut d'aucune façon



s'entendre avec les Allemands, étant donné qu'une telle entente constituerait l'abandon de ses idées et la négation de son passé. Les Allemands, malgré la réponse catégorique et formelle du Prince, ont continué à travailler, ayant eu recours à l'ancien Khédive Abbas Hilmy et le priant d'intervenir auprès du Prince.

Le Khédive, après avoir eu l'avis du Prince, a refusé d'intervenir et de s'occuper d'une affaire qui n'était ni dans les vues du Prince ni dans les siennes, puisque même ses malheurs personnels il les attribue aux Unionistes et non pas aux Anglais.

Le Ministre de Turquie à Berne Fuad Selim, ancien Consul Général à Salonique, ayant su les démarches des Allemands, a vivement protesté auprès de son collègue allemand, disant que s'il s'agissait de provoquer une entente entre les partis politiques en Turquie ou un changement quelconque, ce serait à lui, Ministre Turc et représentant du Sultan, de s'en occuper et non pas au Ministre d'Allemagne. Ainsi, grâce au Prince Sabaheddine et à l'attitude impartiale de l'ancien Khédive, non seulement les efforts allemands ont été avortés, mais aussi une méfiance a été née entre la Turquie et l'Allemagne officielles.

L'attitude de Khédive, qui soutient aussi que la Turquie doit faire une paix séparée et qui est en contact, dans ce sens, avec Rahmi Bey, le Vali de Smyrne, est peut-être due à l'espoir que l'Angleterre ne s'opposerait pas à faire valoir les droits de succession, sur le Sultanat, de ses



enfants du moins. Il est à présumer que le voyage de Réchid Bey, ancien Kapou-Kéhaya d'Egypte à Constantinople et ancien chambellan du Sultan, voyage qui devait le conduire à Paris et de là à Londres, visait à une démarche dans ce sens .

Le Prince Sabaheddine, aussitôt arrivé à Paris, a commencé à travailler d'une manière très active visant deux buts:

1. D'un côté, imposant l'union à tous les groupements libéraux et établissant des communications avec les différents centres d'opposition en Turquie, il s'occupa de la préparation et de l'organisation d'un mouvement révolutionnaire qui, provoquant la chute du Gouvernement Unioniste, conduirait au pouvoir un Gouvernement Libéral prêt à entreprendre des pourparlers avec l'Entente pour la conclusion d'une paix séparée, laquelle, sauvant la Turquie dans la mesure du possible et dotant Constantinople avec les Détroits d'un régime semblable à celui du Danube, établirait un état de choses stable en Orient.

2. D'un autre côté, profitant des divergences de vues et des divisions des Unionistes il voulut, tout en évitant, dans la mesure du possible, l'écoulement de sang, essayer la conclusion de la paix par les Unionistes dissidents. Le docteur Djemil Pacha, ancien Prefet de Constantinople et ami du Prince, a accepté d'aller à Constantinople pour travailler dans ce but. Un mois après le départ du docteur Djemil Pacha, le Ministre de Turquie à Berne, Fuad Sélim Bey, faisait savoir au Prince qu'il avait



lui faire une communication importante au nom du Sultan et de son Gouvernement et qu'il le priait de lui mander de Paris un homme de sa confiance. Le Prince, tenant au courant de tout cela le gouvernement français et l'Ambassade d'Angleterre à Paris, a envoyé à Berne le docteur Nihad Réchad Bey, actuellement interne dans l'hôpital Cochin de Paris, Fuad Sélim s'étant rencontré avec Nihad Réchad Bey, lui a communiqué une dépêche officielle, d'après laquelle le Sultan et son gouvernement priaient le Prince Sabaheddine d'entamer des négociations pour la conclusion d'une paix, sauvegardant l'honneur et l'intégrité, dans la mesure du possible, de la Turquie. Le Sultan et son gouvernement, faisant appel au patriotisme du Prince, laissaient à lui le soin de la discussion préliminaire, promettant de lui adjoindre, une fois les pourparlers avancés les délégués et le personnel voulus. Les bases indiquées furent le maintien de la Turquie comme Empire indépendant, le maintien de Constantinople et des Détroits sous un régime semblable à celui du Danube, le maintien de l'intégrité de la Turquie dans la mesure du possible, et la création d'un Etat-tampon avec les provinces Arméniennes, si leur abandon était jugé indispensable, et l'application de réformes radicalement décentralisées dans toutes les provinces arabes, y compris la Syrie avec la Palestine.

Ainsi toutes les idées du Prince Sabaheddine étaient confirmées et acceptées par le Sultan et son Gouvernement.



Aussitôt, après le retour de Nihad Réchad Bey à Paris, le Prince s'est empressé de communiquer ces résultats à Monsieur le Président du Conseil des Ministres français, sans omettre de les porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

Quelques jours après Monsieur le Président du Conseil des Ministres français annonçait au Prince que le Gouvernement, à la suite d'une démarche de l'Ambassadeur de Russie à Paris, démarche portant une forme de protestation pour tout effort tendant à changer l'Etat de choses en Orient et à faire échouer les projets russes, se voyait forcé, avec regret, de ne pas continuer à s'occuper de la Turquie. Monsieur le Président du Conseil faisait cependant savoir au Prince que le Gouvernement, tout en se conformant au désir de son Alliée était prêt à mettre à sa disposition une somme qui eût permis à lui d'attendre les événements. Le Prince, considérant cette dernière proposition inacceptable et croyant qu'il n'y avait plus rien à faire avec la France qui adoptait la manière de voir russe, a demandé un passeport et s'est retiré en Suisse.

Cependant le Gouvernement Français continue à s'intéresser aux affaires turques, sans vouloir donner des précisions et des assurances, croyant arriver à une organisation libérale, qui, sans précisions et sans assurances quelconques, accepterait de travailler, se contentant de la bienveillance probable des Alliés après la guerre! Un particulier, très connu et très estimé en



France, est allé en Suisse - tout dernièrement - pour dire au Prince que le Gouvernement Français ayant obtenu le consentement de ses Alliés désirait recommencer sa collaboration avec le Prince et qu'il le priait de se rendre à Paris. Le Prince a répondu que sa dignité, après les déboires du passé, lui imposait de demander deux choses: "Une invitation officieuse, sinon officielle, et des précisions." A la même époque, ou quelques jours après, Moustapha Bey, le délégué arabe, invitait le Prince suivant le désir de Lord Grey, à Londres. Le Prince a demandé une invitation quelconque, confirmant ses idées.

Maurice

Les choses sont là ou étaient là avant un mois. Il serait utile d'ajouter que les Libéraux qui se trouvent à Genève, des représentants des Albanais, qui sont à Genève, à Londres et à Paris, y compris Ismail Kémal Bey, des représentants des Arabes, tous sont en contact avec le Prince et veulent le renforcer dans ses efforts libéraux. Ses idées et son programme politique ont été plus que justifiés par les événements, et cette vérité réelle lui crée tous les jours des amis et des partisans fervents. Les populations de la Turquie sont pour lui, ainsi que la majorité de l'armée; même parmi les Unionistes, y compris Rahmi Bey le Vali de Smyrne, on peut trouver des personnes prêtes à s'unir à lui. Une telle force, une telle personnalité n'est pas à dédaigner; d'autant plus que l'on ne peut ni prévoir ni savoir quel sera le sort final de Constantinople, des Détroits,



de la Turquie. Dans tous les cas, même si des raisons politiques et diplomatiques ne permettaient pas une collaboration, il serait très utile de se servir de cette force pour le service de renseignements, renseignements qui, s'ils sont nécessaires à telle personne pour tel ou tel but, le sont au même degré aux amis du Prince, qui ont tout intérêt à suivre ce qui se passe en Turquie dans n'importe quel sens. Voilà pourquoi il est utile - pour tous - qu'une organisation centrale soit faite avec le Prince dans une ville de Suisse et que d'autres organisations soient créées à Athènes, à Constantinople, à Smyrne, à Cavalla, partout où cela serait possible. Ainsi non seulement on aurait des renseignements précis, sérieux, exacts, mais on pourrait aussi, le cas échéant donner telle ou telle tournure aux affaires de la Turquie et intervenir efficacement.

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Athènes,  
le 21 Septembre 1916.

NOTE. Above is from HERMES and no responsibility is taken for the opinions expressed. At the same time statements of facts may possibly be considered accurate.



COPY.

B.

BERNE, September 26th 1916.

Letter from the Representative of our ALEXANDRIA Organisation

The British, French, and Russian Ministries for Foreign Affairs, have consented to participate to the extent of 1/3 each in the cost of sending some emissaries to TURKEY, in order to obtain information as to the present position of the various Political Parties in TURKEY. It has been made clear that the object of these envoys is, purely and simply, to obtain information. No encouragement whatever has been given to the various members of the Opposition in SWITZERLAND, with regard to their proposals and schemes and I will, as soon as an opportunity arises, convey to the proper parties in SWITZERLAND our attitude with regard to their proposals re RAHMI BEY. The attitude which I have adopted with members of the Opposition here, has been that it is very unlikely that their schemes would even be considered by the Allies. At the same time, I have been, and will continue to keep, in touch with them, with the object of obtaining any information either Political or Military, which they may be able to supply.

In this connection I am enclosing herewith a report of an interview with TAHIR HAIREDDINE, giving his appreciation of the Turkish Opposition in SWITZERLAND, also some particulars of TAHIR HAIREDDINE himself. This information is obtained through the intermediary of a secret agent.



TAHIR HAIREDDINE gave the following résumé of his views on the various Turkish groups now in Switzerland and on the situation in Constantinople:-

"First of all, there is no group in Switzerland which can be considered a political opposition party in the true sense. There exist only certain individuals animated by the same feeling of hostility against the members of the present Turkish Government and the same desire to free their country from the Austro-German influence which has brought about her ruin and save her as far as possible from the fate which threatens her. Nevertheless some if not all of these individuals could form a nucleus capable of becoming a reliable and efficacious factor. Therefore what this opposition needs is first of all a selection of the leaders, and then foreign co-operation to encourage them, guide them and support them in their work for the furtherance of mutual interests

I have visited and sounded all the Turkish elements in Geneva, ex-pashas and present members of the Opposition, and the following is the opinion I have formed:-

The Opposition comprises three categories of men: the incapable, the suspects, the reliable and capable.

Amongst the first named - Prince Sabaheddine, Cherif Pasha, Kemal Midhat, Chevket Kibrizli, Sirret and Chefik Essad.

Amongst the second:- Rechid Bey, ex Chamberlain, Hakki Halid and Ahmed Bedevi.

Amongst the last class - Rechid Bey, ex-minister, Youssouf Rassih and Assaf Mouammer.

The first, in spite of their names, have not the initiative, energy and zeal necessary for the immediate and rapid action which the circumstances require, nor the authority and influence necessary for the grouping and swaying of the latent forces which have to be mobilised and utilised in Turkey. They constitute organs of propaganda and polemic writings, - methods which do not meet present requirements.



Those in the second category are of value, but unfortunately, although no definite accusation can be made against them, their relations and attitude make it impossible to entrust them with a political enterprise requiring an unimpeachable line of conduct. Rechid Bey for instance has re-opened the intimate relations with the Khedive which were broken off for some time, and this compromising intimacy with such a man is hardly reconcilable with the position of a resolute adversary of the Young Turks and the Central Powers, whatever plausible reasons may be put forward to justify it. Hakki Halid has made journeys into Germany, and this free access to a belligerent country, so severe towards suspects, is not the guarantee that the Entente has the right to require from those she consents to help. Moreover, although he is known as a late opponent of "Union et Progres", he has never taken his place in the ranks of the champions of the opposition. Lastly the previous precarious existence of both has undergone a transformation that leaves no room for doubt.

With regard to those in the last category - they have to their credit intelligence, energy, boldness, experience of violent movements, and the authority attached to their political past.

I believe that the true organiser of any eventual enterprise tending to provoke the fall of the present Turkish Government can only be Réchid Bey. He would have with him ready to second him, men who have been proved in similar circumstances: in addition to Colonel Youssouf Rassih Bey and Assaf Mouammer, he would have the former leaders of the Kurd risings against the Comité such as Lieut.-Col. Safvet Bey and Névrus Bey, as well as numerous other officers interned at Malta and Cyprus, sworn enemies of the Young Turks, who would be quite ready to organise and conduct a revolutionary movement - the only action opportune, possible or efficacious in the present circumstances.

There are indeed many indications and proofs of a violent and oppressed discontent in Turkey against the Germano-Turkish Government of Constantinople. But, as a natural consequence of



the régime of terror reigning in the Capital at present, this latent hatred of the Enver-Talaat tyranny is quite ineffective without proper organisation. A leader is therefore required who could raise a standard round which to rally and sound a war cry. The most significant fact of the gravity of the discontent in the army and the Comité itself, as well as the impatience to commence the struggle, is a spontaneous and unfortunately isolated action such as that which caused the hanging of Commandant Yakoub Djemil, an influential member of the Comité Union et Progrès.

Moreover, the Allies have at Smyrna a man, Rahmi Bey, and a civil and military population which, with the support of the Entente, might become the most powerful and efficacious factor in the downfall of the Young Turk Government.

Consequently, I would advise you to get into touch with Réchid Bey; you could explain the situation to him and talk over the possibilities and the means of the action to be undertaken.



Note by Representative of Alexandria Organisation on  
TAHIR HAIREDDINE.

Brother of SALIH PACHA, former Aide-de-camp of the Sultan Abdul Hamid, and husband of Princess Munire Sultane, niece of the Sultan Mehmed V, who was hanged as an accomplice in the assassination of Mahmoud Chevket Pasha.

His elder brother, Mehmed Haireddine, living at Tunis, and a sister at present at Constantinople.

Under the old régime he was a general. After having left the Army, he became interested in politics and was elected member for Constantinople, where he opposed Memdough Bey, Minister of Justice.

With the help of Zéki Bey, he founded the "Cherah", the paper belonging to the Opposition, which was suspended and replaced by the "Bédahet". This latter was also stopped on 24.10.12 for having published, in its N° 22, matter "calculated to excite public opinion".

On the 30th January 12. a sequestration of the office took place, and all the numbers, in which the publication of a series of articles by Ali Kemal Bey had been begun, were seized.

Having left Constantinople to escape coming elections, he was brought before the Court Martial 5.2.13. and condemned to two months and ten days imprisonment. He succeeded, however, in escaping, and took refuge in Alexandria.

He returned to Constantinople soon afterwards, under the favour of the Cabinet Kiamil Pacha. He was appointed Governor of Jerusalem, but he retired early in 1913, owing to illegal proceedings of the Committee in the Administration.



On the day of the assassination of Mahmoud Shevket Pacha he ~~was~~ arrested, conducted to Seraskerat in company with 473 other prisoners, spent six days in prison, without being subjected to the slightest questioning, and then was exiled to Sinope, "par mesure administrative." At this time, Djemal Pacha, although he was his old school mate, confessed that his greatest desire had been to see him hanged, as his brother had been, and that he only owed his escape, to the fact that thirteen prisoners had been asked in turn whether they knew him and that all had replied in the negative.

Two months later, owing to the intervention of the French Embassy, he was allowed to return to the Capital, which he left later for Tunis.

This ~~man~~ is thoroughly honest and trustworthy, and of an upright and generous character. Ardent friend of France and of the Entente in general.

He is staying at the Hotel des Bergues, at Geneva, and is leaving for Tunis in a few days time.

-:-:-:-:-



112  
Fair Herbert.

Send you this  
unofficially.

HE may care to  
see, tho' as you  
say the letter is  
written in rather "the  
Cynopial style"!

Seen with W. W. Deeds

Amos 27. 10. 16



E. M. S. I. BUREAU.

ALEXANDRIA.

C. 222

25th October 1916.

Major DEEDES D.S.O.  
Intelligence (b)  
WAT Office.  
CAIRO

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272, 216  
3748/3  
48

Herewith copy of your letter to Captain BINNS.

Original was despatched to-day to LONDON for transmission  
to SWITZERLAND.

R

DIRECTOR  
E. M. S. I. B.



COPY.

HEADQUARTERS

SAVOY HOTEL

General Staff - Intelligence  
Section.

CAIRO.

20th October 1916.

My dear BINNS,

I have long been meaning to write to you, but have ~~never~~ done so! However, the time that has elapsed ~~has~~ enabled you to settle down, and ~~me~~ to see, ~~more or less~~, what you are likely to be in a position to do, and the extent to which you are likely to be able to get information about the various political permutations and combinations at present taking place outside TURKEY - the subject of this letter.

I also have had time to experiment in one or two directions, and am now able to give you some results.

My own activities are confined to the following objects:-

Firstly, as to what I am not trying to do

I am not trying to collect a party of opposition members, with a view to, through them, starting a Revolution in TURKEY.

That I long ago gave up. It's not practicable, and would be premature.

Nor am I trying to collect members of the opposition to discuss with them political questions relating to the partition of TURKEY and the possibility of negotiating thereon with the Powers. That is not my business, and even if it were, I should not wish to do it. I should not wish to do it because I think TURKEY deserves, <sup>to</sup> and feel sure she will, lose, a large part of her Empire. Could not do it because if I tried I should very soon find myself up against such insuperable



obstacles ~~as~~ the future fate of CONSTANTINOPLE, and the future status of ARMENIA and ARABIA. None of the above objects, therefore, ~~am~~ I trying to attain.

What I am doing ( ~~am~~ keeping well in the background in so doing) is :-

I am saying to the members of the so-called opposition outside TURKEY "Whatever the fate of TURKEY be - into details "about which ~~we~~ need not go - it is pretty clear that some "sort of a TURKEY will remain. Whatever remains will want a "Government. Concerning whatever remains someone or some "Party will have to negotiate at the Peace Conference - I "think it unlikely that the Allies will ~~have~~ any intercourse "with the C.U.P. It's up to you therefore, and essential, to "form a Party in the place of the C.U.P. that may speak rep- "resentatively for TURKEY. I am prepared in a semi-official "capacity to put one valuable means to this end at your disp- "osal viz: an uncensored post. Your first duty is to get into "touch with all others of your ~~way~~ of thinking in other parts "of EUROPE. Your second duty to combine all these elements "Your third ~~to~~ elect someone ~~as~~ their chief. Your fourth to "make your influence felt by propoganda and emissaries within "TURKEY. (for which purpose again we will place such ~~means~~ "as we have at your disposal) - then - having got so "far, if you like to approach the Powers as a unified and "representative party with a following in TURKEY, I think it "possible that ~~some~~ notice will be taken of you - at all events "you stand a better ~~chance~~ than you ~~is~~ to-day, with your five "headless and tail less parties ! "

To this end therefore certain people here have sent through ~~me~~ to PARIS and through ~~me~~ and you to SWITZERLAND letters to friends in both places. Replies show a fairly general desire to proceed on the lines I have sketched above.



I also notice that your efforts and those of the French and Russians point to a very similar "but".

What I now want is a full exchange, which will be valuable for checking purposes - of information between the <sup>various</sup> concerning parties i.e. individuals and programmes,<sup>4</sup> the objects each believe themselves to be working for.

The names I found in two reports recently received from you I am submitting to friends here and I shall forward you their remarks.

Will you kindly send me the remarks of your friends upon AZIZ NOURI BEY, YESHILI ZADE, Doctor NOUR ED DIN PASHA and I will send you further names another time.

To recapitulate my programmes which I believe to be the only one to aim at now :-

Keep off International politics.

Keep off discussions re Territorial changes in TURKEY.

Concentrate on the formation of one representative opposition party

And keep off directly (tho' discreetly fanning indirectly!) any revolutionary plans inside TURKEY, especially those which are offered and demand our naval or other co-operation from outside.

Give full facilities by your "bag" for inter correspondence have all your letters from and to them delivered closed and then steam them open! This sounds perfectly dreadful from an officer and a gentleman. But they offer to have them read. I say "No, send them closed" knowing it enables them to write more freely. I keep what I see to myself personally and in a word think it no worse than much else one has to do!

Finally give full facilities for propaganda of the right sort.

Last of all send me as much information as you like, and I will reciprocate.

Yours sincerely,

(sd) W.H.DEEDES



Secret

97951 B.

~~Mr Tol Symes Capt US~~

Residency

I am directed to forward you  
herewith three memoranda on  
the Turkish opposition.

The High Commission desired to have  
a note on the subject.

These papers have been submitted  
to and approved by, the  
Commander in Chief—

I should like to have the  
opportunity of seeing His  
Excellency about this. I do



Not think there is a fall  
for any action at present.

Woods


17.9.17.

Not

ss

vide H.R.'s penultimate comment,

like which C in C agrees.




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10th September, 1917.

SECRET ■ CONFIDENTIAL.

THE TURKISH OPPOSITION.



The history of the Opposition parties in TURKEY since the declaration of war may be resumed in a very few words.

The group of resolute adventurers of the Committee of Union and Progress, who came into power by the assassination of NAZIM PASHA in the spring of 1913, have remained entirely masters of the situation. By the massacre of ARMENIANS, the wholesale execution of the ARAB leaders and the murder of the Heir Apparent, they have established a reign of terror. One or two military conspiracies have been summarily suppressed and their leaders executed, and Opposition is, for the present, dumb, nor is it likely to find a voice until the Turkish Armies have been more badly defeated in the field than has yet been the case.

There are, however, large elements of potential Opposition in the country, including many men of standing who are entirely out of sympathy with the present Government, but have so far escaped imprisonment or exile. These are incapable of any spontaneous movement, but await the opportunity which would be given by a successful military revolt or foreign invasion.

Out of TURKEY, the Turkish Opposition is chiefly composed of men who were driven into exile on the fall of KIAMIE PASHA's Cabinet, or who were accused of complicity in the subsequent murder of MAHMUD SHEVKET PASHA. Some of these, like SABAH-ED-DIN Effendi and SHERIF PASHA, by long residence abroad have lost touch with TURKEY, and their claims to represent TURKISH opinion are mainly based upon their own vanity and ambitions. Others are ex-Ministers, ex-leaders and members of Parliamentary Groups, ex-officers under sentence by Court-Martial, opposition journalists, and two or three relations of notable Turkish Statesmen of the past, such as MIDHAT PASHA and KIAMIE PASHA. But none of them can be said to be truly representative of more than a fraction of Turkish opposition, or to be in a position to take a lead which would readily be followed by other Group-leaders.

SABAHEDDIN Effendi and SHERIF PASHA live in PARIS but from time to time have visited SWITZERLAND where the majority of the Turkish exiles are to be found. These have been allowed to keep touch with the Opposition members in EGYPT by correspondence passing through our hands, the general tenour of which has been to show that there is a unanimous profession of the desire to combine for action against the common enemy, but a complete absence of any capacity to give effect to that desire. It may be noted here that this incapacity for action, is described by the Opposition members themselves to the lack of sympathy and support afforded them by the Entente Powers.

In EGYPT the Opposition includes some influential members, such as the ex-Sheikh-ul-ISLAM JEMAEDDIN Effendi, who are unwilling to take an active political part owing to fear of consequences - the confiscation of property or the



10th September, 1917.

-2-

persecution of members of their families who have remained in TURKEY.. The others belong to the various categories enumerated above, and include a number of Turks who were arrested and interned on erroneous information on the declaration of war and who were subsequently released by order of the Commander-in-Chief.

Here, as in SWITZERLAND, great difficulty has been experienced by the elements of opposition in organizing themselves for united action, to establish closer touch with those in SWITZERLAND and so to prepare the way for a movement of revolt in TURKEY against the tyranny of the Union & Progress Government. Of late however there have been some indications of a desire, both in SWITZERLAND & EGYPT, to put aside personal jealousies and conflicting claims to leadership and to work together for the above purpose, and although no great hope can be held out of the complete success of such an endeavour, yet the tendency deserves to be encouraged in so far as it is possible to do so without compromising our political position and obligations.

The question of CONSTANTINOPLE and the Straits has been the greatest obstacle to any understanding between the Opposition Groups and the Entente Powers, should the latter desire to enlist their co-operation in subverting the present Turkish Government. Now, however, RUSSIA's reported renunciation of all territorial ambitions may remove, or at least

also

It may be thought that an obstacle to any such co-operation is to be found in the agreement entered into with the King of the Hedjaz and the Arab policy to which we have committed ourselves. But this need not be regarded as insuperable, for the Turkish opposition are becoming more or less reconciled to an inevitable change, and will probably be ready to accept the "fait accompli" of the loss of the Arab Provinces, provided that it is decently veiled by some formula calculated to save their face with public opinion in TURKEY.

It is now submitted that a purely expectant attitude on our part can have no other result than to strengthen Germany's hold on Turkey - Military for the present and political and economic in the future. The alternative would be to encourage the organization and support of a body of Opposition favourable to the Entente Powers, capable at a given moment of providing an alternative Government for TURKEY with which they could treat for peace, and through whose instrumentality they could combat the continued penetration of TURKEY by GERMANY after the war.

In GREECE, the military situation compelled the Entente Powers to espouse the cause of those who were in opposition to the Germano-Greek Government. No such military necessity exists in the case of TURKEY, but the political and economic situation which will arise there after the war seems to demand the adoption of a similar policy. The foundations of that policy should be laid now if we are not to be confronted with a solidly established and recognised German influence in TURKEY



GENERAL STAFF INTELLIGENCE SECTION.

2ND ECHELON, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

10th September,

1917.

-3-

which might prove an important asset on the enemy's side when a general settlement is to be arrived at, and to which it might well be asserted that no opposition existed in TURKEY itself.

-ooo-



Telegrams: ARBUR, CAIRO.  
Telephone: { CAIRO, 5591  
CAIRO, 5613.

ARAB BUREAU,  
SAVOY HOTEL,  
CAIRO.

~~SECRET~~

6th September, 1917.

Lieut. Col. Deedes, D.S.O.

I have read, with interest, the attached draft memorandum on the subject of the Turkish opposition. I am entirely in agreement with the first part of the memorandum which describes the status and origin of this party, but I am not at one with the policy advocated in the latter portion of the memorandum.

We are committed to the support of Arabs, Syrians, Jews, and Armenians, and I cannot see that we can take up anything but an attitude of complete hostility to the Turks while the war is still in progress. In the early days, for political reasons, we endeavoured to discriminate between the Committee of Union and Progress and the Turkish Nation. I was never very sure that this policy was a wise one, or that it produced any appreciable result, and, in my opinion, the time has now passed when any such policy can be followed with advantage.

Are we able to point to a single individual among the Opposition (Party), either in Switzerland, or Egypt, who is likely to exercise the slightest influence, either in the Turkey of today, or in any future Turkey which may emerge from this war ?.

Those with whom we are in touch appear to me to resemble closely the representatives of the Arab party in Egypt, whose faculty for wasting the valuable time of officials with the minimum of effect is almost incredible. To enter into any serious negotiations with the Turkish Opposition Party, as we know it here, would appear to me to be only to increase the tangle of



Telegrams: ARBUR, CAIRO.

Telephone: { CAIRO, 1111  
CAIRO, 5615.

ARAB BUREAU,  
SAVOY HOTEL,  
CAIRO.

(2)

minor politics in which we are already enmeshed, and personally I am not satisfied that any adequate advantage would result.

It appears to me that the only way in which we can, after the war, secure a hold over the future Turkey is by such wise action on her behalf at the Peace Conference as may be indicated by the situation as it stands at the close of hostilities.

  
Brig. General.



S E C R E T.

10th September, 1917.

Brigadier-General CLAYTON, C.M.G.  
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In reply to your note of September 6th, it is possible that my meaning was not clearly enough expressed on one or two points, which I will now try to make more plain.

Let me begin by saying that I am as averse as you are to anything like overt action in favour of, or co-operation with the Turkish opposition to-day. I only suggest that we should make some preparation now for the situation which we shall have to face in TURKEY on the conclusion of peace.

TURKEY is to-day ostensibly Germanophil, owing to Germany's military hold upon her, and she is in danger of remaining so after the war, with the perpetuation of German influence and penetration, unless the body of anti-German opinion which exists in the country is able to assert itself when the critical moment comes. Our only means of reaching that body of anti-German opinion in TURKEY is through the opposition elements outside TURKEY, and though I admit that the latter have so far proved themselves incapable of any useful concerted action, that is due, in part at least, to the want of any direction or sympathy from us. There are amongst them a few men who are perhaps not quite so incapable of exercising any influence in TURKEY, now or in the future as you seem to think.

By securing them now, we may hope to get first hold on the pro-Entente elements in TURKEY after the war, but if we consistently cold-shoulder them, we shall only drive them and their fellows in TURKEY in despair into the O.U.P. Camp. The net result of this would be that Germany, whether militarily victorious or not, will have gained her end and be able to reckon on a solidly Germanophil TURKEY in either eventuality, - thus realizing one of her principal aims in the great war, "an open road for the DRANG NACH OSTEN!"

*[Signature]*  
Lieut-Colonel, G.S.I.

*if we are to make use of the Turkish opposition - such as Col. Deedes suggests - our first step (before discussing our plans) would be to ascertain how the opposition party view our present Arab policy - we cannot be so straightforward with our Arabs + unless the Turkish party are prepared to admit the future main burden of our obligations to the Arabs, we dare not go in with them*  
R.W.  
20/9/17



S. J. H.

No. 385

(242810/W.44/1917)

✓ KE ✓

Sir M. Anselm

L. G. Hughes

✓ Copy 15 Col. Sec. (for Anselm) Mlt



The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his  
compliments to His Majesty's Representative at **Cairo**  
and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

December 29, 1917.

Reference to previous despatch:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Lord Bertie (Paris) No. 716. Dec. 19.	British forces in the East.



December 19, 1917

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that General Sherif Pasha called on me yesterday and discoursed at considerable length on the serious position that would be created for the British forces in Syria and Palestine by the liberation for operations in Turkey of the Turkish troops on the Russian and Roumanian fronts. He urged the necessity of preparing at once to meet an attack of the Turkish forces reinforced by some 300,000 troops from Europe. This being a matter for military consideration, I asked the Military Attaché to see Sherif Pasha, which he did in the course of the afternoon before Colonel Le Roy Lewis left for England. Captain F. B. Goldney M.P., who has been assisting the Military Attaché at the request of Major-General Sir George Macdonough, was present at the interview, and has drawn up the enclosed report of the views expressed by General Sherif Pasha.

I have from time transmitted to the Foreign Office memoranda on the situation in Turkey which have been communicated to me by General Sherif Pasha, and notably in regard to the Dardanelles expedition (see my despatches Nos. 123 of March 23, 147 of April 11, 211 of June 9, 341, 347 and 355 of September 11, 18 and 23 respectively, 374 and 402 of October 8 and 22, 413, 425 and 433 of November 2, 7 and 21 respectively, 453 and 470 of December 6 and 21, 1915; and Nos. 12 of January 7, 64 and 79 of February

9th

The Right Hon.

A. J. Balfour O.M., M.P.

20

20

20.



February 9 and 21, 135 of April 16, 340 of September 9, 412 and  
445 of October 11 and 30, and 503 of November 30, 1916; and Nos.  
365 of July 21, 500 of September 27, and my private letter to  
Sir Eric Drummond of November 7th of this year.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient,

Humble Servant

(s) Bertie of [redacted]



COPY

British Embassy,

Paris.

19th December, 1917.

To His Excellency,

The Rt. Hon.

The Lord Bertie of Thame, F.R.S., G.C.B.,  
etc., etc., etc.

British Embassy,

PARIS.

My Lord,

I have the honour, in the absence of the Military Attaché, Colonel LeRoy-Lewis, who had arranged, and before leaving Paris yesterday, held, a personal interview with General Cherif Pascha, to report fully as follows upon that conversation which at Colonel LeRoy-Lewis' request took place in my presence.

At the same time I have the honour to enclose a copy of a Declaration given to Colonel LeRoy-Lewis by Cherif Pascha who explained that he had the day/night before handed the Declaration itself to Monsieur Clemenceau, who, to use the translation of the Pascha's own words, "had received it favourably".-

This Declaration bears the signatures of the three leaders who have been chosen acting Chiefs of the Turkish Liberal Party,- Cherif Pascha, Rehid Bey and Prince Sabaheddine.

Throughout the conversation Cherif Pascha was extremely anxious that the British Government and the High British Military Command should be made fully aware of the increasing gravity and danger of the military situation in the Near East, more especially East of Constantinople.- In this connection he insisted that the British High Command had hitherto given too little heed to the possibilities of failure in the different distant enterprises in which they have found themselves engaged.



~~to join hands with both the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia and in Palestine.~~

~~He considers it, therefore, absolutely essential that our own forces should be immediately substantially augmented~~

It was, he said, with a view of ~~preventing the enemy from~~ especially in Palestine and in Egypt, which he asserts is the real in the near future on the Palestine, Mesopotamian and Egyptian objective of the enemy.

fronts, that he so urgently begged that the views he expressed regarding the military should be conveyed at once to the British Military Authorities, so that action may be taken while there is yet time.

Referring to our failure in the Marstonelles he pointed out that he had himself forewarned the British Military Authorities that the Marstonelles expedition planned and carried out as it was, was foredoomed to disaster.

The Pascha then went on to say that the Russian situation would bring about the release of at least three hundred and fifty thousand enemy fighting-men from the Caucasus front.- He added that these enemy reinforcements would probably endeavour to join hands with both the Turkish forces in Mesopotamia and in Palestine.

He considers it, therefore, absolutely essential that our own forces should be immediately substantially augmented especially in Palestine and in Egypt, which he asserts is the real objective of the enemy.

Regarding the Military Situation as affected by the pending enemy reinforcements from the Caucasus, the Pascha strongly emphasised the wisdom of the British occupying and retaining Alexandretta, whence, he urged, that a competent force might well cut the Turkish Army in twain and completely isolate Constantinople and a great slice of Ottoman territory from Palestine and the Arabs who were by no means always to be trusted.

Whilst speaking of the vital importance of Egypt to the British he strongly emphasised the point that at the present



grave period of the War we could not afford to make an error with regard to our security in Egypt, where by certain sections of the population we were cordially disliked, a fact he repeated, <sup>it</sup> which/would be dangerous to ignore.

Continuing, the Pascha stated that the Party of Union and Progress in Constantinople can not be won over to the Allied Cause.

This Party, he added, is now extremely well off for funds as it has instituted a kind of cooperative-supply organisation, under its own control. By this means it has already contrived, out of sales of food, and other necessaries of life, to the partially starving population, to extract for itself a clear profit of over forty millions of pounds sterling.

The Pascha laid great stress upon the urgent necessity for the British to set up a Provisional Government in Turkish Territory; a Government of Turks working loyally with the British Authority.

He asserts that if this were done, and a Proclamation issued and wisely distributed, that the British aim is solely to rescue Turkey for the Turks from Teutonic designs and insidious domination, it would not only be widely welcomed, but its effect would be felt even as far as Constantinople itself.

The Pascha also strongly insists that we should at once institute an active Propaganda, not English, but Mussulman.

For this purpose he says that he and his friends are prepared to place themselves entirely at the disposal of the British Government, and in this connection he added that his own position as well as that of his friends is far greater in comparison, for instance; than that of the present Revolutionary Leaders in Russia who appear to have been so successful in misleading the Moscovite people.



He says that with a Provisional Government, a Mussulman Committee and a Mussulman Propaganda, very large numbers of Turkish Officers would be won over to the Allied Cause.- to which many are already known to be sympathetic.

In addition to winning over so many of these Officers in Palestine and Mesopotamia we should also gain considerable numbers of those now on the Caucasus Front.

He expressed also his personal conviction that if a large number of the last mentioned officers came over to the side of the Allies, a proportion at least of the Armies themselves now in Palestine and Mesopotamia as well as on the Caucasus Front might well be expected to come over too.

In conclusion the Pasha expressed the opinion that the Russians without Constantinople are no longer the vital necessity for us which they would be if Constantinople were in their ultimate power.

I have the honour to be, My Lord,  
your most obedient, humble servant.  
(sgd) Francis Bennett-Gelany,  
Captain.



Nous avons l'honneur de faire part à l'éminent  
Chef du Gouvernement Français de l'entente parfaite  
qui s'est établie entre les Chefs de l'Opposition  
Libérale Turque réunis aujourd'hui en séance extraordinaire.

Nous espérons ardemment que le concours  
bienveillant du Gouvernement de la République ne nous  
fera pas défaut dans l'accomplissement de notre devoir  
patriotique.

Nous avons l'honneur de prier Monsieur le  
Président du Conseil, de vouloir bien agréer avec l'expression  
de notre estime particulière, l'assurance réitérée de notre très  
haute considération.

(signé)

**CHERIF**

**A. RECHID**

**SARAFEDDINE**





This was the  
circular issued in 1909  
with the hope of checking  
pro-German propaganda  
in the East; but it  
failed. We got no report  
at home. Some other:

G. Adolphus Turner  
London W.C.

20 Nov. 1917



## THE NEW ERA IN TURKEY.

*The following circular letter has been addressed by the Eastern Question Association to its Corresponding Members and District Agents:—*

SIR,

In reply to enquiries from Members of the Association desiring guidance in their public utterances on the Turkish Question, the Committee desire to offer the following observations.

It is clear from evidence obtained from the most trustworthy sources that the Constitutional Party in the Ottoman Empire has still to contend with enormous internal difficulties, varying no doubt in degree or extent, but all constituting grave dangers to the stability of the new régime. For this reason no efforts should be spared by those who speak and write on this question—certainly the most urgent problem of the present time—to press upon the various races dwelling in the Ottoman Empire the paramount duty of giving a loyal and whole-hearted support to the Turkish reformers in their onerous tasks. It must be remembered that during the whole course of their career, whether as exiles or as citizens of a reformed State, these men have given proofs of their sincerity, capacity and unselfishness for which history will long hold them in honour.

The problems with which the Government of the Porte is confronted are the most complex which any State in Europe—perhaps in the whole world—has to meet. They are at once external and internal—questions of national existence, and military defence—of race, of creed, of ancient tradition, and of patriotic pride.

I. To take first the external question of National independence, it is plain that the very existence of Turkey in Europe has been threatened and attacked at intervals for a century by powerful neighbours, and has been repeatedly the subject of European settlements. And it has been continually harassed by the pretensions of smaller races on its southern and eastern frontiers. All these encroachments on Ottoman autonomy have been opened again by recent events, and are still hardly yet closed.

It is, as you are aware, the aim of this Association to urge the maintenance of the *status quo*—the National independence of the Ottoman Empire—as the key-note of peace in Europe,—as it is essentially a prime interest of British policy, especially with regard to our vast Moslem dominion in the East.

Any movement which would threaten the stability of the actual Ottoman Sovereignty tends to re-open the embroilments chronic in the Balkan Peninsula, and brings us to the verge of incalculable confusion and adventures. For thirty-five years at least, in a series of wars and military demonstrations, the Turks have proved their ancient capacity for defence. And it cannot be seriously argued that any other people are now able to take their place in this region of the Near East. It has therefore been the first task of the Turkish Reformers to guarantee the independence of the Ottoman State, and it must be a cardinal point of European—and especially of British—diplomacy to support that principle.



II. The novel and most promising reform proclaimed by the Turkish Constitutionalists is this—that, whilst appealing to the patriotic and warlike traditions of the dominant race, they announce the complete equality and freedom of all Ottoman citizens, Christian, Catholic, Jew, Greek, or Armenian, without distinction of race, creed, or custom. But this momentous and auspicious revolution in a people fervently devoted to Islam, as the bulk of the Turkish race still remains, is a change of front as difficult to execute as it is blessed to contemplate. When carried out successfully it would at once compose those passions and feuds which have formed the crux of European diplomacy for more than half a century, and have been the battle-ground even of British parties. The peculiar difficulty of the problem of introducing constitutional and liberal institutions into the disparate Ottoman State consists in this, that this State is at once European and Asiatic, Moslem and Christian, in varying and different degrees of civilization, and contains five or six different races, bitterly hostile to each other, jealous of all superiorities, animated with extravagant aspirations, and together greatly outnumbering in many provinces the old Turk element, which, for the present can alone supply the necessary force, whether military or administrative.

The Turkish Reformers are willing to cede the position of being exclusively and permanently the sole dominant race in the Empire, and yet for the time being they are obviously the only Ottoman race competent to defend the State from its mighty neighbours, and also to guarantee order amidst the jealous and ambitious races within the Empire, to whom they offer religious equality and civic justice.

To the Turkish Reformers who have devoted their lives and their fortunes to this magnificent but perilous task, all men should heartily give their support if they value the peace of Europe and have hopes for the future of human civilisation.

FREDERIC HARRISON, *President.*

EDWARD ATKIN, *Hon. Secretary.*

EASTERN QUESTION ASSOCIATION,

3, Plowden Buildings,

London, E.C.

27th August, 1909.



# EASTERN QUESTION ASSOCIATION.

Address of the President — Professor D. S. Margoliouth, Litt D.

*Delivered 4 April, 1911.*

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I deeply regret that the Chair on this occasion is not occupied by the President of last year (Mr. Frederic Harrison), who, from his intimate acquaintance with the Ottoman reformers, from his mastery of political science, and from his command of public attention, is so admirably qualified to fill it. No one is more conscious than myself of the real loss we have sustained by his retirement.

An Ottoman statesman, who has kindly consented to address us later on in the year, has found fault with the name of the Association, on the ground that the Eastern Question is now solved, and our title implies that it is open. It is proposed to make a slight alteration in the name, so that it may no longer be open to this objection. The doctrine that the Eastern Question is now solved seems not unreasonable, if we remember that questions of such import are never finally solved, as we know in our own country from such cases as the 'Irish Question, or even the British Constitution. By solution then we mean material progress towards solution, and this the Ottoman reformers may well claim to have achieved.

The sources whence those who live in one country can learn what is going on in another are in the main, two ; the statements of their own countrymen who are either permanently settled in the other or have visited it, and the statements of the ordinary inhabitants in their own newspapers and publications. An invaluable source of the former kind has been lost to the Association by the death of Sir William Whittall, a truly great and unselfish Englishman, justly respected and even revered in Turkey, at all times in active sympathy with good causes.

The British public has had accounts of the new régime in Turkey from several highly-qualified observers, among whom Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay, Sir Edwin Pears, Mr. David Fraser, and Mr. Noel Buxton may be named. All these writers agree that the present government is the best which Turkey has hitherto had. Far less sympathetic is the account given by the eminent German Orientalist, Herr Hartmann, who paints both the character and prospects of the Turks in what might be called prophetic black. Yet even he admits some rays of light in the case of the latter, if not of the former.

If we turn to the second class of sources, it must be observed in the first place that their existence is characteristic of the new régime. The Ottoman press before the Revolution scarcely existed ; it is now on a level with the metropolitan journalism of Europe. Unlike much of the daily press even in this country, the journals of Constantinople are able, during the greater part of the year, to interest their readers with serious matter without having recourse to fiction. During the troublous times of the year which has passed, the *Tanin*, which I regularly read, appears to have handled every question with the restraint and dignity which are characteristic of the best journalism ; and other Constantinople newspapers have probably done the same. The freedom of the press has, as might be expected, started a new epoch in Ottoman literature. Just as there is a publication by the Society of Ottoman Painters, so there is an Ottoman Historical Society, which issues a journal containing matter that is both interesting and important. The life of ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, by Osman Nuri Bey, presents from every point of view an advance on any original biography which has hitherto appeared in a Moslem language. Translations are also being issued of European works on Ottoman and Islamic history, such as Englehardt's treatise on the *Tanzimat*, and Syed Ameer Ali's Islamic history. The Constantinople booksellers have commenced issuing printed catalogues, which they do not appear to have done before.



More important than the progress of science and art is that in political and religious equality. To begin with the Jews ; on March 5, the member for Salonika observed in the Ottoman Parliament that : "not only the Ottoman Israelites but "even foreign Israelites felt cordial attachment towards the Turkish government, "it being well known that when the Jews had been contumeliously driven out from "other countries that government had opened to them the wings of its kindness "and protection ; and would at no time refrain from manifesting the same generosity" ; a sentiment which was received with loud applause. The charge of Zionism (which in Turkish is said to mean the desire to sell the country to the Jews), brought against the government, and shown to be ridiculous, is nevertheless evidence that good treatment is accorded to that nation. With regard to Armenians and Greeks, paragraphs occasionally appear in the newspapers indicating that these races are developing, or at least manifesting Ottoman patriotism. In the *Tanin* of March 4 there is an announcement of a contribution sent to the Ottoman Fleet Fund by the Greek Christians of a certain village ; and in that of February 6 the Armenian organ of Yuzgad is cited for a resolution on the part of the Armenians of that region to devote to the same fund the money ordinarily spent on cakes and sweets for their national festival ; a resolution which the *Tanin* naturally reports with enthusiasm. But it may be doubted whether even in worse times the sentiment of Ottoman patriotism was wanting in a large part of the Armenian nation, who felt pride in the greatness of the Empire, and were unwilling to see it dismembered.

The statement in the *Saturday Review* of March 11 that the position of the Sultan's Christian subjects seems to be worse since the Constitution receives a curious commentary from the story of the Greek difficulty last year, when a Bill was passed with the view of definitely settling the dispute between the Greek and Bulgarian churches, which has been the cause of trouble since 1870, when the latter was recognised by the Porte, and indeed longer. The Bill is said to have been drawn on lines closely resembling those whereon a dispute between two of the Scotch churches was settled in this country quite recently. The Greek Patriarch addressed a violent and menacing letter to the Ottoman Ministry of Justice, which declined to receive it. He also summoned a Greek National Assembly, and persisted in this course when such an assembly had been forbidden by the government. There is no question that under the former régime these steps on the part of the Greek ecclesiastics would have cost a large portion of their co-religionists their lives. The present government simply prevented the meeting of the assembly with a minimum of force. The difference between being massacred and being treated like naughty children appears to most of us very considerable ; the latter is a decided improvement on the former.

The Macedonian troubles have been the subject of a question in the House of Lords, and the *Times* of March 10 published a statement by Talaat Bey, ex-Minister of the Interior, declaring that rumour had greatly exaggerated what had occurred. The *Times* replied that its correspondent could not be mistaken. We are therefore in the same difficulty with regard to this matter as to the case of Ireland ; a magazine was circulated for months, called "Grievances from Ireland," giving details of outrages committed on Irish Protestants, and inadequately punished ; the Chief Secretary for Ireland, on the other hand, declared that the state of the country was comparatively satisfactory. Which should be believed in such a case, the official or the unofficial reporter ?

Here is the statement of a Turkish gentleman on this subject. Ali Hikmet Nahid Bey writes :—

"It is idle for any person to declare that the Macedonian Committees, with "their complete organization, have attempted to co-operate with the Ottoman



“authorities, in a hearty spirit or generally for the good government of the country.  
 “No one can doubt that the aim of these Committees is to render impossible any  
 “improvement in the state of affairs, and the following order of the Monastir Revolu-  
 “tionary Committee, threatening with death Christians disobeying its commands,  
 “requires no further explanation :—



ORDER OF COMMITTEE }  
 CONCERNING ARMS. } Monastir. 27 May, 1910.

1. Give up a quarter of the worst arms to the local authorities.
2. Anyone giving up his arms contrary to this order will be secretly killed.
3. As soon as a state of siege is declared at Monastir, send journals, records, and all Committee correspondence to the Central Committee.

“Passports, bearing the authorised seals of the Revolutionary Committee,  
 “were regularly issued during the past two years, and copies have been produced  
 “in the Chamber of Deputies. The seals were discovered in the house of Atchi  
 “Doreff, a well-known resident at Monastir. The signature of Blagé Christoff,  
 “voivode of Chrechovo, on a revolutionary document in the possession of the Ministry  
 “of the Interior, and dated 4th May, 1910, has been admitted to be genuine ;  
 “it was delivered to Michael Constandinoff, whose name it bears.”

In favour of Talaat Bey's report some pieces of evidence may be cited. On the one hand there have been meetings held by Osmanli Greeks and Bulgarians protesting against the charges brought against the Ottoman government by the European press. At one held in Voden in the vilayet of Salonika on March 4, there was a resolution carried to the effect that in consequence of the justice and generosity which they had experienced from the Ottoman government their sentiments of loyalty towards it were absolutely unshakeable, and that they indignantly repudiated the false charges which the European papers had brought against it. At a mixed meeting of 800 Moslems and non-Moslems held in the district of Petritch about the same date a protest was similarly raised against the defamation of the Ottoman government. Under the former régime there would neither have been indignation meetings on any subject whatever, nor would the press have been permitted to report them. Secondly, it is worth observing that in a paper which professes to defend the interests of the Arabs the same minister is charged with having in Adana armed the Christian population against the Moslems. The explanation which suggests itself is that in countries where racial and religious animosities have burned so long and so fiercely the Government if it represses is said to commit atrocities, if it does not repress, to permit them. And the eulogies which men receive for solving questions of great difficulty indicate that they deserve little blame if they fail to solve them to everyone's satisfaction.

There is one other Christian community in a remote part of the Ottoman Empire about which something must be said, partly because the evidence before us in this case is absolutely trustworthy and impartial. The Archbishop of Canterbury's Missionaries to the Assyrian Christians have been scrupulously just to the new government, and it is therefore to be regretted that the reports which their last Journal contains are decidedly gloomy in character. There are two documents dealing with the condition of the Nestorians under the new régime, one in the naive English of a Syrian, the other by an English clergyman. Of the two, that by the Syrian is the more favourable. His community have been incessantly raided and plundered by the 'Kurds, and under the old system there was no redress. In the Province of Diarbekr there would seem to be some improvement. He writes :—“There had been three villages of Syrians burned  
 “and ravaged by the Kurds”—the writer is dealing with the end of 1909—“and  
 “the inhabitants had been scattered to various places. After I had travelled in  
 “these villages I asked of the Government that the things that had been taken  
 “from them should be returned to them. We got an order from the Government



"of Diarbekr, and the Kaimmakam of Jezireh did give us sixty soldiers and they  
"got back a good portion of the things which had been taken, sheep to wit and  
"lambs and some part of the household stuff ; they also took the bracelets and  
"rings of the Kurdish women in the place of the things that were not found, and  
"some money." This Syrian also succeeded in getting the chief oppressor of  
the Christians arrested and imprisoned.

The rest of his letter deals with a matter in which neither the Christians nor  
the Government come off with credit. The Uniats—i.e., Nestorians, who have  
adopted the Roman doctrine—of Alkosh, having returned to the Nestorian  
community, desired to have a Bishop appointed over them by the Nestorian  
Patriarch. Such a Bishop was sent, but the Romanists decided to thwart this  
movement, and are said to have plotted against the life of the Bishop-elect, and  
to have induced the local government to refuse recognition either to the Nestorians  
as a sect, or to their Bishop ; who received orders to return to the seat of the  
Patriarch, but had to adopt various disguises and expedients in order to avoid the  
plot against his life. The complaint then made in this letter against the Govern-  
ment is not that of favouring Moslems against Christians, but of unduly favouring  
one Christian sect against another, and indeed owing to bribes. Meanwhile, the  
moral condition of Christianity in these parts is evidence that such non-proselytizing  
agencies as the Archbishop's Mission are by no means superfluous.

Mr. Wigram's report from the remoter region of Julamerik is far more  
unsatisfactory, and one paragraph of it may be excerpted : "The men of a village  
"in Tiari were up with their flocks in the summer pasture when the Kaimmakam  
"passed with his train. They offered their share of the taxes which they supposed  
"he had come to collect, but he told them to have it ready later. Two nights  
"later soldiers attacked the tents, carried off all the sheep there on account of  
"the taxes, and even tore the clothes off the women, a thing which Kurdish  
"raiders do not do. The sheep were taken to Julamerik, and complaint was made  
"to the Governor. He ordered the sheep to be returned and money to be taken  
"in their place. The order was disregarded and the sheep marched off to another  
"district to be sold. This being one of several similar cases, the Nestorians think  
"the old régime was better than the new."

Attention has been paid only to the intellectual revival and to the question  
whether there is any noticeable advance in religious and political liberty and  
equality. About the first there seems to be no doubt ; with regard to the second the  
improvement would seem to vary inversely with distance from the centre, so that  
near the Eastern extremity of the Empire things are much as they were.

Rome, however, was not built in a day. The doctrine with which this address  
started seems reasonable and generous, viz., that in the case of great political and  
social problems credit for solution should be given to those who have materially  
advanced them ; whilst we may be confident that the Ottoman Reformers will not  
take that view of their operations, and will not rest so long as possibilities of  
amelioration and improvement display themselves. I cannot close these remarks  
without entirely associating myself with every word uttered by Mr Harrison in  
his presidential address of last year. We have no concern with the party politics  
of Turkey or Persia. We do not presume to support or oppose the policy of Great  
Britain or of any other country. Our main interests are humanitarian, social and  
educational. We desire that reformed administration shall be undertaken solely for  
the benefit and strengthening of the Governments of the Sultan and the Shah,  
because we know from the teachings of history that the one sure basis of successful  
government is the constant and perpetual wish and determination of the Ruler to  
render to every man his due.



Det. 70.

no. 20

Handwritten

Opinion's memo  
must be sent  
under a cover  
to the FO —


It is fairly conclusive  
generally sound —  
except in one point.  
R. W. 6/2/18



*HQE*


*I/10740/B.*

The Residency,  
CAIRO.



With reference to your minute of January  
21st 1918, forwarding copy of No. 385 (242810/W44/1917,) <sup>(48/15)</sup>  
from the Foreign Office, on the subject of the British  
Forces in the East, I forward herewith copy of remarks  
by Capt. R.W.Graves C.M.G., with which I entirely concur.

G.H.Q. 1st Echelon.  
1/2/18.

  
Lieut. Colonel,  
P.I.



I.7951/B.

1. The declaration handed in by Sherif Pasha is misleading. He, Sabhaeddine Effendi and Reshid Bey have never been chosen as Chiefs of the Turkish Liberal Opposition, but seem to have appointed themselves to that position at a recent meeting which they had in Switzerland. They are not really representative of the Opposition parties in Turkey, and their alleged "entire agreement" would not be binding upon any but a few of their personal friends and adherents.

SHERIF PASHA himself is a vain and ambitious windbag, who only owes his position to the money of his wife, an Egyptian Princess.

SABAHEDDINE EFFINDI, son of the late MAHMOUD DAMAD PASHA and of a sister of the Ex Sultan ABDUL HAMID, is a plausible exponent of the decentralization policy for Turkey, but has no capacity for action.

RESHID BEY ex-Minister of the Interior in GHAZI MUKHTAR PASHA'S Cabinet, is more capable and energetic, and is feared by the Young Turks on that account. But he has a bad record as a corrupt and unscrupulous official under the old regime in Turkey.

2. SHERIF PASHA'S views on the Military situation are of very little value. The danger of Turkish forces being released from the Caucasus front owing to the Russian collapse is sufficiently obvious, but whereas SHERIF talks of 350,000 fighting men being so released, the total Turkish Force on that front was estimated at about 150,000 last autumn, and has already been drawn upon to a considerable extent for Mesopotamia and Palestine.

3. The Advice to occupy ALEXANDRETTA is an old story, and must be regarded as a "Counsel of Perfection" at the present moment.

4. Our unpopularity with the Egyptian population while regrettable cannot be regarded as a cause for present anxiety.

5. It is quite possible to agree with the proposition that the party of Union and progress in Constantinople can not be won over to the Allied causes. The statement that the party has made a clear profit of £40,000,000 from sales of food etc, is mere guesswork and is probably greatly exaggerated.

6. The proposal to set up a provisional Government in Occupied Turkish Territory could not possibly be entertained, unless we were in occupation of some part of ANATOLIA. To do so anywhere in the Arab Countries would be a reversal of our whole policy towards the Arab movement.

7. Nonobjection can be taken to the suggestion that we should institute a more active Mussulman propaganda, and one would be glad to hear how Sherif Pasha and his friends propose to assist us in the matter. The usual proposal is that we should provide funds for the publication of Turkish opposition - Newspapers in Egypt and elsewhere, the practical value of which would be very doubtful.

sd, R.W. Graves,  
Capt.

22nd Jan. 1918.

G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon.

E.E.F.





THE RESIDENCY,

CAIRO.

February 7th 1918.

No. 20.

(48)

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No.335 of December 29th, forwarding copy of Paris despatch No.716 of December 19th, relative to the Military and Political situation in the Near East, and to report that I communicated copy of this despatch, and enclosures, to the General Staff of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

I have now the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum on the subject, which has been submitted to the Commander-in-Chief by Captain R.W. Graves, C.M.C., formerly Financial Adviser to the Ottoman Government.

I have sent copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest respect,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) REGINALD WINGATE

The Right Honourable

Arthur James Balfour, M.A., M.P.,

etc.

etc.

etc.



## M E M O R A N D U M

1. The Declaration handed in by Sherif Pasha is misleading. He, Laqaseddine Effendi and Meshid Bey have never been chosen as chiefs of the Turkish liberal opposition, but seem to have appointed themselves to that position at a recent meeting which they had in Switzerland. They are not really representative of the opposition parties in Turkey, and their alleged 'entire agreement' would not be binding upon any but a few of their personal friends and adherents.  
  
SHERIF PASHA himself is a vain and ambitious windbag, who only owes his position to the money of his wife, an Egyptian Princess.  
  
LAQASADDINE EFFENDI, son of the late Mahmud Nasir Pasha and of a sister of the ex Sultan Abdul Hamid, is a plausible exponent of the decentralization policy for Turkey, but has no capacity for action.  
  
MESHID BEY, ex-minister of the Interior in Ghazi Mustafa Pasha's Cabinet, is more capable and energetic, and is feared by the Young Turks on that account. But he has a bad record as a corrupt and unscrupulous official under the old régime in Turkey.
2. Sherif Pasha's views on the military situation are of very little value. The danger of Turkish forces being released from the Caucasus front owing to the Russian collapse is sufficiently obvious, but whereas Sherif talks of 350,000 fighting men being so released, the total Turkish force on that front was estimated at about 150,000 last Autumn, and has already been drawn upon to a considerable extent for Mesopotamia and Palestine.
3. The advice to occupy ALEXANDRIA is an old story, and must be regarded as a "Counsel of perfection" at the present moment.
4. Our unpopularity with the Egyptian population while regrettable cannot be regarded as a cause for present anxiety.
5. It is quite possible to agree with the proposition that the party of Union and progress in Constantinople can not be won over to the allied causes. The statement that the party has made a clear profit of 140,000,000 from sales of food etcetra is mere guesswork and is probably greatly exaggerated.
6. The proposal to set up a provisional government in occupied Turkish territory could not possibly be entertained, unless we were in occupation of some part of ANATOLIA. To do so anywhere in the Arab Countries would be a reversal of our whole policy



policy towards the Arab movement.

7. No objection can be taken to the suggestion that we should institute a more active Mussulman propaganda, and one would be glad to hear how Sherif Fakhri and his friends propose to assist us in the matter. The usual proposal is that we should provide funds for the publication of Turkish opposition - newspapers in Egypt and elsewhere, the practical value of which could be very doubtful.

(Signed) W. A. CLAYTON,  
Captain.

G.H.Q., 2nd Echelon,  
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.  
January 22nd 1918.



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

102

Feb. 23<sup>rd</sup> 1918  
H. du Vallum

Dear H. du Vallum

HIGH COMMISSIONER EGYPT	
23 FEB 1918	
NO	48 / 20

The attached political reports having been  
signed in Bern may be of interest to you  
though possibly you will have received the  
information already

Yours sincerely  
C. J. R. du Vallum

I have sent a copy to OSI 2 Tchen



18th J anuary 1918.

G/EAST/151.

## T U R K E Y (Political)

=====

The following is from G.12:-

1. Early this week G.12 had the opportunity of a long chat with MAHMOUD MOUKHTAR Pasha, late Turkish Ambassador in BERLIN.
2. During the conversation MAHMOUD MOUKHTAR expressed the following views :-
3. In view of the geographical situation of TURKEY, this EMPIRE would always be in close contact with the BRITISH.
4. TURKEY's political life, therefore, is absolutely dependent upon the goodwill of GREAT BRITAIN.
5. The reform, or ruin, of the country: her commerce: and her financial future are also dependent upon the friendship of GREAT BRITAIN.
6. Mr. LLOYD GEORGE's last speech has very much astonished him, and also other TURKS - friends of his - in SWITZERLAND, as there was no mention of BULGARIA.
7. The impression that has been left is that GREAT BRITAIN desires to favour BULGARIA.
8. The KAISER's JOURNEY to CONSTANTINOPLE made no impression upon the population. He gave away a number of decorations, but the only GERMAN power in TURKEY to-day is ENVER Pasha and some of the military.
9. The action of the GERMANS during the war in TURKEY has no disgusted the TURKISH Population that GERMANY will not be able to develop her trade in TURKEY after the war in the way she expects.
10. He is confident that the prestige of GREAT BRITAIN will be greater the World over after the war than it was before. But, for all that, GERMANY will still have some hold on the EAST.
11. In his opinion, the present moment is the right one for TURKEY to make a strong effort to come to an understanding with GREAT BRITAIN.
12. TURKEY will be obliged to agree to the AUTONOMY of ARABIA and PALESTINE, and also MESOPOTAMIA.
13. She will, however, resist any effort to include SYRIA among the Autonomous States.
14. SYRIA he considers one of the richest TURKISH Provinces and indispensable to the future of TURKEY.
15. The TURKISH policy, with respect to the Arabs has always been bad. If a decent line had been observed with respect to the ARABS, they would to-day be fighting with the TURKS.



16. He strongly urged the idea of an understanding between TURKEY and GREAT BRITAIN in the common interest of both, for, he said, GREAT BRITAIN, as a Great MOHAMMEDAN Power, required the support and friendship of TURKEY.
17. With respect to the TOURANIAN Movement, MAHMOUD MOUKHTAR Pasha was very scathing. He said it was all GERMAN propaganda prepared for the purpose of exciting the TURKS, but, in view of the diversity of customs of the various MOHAMMEDAN races spreading from CONSTANTINOPLE to SIBERIA, and the difficulties of communication, in his opinion the whole movement was destined to failure.
18. Entirely from his personal point of view, he considered the proposals of the Allies with respect to TURKEY entirely satisfactory.
19. He said that the policy of freeing the ARABS from TURKISH control was entirely justified, for the hatred between the ARAB and the TURK was greater than between the ALLIES and the CENTRAL POWERS.
20. G.12 then asked MAHMOUD MOUKHTAR Pasha why he did not write these views to the public press. His reply was that he was frightened of the GERMANS.
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18th January 1918.

From G.23.T U R K E Y ( Political )  
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1. G.23 recently had the opportunity of a long conversation with the TURKISH Minister in BERNE. His Excellency stated that he could not understand Mr. LLOYD GEORGE and the BRITISH policy. It appeared to him that the present moment would be one in which GREAT BRITAIN would make a special effort to win the friendship of TURKEY. The awakening of TURKEY now in progress is much greater than is generally realised. The TURKS, who, in the past, have taken on interest in trade and industry are doing so now to a degree that would astonish any ENTENTE National who knew TURKEY and the TURKS before November, 1914.
2. A people who was awakening was always dangerous. GREAT BRITAIN, with her large MUSSULMAN population, should therefore make an effort to win the friendship of TURKEY during the period of her awakening and not antagonise her.
3. RUSSIA had always been the object of TURKEY's hatred and fear. Now, not only has this disappeared with the Revolution in RUSSIA, but there was an opportunity of expansion by treaties and arrangements in the direction of TURKESTAN and MOHAMMEDAN RUSSIA. It was the intention of TURKEY to take every advantage possible of the change in RUSSIA, and also as a consequence of this change, of the change in PERSIA. TURKEY would be able to win their brothers in PERSIA and in RUSSIA and form a large MOHAMMEDAN EMPIRE. This Empire it is in the interest of GREAT BRITAIN to be friendly with.
4. Speaking of the EX-KHEDIVE and the future of EGYPT, the Minister stated that under no circumstances would the EX-KHEDIVE ever rule EGYPT. In the event of victory of the Central Powers, a TURKISH Prince would be appointed.
5. NEGOTIATIONS at BREST LITOVSK.

From the conversation that the Minister had had with the members of the GERMAN Legation, he had come to the conclusion that if the BOLSHEVIKS at BREST LITOVSK did not agree to the GERMAN terms amicably, they would be compelled to do so by force.

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COPY

G.EAST.161

GENEVA, 26th January 1918.

From G.10

T U R K E Y                      P O L I T I C A L

=====

TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS WITH GERMANY FOR ASSISTANCE  
in PALESTINE .....

1. SELIM FUAD Bey, TURKISH Minister in BERNE, has received the following instructions from CONSTANTINOPLE :-

GERMANY and AUSTRIA treat our friendly applications for assistance in the matter of reconquering PALESTINE and JERUSALEM in an evasive manner which we have reason to believe is prompted by the Christian fanaticism of both countries in particular those of the AUSTRIAN Court. Therefore to help our efforts with our Allies it is necessary that you undertake the confidential and delicate mission of arranging for the publication of suitable articles in the SWISS Press, which should point out the invaluable services rendered by TURKEY to GERMANY and AUSTRIA and that the victories against RUSSIA would not have been possible without the help of TURKEY. And that if the seal of TURKEY in the war was checked by any action of the two Central Powers the result would be felt very quickly.

SELIM FUAD acted on these instructions, and granted an interview to the editor of the "Bund", in which, however, he did not go to the length required of him by the Sublime Porte.

2. A telegram has been received from CONSTANTINOPLE in which the Foreign Office says that the "Bund" interview was exactly what was wanted and that it has had the necessary effect in BERLIN. It adds "We wish to communicate to you our entire satisfaction and to say that the efforts in various directions in this matter (PALESTINE) have not been without results."

The efforts referred to are a memorandum addressed to the GERMAN Ambassador in CONSTANTINOPLE in which the following is set out :-

That the delay and procrastination shown by our great Ally in coming to our help in PALESTINE is having a disastrous effect upon the public opinion and in the Army. The Government is being severely criticised by its own supporters, to such lengths are the criticisms directed that we fear that unless an effort is made in the way suggested, a rising in the Army is possible and a consequent fall of the Government.

This communication has had the desired effect, for von KUHIMANN has confirmed his previous verbal assurances by showing us a confidential memorandum in which GERMANY states that she will not fail at the proper moment and in the near future to lend TURKEY the necessary military aid to expel the BRITISH from PALESTINE and JERUSALEM and that in any case the return of PALESTINE and JERUSALEM will be made fundamental condition of the evacuation of BELGIUM.



PLANS TO WIN BRITISH SYMPATHY.

The Minister wrote to CONSTANTINOPLE some little time ago suggesting that steps be taken to win British sympathy for TURKEY. That GREAT BRITAIN was a great Power and particularly a great MOSLEM Power and that she would be necessary to the future of TURKEY, &c. &c.

He has now received a telegram that he should begin the propaganda suggested as the sympathy of GREAT BRITAIN is necessary for TURKEY not only in the future but the present also. He should, however, throw the responsibility of the war upon the rulers of GREAT BRITAIN and not upon the people who were always friendly to TURKEY.

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G/EAST/163E A S T E R N      P O L I T I C A L.  
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1.        We learned at the beginning of this week that KARA KEMAL, one of the most influential - if not the most influential - member of the Committee of Union & Progress, spent two nights in GENEVA: that the TURKISH Minister in BERNE came here: and that there was much conferring between KARA KEMAL, the Minister and the Turkish Consul in GENEVA.
  2.        The information has been confirmed to us from other sources, and at the same time denied from sources equally well informed.
  3.        It is said that KARA KEMAL brought a large portion of the funds of the Committee, and all their important archives.
  4.        The policy with respect to PALESTINE, MESOPOTAMIA and ARABIA which the Committee wish spreading among the TURKISH element in this country - and so to get it to work back to CONSTANTINOPLE - is that these Provinces have always been a drain on the TURKISH Exchequer: that any arrangement, therefore, by which tribute be paid to TURKEY in future, would mean a financial advantage which would increase the power of the Central Government in CONSTANTINOPLE and facilitate the development of ASIA MINOR.
  5.        At the same time as this policy is to be spread with respect to the three Provinces; the line adopted with regard to ARMENIA is to be that this Province cannot, under any circumstances, be separated from TURKEY.
  6.        We send this information forward with some reserve. We are continuing investigations, and have asked BERNE to do so also.
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E A S T E R N      R E P O R T      P O L I T I C A L  
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The following are recent TURKISH Diplomatic appointments with some information concerning the Ministers in question:.

**STOCKHOLM.** HUSSEINE DJEVAD Bey, the new TURKISH Minister at STOCKHOLM, was born in 1873 at CHANAK KALE (Dardanelles). He spent his boyhood in CONSTANTINOPLE and there completed his education at GALATA SERAI.

In 1893 he ~~was~~ attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he remained two years. Since 1895 HUSSEINE DJEVAD has always held appointments abroad, his first appointment being as third Secretary to the Embassy at TEHERAN. In 1897 he was sent to PETROGRAD and in 1898 to VIENNA. From 1899 to 1905 he ~~was~~ second Secretary to the TURKISH Legation in ATHENS, afterwards to CETTINGUE as first Secretary and in 1907 was appointed first Secretary to the Embassy at PETROGRAD. In 1908 he succeeded ABDUL HAKK HAMID Bey as Adviser to the Embassy, the latter being appointed Minister at BRUSSELS. From LONDON where he remained until 1913 he was appointed Adviser to the Embassy at WASHINGTON. Shortly before the SERAJEVO incident HUSSEINE DJEVAD was appointed Minister at BELGRADE where his mission was to replace on an amicable basis the diplomatic relations so much disturbed by the BALKAN War. TURKEY's entry into the present war terminated his activities in SERBIA.

During the war he has held the post of Minister (ad interim) at STOCKHOLM, COPENHAGEN and SOFIA respectively.

HUSSEINE DJEVAD has left CONSTANTINOPLE to take up his post at STOCKHOLM.

**COPENHAGEN.** ALI FUAD HIKMET Bey, the successor of SEFA Bey, as TURKISH Minister at COPENHAGEN, is the brother of the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He was born in CONSTANTINOPLE in 1867 and is the eldest son of the late HIKMET Bey; who was President of the Court of Cassation. He was educated at GALATA SERAI where he took his degree. He entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at an early age and he was appointed in 1891 Secretary to the TURKISH Embassy at PETROGRAD, from whence he was appointed in 1895 to VIENNA, in 1896 to BERLIN and in 1901 again to VIENNA, where, in 1902 he was appointed Adviser to the Embassy. With the same appointment he went to PETROGRAD in 1905 and afterwards to ROME.

In 1908 FUAD HIKMET was appointed Consul General at BUDAPEST and in 1909 was sent as TURKISH Minister to BELGRADE. He remained in the SERBIAN capital until the outbreak of the BALKAN WAR.

In 1911 FUAD HIKMET would have been appointed Ambassador at ROME but owing to the war in TRIPOLI he could not join his post. Shortly before the breaking off of relations between AMERICA and TURKEY it was intended that he should be appointed Ambassador at WASHINGTON.

In 1912 he married a GERMAN.

**SOFIA.** The return of FETHY Bey to the Chamber as Deputy of CONSTANTINOPLE a month ago rendered vacant the post of Minister at SOFIA. HUSSEINE DJEVAD Bey acted as Minister in the interim



until the recent appointment to this post of SEFA Bey.

SEFA Bey, Minister at SOFIA, belongs to an ALBANIAN family. He is an old pupil of GALAT SERAI and on finishing his studies was attached to the Correspondence Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He afterwards became Director of this Bureau.

After the TURKISH Revolution he was appointed in September 1908 Minister to the TURKISH Legation in BUCHAREST where he remained until diplomatic relations between ROUMANIA and TURKEY were broken off.

In November last he was appointed Minister at COPENHAGEN. SEFA Bey arrived at SOFIA from COPENHAGEN via BERLIN with his wife on January 6th.

-- \*\*\* --



COPY.

N°.305.

BERNE.

26th January 1918.

EASTERN REPORT - POLITICAL.

=====

Following from B.13:-

Previous to the departure of TALAAT PASHA for BREST-LITOVSK a Council of Ministers was held at CONSTANTINOPLE and among many minor points the following more important ones were decided upon, and TALAAT PASHA was requested to insist on these.

1. (a) The return to TURKEY of the whole of occupied ARMENIA. TURKEY would be willing to consult the population of ARMENIA as to their form of Government but that there should be no outside interference in this question. The point of view of the Council of Ministers was that they could safely agree to such a proposal as the ARMENIAN population are now in the minority, the provinces in question being composed principally of TURKS who would vote in accordance with the wishes of the Government.
- (b) The freedom of the Straits would be assured to RUSSIA with a reservation that some special arrangement would have to be arrived at between TURKEY and RUSSIA as to the manner in which the Straits would be closed in the event of TURKEY going to war with another country.
2. MOUKHTAR Bey of the Prisoner Exchange Commission (who is still in SWITZERLAND) informed B.13 that if the GERMANS did not support the TURKISH point of view at BREST-LITOVSK conference TURKEY would be forced to admit that she could not really count on GERMAN promises which have been repeatedly made to her and that she would then be obliged to make the best bargain she could with the Entente.

(NOTE: This latter information is probably correct but merely conveys the ideas of MOUKHTAR Bey)

B.X.

Copies to:-

LONDON.  
Minister.  
CAIRO.



48

#12 ✓  
Hi Melchior  
Copy to (- in - C) ✓

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
8 APR 1918  
No 48/21

No. 101

(48) 49 W.44

L. W. Melchior Mth

Arab Bureau  
(signature)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his  
compliments to His Majesty's Representative at (Cairo)  
and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

March 23, 1918.

Reference to previous despatch:

From Foreign Office.  
To

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Sub Rumbold, No 201. March 11th	Turkey  In the copy Passed M. 12-4-18



Copy

No.201.

(48749)

BERNE,

March 11th, 1918.

Sir:-

With reference to my despatch No.173 of the 2nd instant respecting conditions in Turkey, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a tenth weekly memorandum on the same subject.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) Horace Rumbold.

The Right Honourable

A. J. Balfour, O.M., M.P.

etc., etc., etc.



No.10.

Information is partly derived from Pangiri Bey, of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, who has recently arrived in Switzerland. Part also comes from the Turkish minister at Berne and part from a distinguished retired Turkish diplomat, now resident in this country. The remainder comes from monsieur Busson, editor of the "Revue de Turquie".

#### POLITICAL INFORMATION.

Pangiri Bey, in direct contradiction to Samy Bey Junzberg ( see Berne despatch No.136 of 19th ultimo) states that Talaat Pasha came back to Constantinople from Berlin well satisfied with his mission.

He had obtained a written promise from the Germans to send an unspecified number of German divisions against Palestine and Mesopotamia.

Germany also grants the Turks a free hand with regard to any policy they wish to adopt in respect of Armenia and Asia Minor.

Both Turkish and German Officers have been sent to Turkestan, with the object of organising a Mahometan army to deal with the British forces in Mesopotamia and Palestine.

Pangiri says that Talaat now declares that Turkey will be able to enter the Caucasus and recover all she lost in 1878.

On the subject of the proposed Caucasian Republic the Turkish Minister at Berne and the retired diplomat tell very similar stories. The Turks, in agreement with the Germans, hope to create an independent Mahometan State in the Caucasus, which will come right down to the Crimea. The plan is



is to persuade the inhabitants to proclaim their independence, establish a republic and then ask for Turkish protection, in order to expel the Russian elements in the country. In this way the Caucasus will become part of the Turkish Empire.

The Turkish Minister in Berne gave other information. He said that Turkey was demanding an indemnity from Russia. This money, the amount of which is still unfixed, will be devoted to the construction of railways in Anatolia.

The Minister confirmed his previous statement that Palestine would be granted autonomy under Turkish suzerainty, so that contact with Egypt may be maintained. What is done with Egypt itself will depend on how the military situation develops.

The Minister also explained that, as soon as peace is signed with Roumania, the four sovereigns of the Quadruple Alliance will meet in Berlin, in order to discuss the war.

Finally he announced that Turkey was girding up her loins to deal with England, who was now her only enemy.

This last statement finds confirmation in the Minister's conversation with Monsieur Busson, editor of the "Revue de Turquie".

Monsieur Busson has continual trouble with Nafilian, who is always trying to insert into the Review, articles praising the Young Turks. Busson finally got so annoyed as he understood that the paper was to deal only with economic subjects, that he complained to the Minister. The Minister said that he wished him to print articles favourable to the French. The French had no ambitions in Turkey, except with regard to Syria, as to which arrangements could easily be made. On the other hand, the Minister did not wish Busson to be very friendly to the English. Busson replied that the Entente were solidly united and that he did not believe there was the least chance of sowing dissension between England and France. It is significant that the Minister has considerably

changed



changed his tone. A month ago he was urging on his Government (see Berne despatch No.97 of 6th ultimo) the necessity of winning British sympathy for Turkey.

However, the anti British feeling now reigning in the Turkish Government, is guaranteed from another source. A Turkish officer, recently arrived in Switzerland, told the retired diplomat above-mentioned that he had called on Dr. Nazim, of the Committee of Union and Progress, just before leaving Constantinople. He found Dr. Nazim surrounded by Indians and Arabs from the Aden district. Nazim told him that they were emissaries, who were being sent to India to stir up sedition among the natives and that money in plenty was forthcoming for the work.

British Legation,

Berne,

March 11th, 1918.




102

Hi Palhuthani

No. 126.

75184 / W. )  
44

Copy sent to Cairo  
10.11.18  
23.5.18  
Confidential



The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his  
compliments to His Majesty's Representative at *Cairo*  
and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

*May 2*, 1918.

Reference to previous despatch

From Foreign Office.  
To

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.

Subject.

H.M. Minister  
at Berne,  
(Telegram no. 622)

April 24

Young Turk  
movement in  
favour of  
peace.



SWITZERLAND

MILITARY

Telegram (en clair) from Sir H. Rumbold (Berne) to  
Mr. Balfour.

D. April 24th.1918.

R. April 29th.1918.

No. 622.

BY BAG.

.....

Following report of a conversation between the well-known Albanian, Dr. Adamidi, and the Turkish Senator Boustani, is communicated by the Military Attaché's Department.

Boustani told Adamidi that a strong movement in favour of peace is beginning among the Young Turks. Ever since the Russian collapse removed the hereditary bugbear, they have been turning their eyes eastwards, and dreaming of Pan-Turanianism.

They cannot, however, expand peacefully in the East, while the British are hammering them on both flanks. They were greatly impressed by the arrival of the British at Aana and the cutting of the Hedjaz railway. They are also very despondent about Bagdad. They fear the occupation and fortification of the Hanna Mountains by the British. These once seized, it would take half a million Turco-Germans to drive them out.

Promises of German help are not encouraging. Also the Turkish officers are getting more and more discontented with the Germans. Mcustapha Pasha Kemal has already resigned the command at Aleppo owing to differences with Falkenhayn. He was considered one of their best officers.



The Turks are beginning to feel that they have nothing to gain by continuing the war. If the German offensive in the West fails, the Turks are undoubtedly lost: and they will not be much better off, even if it succeeds.

Talaat, now that the Russian danger is over, thinks of nothing but making peace. In proof of this, he has sanctioned an inter-parliamentary conference on behalf of peace, which Boustani is anxious should be held in Switzerland. Germany has been approached on the matter, but has not yet replied.

Boustani told Talaat plainly that Mesopotamia, Syria and Arabic Palestine were for ever lost to Turkey. The Turks, however, still have some hopes of Palestine and Mecca.

In this they are encouraged by the ex-Khedive. He devotes all his energies to this, and is always trying to get Arab and Persian chiefs to come to Constantinople.

Boustani is very sceptical of the success of the movement to unite Sunnites and Shiites. He says that four or five Persians in Turco-German pay recently went to Berlin. There, in imitation of the Egyptian, Farid Bey, they spread a report that an agreement between the two sects had been reached. No one believed this, and they were only laughed at for their pains. The ex-Khedive was concerned in this manoeuvre.



**[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and  
should be returned to the Foreign Office when done with unless required  
for official use.]**



48  
232

Confidential.

No.

210.

~~Commercial.~~

143333 / 14339

Seen  
B

ME.

Li M. Cheetham

Copy to C. W. C.

with compli - Mx

HIGH COMMISSION  
EGYPT  
17 SEP 1918  
No 48/23.

R/7/10

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his  
compliments to His Majesty's Representative at **Cairo**  
and transmits herewith cop of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

August 23, 1918.

Reference to previous despatch:

To  
From Foreign Office, No, ~~Commercial~~

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<u>To</u> Lord Derby, Paris Aug. 23	German assistance to Turkish Armies



*Confidential.*

FOREIGN OFFICE,

August 23rd, 1918.

No. 709.

(143333/n/39)

My Lord:-

In conversation with Sir Ronald Graham on the 17th instant, the Counsellor of the French Embassy stated that the following information had been secured by the French Embassy at Berne from Basri Bey, First Secretary of the Turkish Legation at that capital.

It appears that the ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, had recently visited Berlin in order to lay before the German Emperor the lamentable condition of the Turkish Armies in Syria and Palestine and to press him to send a sufficient number of German troops in order that it should be possible to take the offensive in Palestine and against Egypt.

The Emperor answered that he was always interested in the fate of Egypt, and in the personal position of the ex-Khedive, whom he wished to see re-established on the Throne, but that Germany could not see her way at this moment to make a great effort in Palestine. His Majesty added that he continued to furnish the Turkish Army with munitions, arms and other war material; also with officers and small reinforcements, so as to allow the Turkish troops to hold up the British forces. This was, he said, all that these troops were called upon to do for the present. Before long there would be a military decision on the Western Front, which would decide the fate of Egypt.

The French Embassy at Berne declared that Germany's determination

His Excellency

The Right Honourable

The Earl of Derby, K.G., G.C.V.O.

Ac.,

Ac.,

Ac.



determination to make her principal effort on the Western Front is confirmed by the language held by Reschid Pasha, ex-Turkish Ambassador at Vienna. Reschid ~~was~~ Hakki Pasha, the Ambassador at Berlin, before the latter's death, and Hakki assured him that the German General Staff were determined to seek a decision on the Western Front and not to undertake any important enterprises in either Palestine or Mesopotamia.

This declaration had given rise to a heated discussion between Hakki and Reschid, the former affirming his confidence in the ultimate victory of Germany, the latter ~~on~~ the other hand stating his belief that Germany would abandon Turkey to her fate if events in the West did not ~~come~~ ~~turn~~ up to her expectations.

I am, with great truth and respect,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient  
humble servant,

*(For the Secretary of State)*

*(Signed) R. Graham.*



ANY REPLY TO THIS LETTER  
should please be addressed to  
G. S. "I" (g) 2nd Echelon.

*Sir H. V. Chatham*

*70*

*The Constantinople*

GENERAL STAFF - INTELLIGENCE,

2nd Echelon, G.H.Q., E.E.F.

I.19616/D.

21st January,

1919. COM. STAFF. EGYPT
22 JAN 1919
No 48/25

THE RESIDENCY,  
CAIRO.

We have been approached by a group of Turks in Cairo headed by SALAHEDDINE BEY and Dr. NOUREDIN PASHA. This group wish to send a delegation under SALAHEDDINE BEY to CONSTANTINOPLE to oppose the C.U.P. party in the forthcoming Turkish elections. Should you think it advisable we would suggest that the question of the journey of this Delegation to CONSTANTINOPLE should be referred by you to H. E. The High Commissioner at CONSTANTINOPLE for his views. The group has formed a Committee the prominent members of which are :

*A*  
SALAHEDDINE BEY, Secretary to Kiamil Pacha.  
ABDUL-AZIZ MEEDJDI EFFENDI, former deputy of Karassi.  
HAFIZ ISMAIL EFFENDI, editor of the 'Moussawat'.  
EDHEM PACHA ZADE.  
AHMED BEY.  
LEON BEY ANDOUN.

We should be glad if you would inform us of any action which you may take in this matter.

*C. J. R. de*

Lieut-Colonel.  
G.S. "I".




Code, Cypher  
or clear?

B.

(48/26)

# TELEGRAM.



From  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT  
Cairo.

To FOREIGN OFFICE

Repeated CONSTANTINOPLE.

*Dated*  
*Despatched* } January 23rd 7.45 pm.  
(Date and time)

No. 131.

Group of Turks in Cairo have  
approached Military Authorities with a view to  
sending a delegation to Constantinople to oppose  
the C.U.P. at forthcoming Turkish elections.  
Group is headed by SALAHEDDINE Bey and Dr. NOUREDIN  
Pasha; and prominent members of their Committee are:-

SALAHEDDINE BEY, Secretary to Kiamil Pasha.

ABDUL AZIZ MEEDJDI EFFENDI, former deputy of  
Karassi.

HAFIZ ISMAIL EFFENDI, editor of the "MOUSSAWAT".

EDHEM PASHA ZADE.

AHMED BEY.

LEON BEY ADOUN.

You will no doubt send instructions on  
hearing views of High Commissioner at Constantinople.

Repeated Constantinople.



48

Code, Cypher  
or clear?

B

# TELEGRAM.

HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
30 JAN 1919  
No 48/27.

From Constantinople

To  
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR EGYPT  
Cairo.

Despatched (Date and time) Jan. 29th 8 49 pm

Received (Date and time) 30th 6 10 am

No. 25~~18~~

Dated: 29th.

(into F.O.) 48/26

Reference your telegram 131 of Jan. 23rd.

There are no signs of election coming on at present.

Addressed Sir R Wingate Cairo No. 25 repeated F.O. No.

299.

Note to F.S.I(g) with ref to their  
I. 19616/D 7 Jan 21.  
v. 1/2/19





48

General Staff Intelligence (g) 2nd Echelon.

With reference to your I.19616/D of January 21st, we have received a telegram from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated January 29th, stating that there are no signs of an election coming on at present.

Should, therefore, Salaneddin and Nouredin raise the question of their journey again, it would seem best to tell them that there is no need for them to proceed to Constantinople as yet. Sir A. Calthorpe will presumably let us know when an election seems probable, and give us his considered opinion as to whether these delegates should then be allowed to proceed.

February 1, 1919.



No 96

(38021/M.E.44 ~~11~~)188. ✓  
Sir M. Chulham

✓ Copy to Gen Clayton

22/4/19.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his  
compliments to His Majesty's Representative at *Cairo*  
and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

My Mr 22, 1919.

Reference to previous despatch :

From Foreign Office :  
To

Description of Enclosure.


Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Mr. Balfour</i> <i>Paris No. 197.</i> <i>Mar 8.</i>	<i>Future of Turkey.</i>



1-2  
48  
PRIORITY.

PARAPHRASE.

SECRET.



FROM : BRITFORCE, CONSTANTINOPLE.

To : Addressed SIMLA, Repeated BAGHDAD, EGYPTFORCE and DIRMILINT.

I. 6237. 14-6-19.

Despd. 1430 15-6-19  
Recd. 1400 16-6-19.

Your 47041 M.O.S. June 9th. A state of tension exists in TURKEY, which is favourable to PAN ISLAMIC and Anti-Christian excitement, but is probably the natural result of apprehensions regarding decisions of Peace Conference and of such recent events as Greek occupation of Smyrna.

Undoubtedly, attempts are being made by BLSHE'S from MOSCOW and scattered elements of CUP PAN ISLAMISTS to exploit this situation as a result which we have heard rumours of impending Christian massacres and a general statement that such events will take place after RAMAZAN.

However, there is no definite evidence that an organized PAN upheaval is to be expected after RAMAZAN.

In the present circumstances it is considered almost impossible that the responsible Turkish Govt. should be lending itself to such a scheme, and it is very unlikely that the BL and PAN ISLAMIC in Turkey are sufficiently organized to act independently at present.

Copies to : C.P.O.  
Residency. —  
B.G.G.S.  
B.G.I.  
Advantall Central Aleppo  
I.B.  
I.B.X.  
I.A. Mt. Carmel.  
Cipher Office  
File.


20 (KMG)



I.9308/S.

PRIORITY.

SECRET.



From:- BHI FORCE, Constantinople.

To:- EGYPT FORCE.

Desp d. 1705. - 1/7/19.  
Recd. D745. 2/7/19.

I.6393.

-----  
Following is situation in interior :- Throughout country certain military commanders and C.U.P. agents are working to stir up trouble, to upset present Government and organize armed bands against Greek and Italian -----?. Latest reports from Kenia state General Djemal pasha engaged in these activities which extend into your area. His recall has been requested. Report following.  
-----

Copies to :-

Residency. —  
B.G.G.S.  
B.G.I.  
C.P.O.  
I.A. Carmel.  
I.B. (S. & P.)  
File.  
Ciphers.

*Ld Djalma*  
*K.B.*  
*We shall never*  
*have peace till we*  
*have caught the Chief*  
*leaders*  
*3/7/19.*



No. 316.

(95483/m.F.44)

Ld Dalrymple  
KB/200 24/7/19

43  
48/32  
24 JUL 1919  
MISSIONER  
E. P. T.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to His Majesty's Representative at Cairo and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

July 5, 1919

Reference to previous despatch:

To the Secretary of State, No. 285, of June 23.  
From (545/39)

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Telegram from Benne No. 996. June 25.	Future relations between Turkey & Greece Ligeia Pasha Chris to S.H.Q. (for C.P.O.) Arab Bazaar

2



(95483).

POLITICAL

SWITZERLAND

Telegram (en clair) from Lord Acton. (Berne).

D. June 25th.1919.

R. July 3rd.1919.

No. 996. By Bag.

-----  
My despatch No. 306 of May 26th, 1919. (545/39)

Same informant has sent me a further memorandum embodying views expressed to him by Turks in this country as regards future relations between their country and Greece. He has the impression that to allow Greece to play a predominant political role in Turkey would only lead to continued disorder, as, true to their oriental mentality, the Turks would never submit to the hegemony of a people for whom they do not feel the respect which springs from fear. Informant further argues that His Majesty's Government could never exercise as much influence over the Greek as over the Turkish Government: he also maintains his contention that it is in the interest of Great Britain and France as Mohammedan powers for Constantinople to remain the seat of the Caliphate and therefore, at any rate nominally, Turkish. He further believes that Turkey reduced to her ethnographic frontiers and taught by the painful experience of the past, will succeed in creating an honest and capable Government: in this connection he suggests that, though it would be injudicious to try to create friendly relations with the Committee of Union and Progress in its present form, it would none the less be possible to find among those members of the Committee who as early as 1918 had begun to oppose the policy of Enver and Talaat, persons fit to co-operate in such a Government. If the solution decided on should be contrary to Turkish aspirations, informant, while considering the Turks as orientals incapable of organizing a holy war on a vast scale, nevertheless fears that a European power might make use of the situation to organize a Panislamic movement directed against Great Britain and France.

(3.7.3-4).



Approved by RE

Permit

Constantinople

July 19 1919  
23 JUL 1919  
no 48/33.

My dear General.

I am venturing to write you a further letter on the situation here which will, I trust, be of interest.

The delegation left for Paris one half of it containing the Grand Vizier, Samad Ferid Pasha, in a French <sup>Battleship</sup> ~~train~~ <sup>about 10</sup> days ago and the other half of it containing the Ex Grand Vizier and Ambassador in London Tewfik Pasha in a <sup>fast</sup> British ~~ship~~ <sup>Cruiser (the Ceres)</sup>. Public opinion has, therefore, made up its mind that the delegation as a whole is divided in opinion, the one Grand Vizier being in favour of a French and the other in favour of a British mandate!

I alluded in my last letter to the mode of communication to the Porte of the ~~invitation~~ invitation to Paris; namely that it had been made by M. De France alone and not with his colleagues. A couple of days later we received the instructions of the Foreign Office

Admiral Webb's technical corrections!



On the Subject, namely that the Communication was to be a joint one, the Americans included. These instructions had similarly been communicated to Mr. De France.

His action therefore speaks for itself. The total effect was not, however, very durable in spite of the advertisement which was given to French action in their more vigorous propaganda—

The Delegation to Paris is not looked upon with favour by a large section in Constantinople.

One party, the pro British one, says that the Delegation is Francophil and dislikes it on those grounds—

The other, the National and/or "CUP" Party, says that it is not representative of the nation, will not defend the rights of the nation and that it should have included some of their own number.

As far as we know we believe the Delegation to be composed of about as respectable people as it is possible to find in Turkey today



and, on the whole, consider it slightly more Anglo than Francophil, for what that may be worth—

As to the Government it falls more or less evenly (with certain variations into which it is not necessary to go) into two groups.

The moderates who desire to maintain public order and keep things quiet while the delegation is settling the country's fate at Paris; and the chauvinists who are all for National manifestations and protestations and (as is beginning to make itself seen) active resistance to the Greeks down Smyrna way—

The movement of the latter, therefore, is both anti Greek and Foreign (Italian) aggression and anti-Government—

We call it "National" but there can be little doubt that the "CUP" is in the background and probably Enver and Co on the very edge of the picture.

In the Cabinet the Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs appear to



Is on the Chauvinist Side -  
 remainder of the

The Government is anxious to strike a blow and make a number of arrests; in doing which they desire our assistance. Our (The Allies) position is none too easy now is that of this High Commission in particular. For apart from reluctance to interfere in what is, in part at all events, Party Politics, the situation is further complicated by the fact <sup>that</sup> our Allies are associated in greater or lesser degree with the different Parties. We can, therefore, but take refuge in the statement that we propose "to maintain public order and proceed against the disturbers of it irrespective of party, race & creed."

It is not today very clear how it will all end.

American missionaries and Christian Communities in the interior anticipate that the movement will spread from being a "National" into an "anti Christian" one and that the order will go forth that "if the heathens must die the Christians



shall die with them."

[It must be remembered that the Greek & Italian Occupation of the Smyrna Villages is being used as a pretext to convince the people that the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire has begun].

I am not at present inclined to think things will go to that length but then I do not feel that anyone's opinion is worth anything in this country where everything is "incalculable" —

An interesting feature (and a rather significant one) is the part which is being played now by the Itiri apparent —

He has been appearing more prominently in public and has been writing himself up in the Press. Meetings are said to take place at his house attended by well known C U P members. He has sent telegrams, in defence of Ottoman "Rights," to the President of the French & American Republics and the Kings of England and Italy. [The French replied to him!].

And finally the other day he sent a letter to the Sultan in regard to the delegation and the Government



which, though, strictly correct in the manner of it contained a veiled threat in the matter. The Sultan was very alarmed and let us know that he was so. It is not known how much there is in the King's apparent action. Some think he is being made a tool of by the Chauvinists who desire to place him on the throne in lieu of the present Sultan and to establish a National Government with its seat somewhere in Anatolia. But there are as yet no indications <sup>that</sup> this is more than mere surmise.

The political situation is however distinctly interesting and full of potentialities.

Just within the last day or two things have rather come to a head Smyrna way. There has been fighting at Pergamos [Bergama] and 100 Turks massacred (so our reports have it) at Menemen. National Defence Committees are increasing in number and voice in the Sandjak of Balıkesir and Villages of Brusa. In the latter the Vali is reported to be levying a ~~tax~~ subscription for National Defence purposes and leaflets of an inciting nature are in circulation.

The Bands of Brigands and others who now infest the country side are finding plenty of employment and are coming in handy for



the Country which is naturally a bit short of Troops!

But Samson and Tietzonde way there is a little effervescence also. All due to the same cause and all fully exploited by interested political personages.

The Government conceived the idea, the other day, of dividing Anatolia up into Military Zones which were to be placed under "Military Inspection" whose ostensible functions were to supersede those of the civil officials in all matters relating to public security. The move was, however, rather too palpable; the "inspector" appointed rather too young and energetic (some were ex Commanders of Corps and Divisions in Palestine!) and so we were obliged to sit on the proposal.

It seems clear, however, that there is a not inconsiderable party of "last ditchers" who consider that it is an ignominious death for the Moslem to lay his head on the Conference Table for decapitation and that it is more in accordance with history and tradition to go down with a struggle. The public, I veritably believe, if left alone would accept Paris with complacency.

Sincerely,

Arthur B. Woods



HIGH COMMISSIONER  
EGYPT  
9 AUG 1919  
No 68/54

No. 360

(104509/ME.44)

5102 ✓

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments  
to His Majesty's Representative at *Cairo*  
and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

*July 24*, 1919.

*K.B.*

Reference to previous despatch :

To  
From the Secretary of State, No. of

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>1. Berne.</i> <i>No. 1094.</i> <i>July 17.</i>	<i>Sezai Bey, &amp; Future of Turkey</i>
<i>2. Mr. Traugott. Berne.</i> <i>No. 1073.</i> <i>July 11.</i>	



*General H. G. Bell*  
*R. G. Bell*  
*1919*

• FILES ONLY.

Decypher. Lord Acton (Berne) July 17th 1919.

D. 7.0 p.m. July 17th 1919.

R. 11.30 a.m. July 18th 1919.

No. 1094.

-----

Mr. Craigie's telegram No. 1073.

Sezal Bey formerly Turkish Minister at Madrid who has arrived in Switzerland on a French safe conduct offers through Military Attache's Department, to transmit direct to Sultan any message from His Majesty's Government relative to future policy of Great Britain in regard to Turco- Greek conflicting interests. I believe previous to war this man distinguished himself by pro-Entente propaganda.

Repeated to Peace Conference 227.

(18.8.8-4)

*Copy to S. H. G.*  
*2*



Telegram, en clair, No. 1073

Mr. R. L. Craigie to Earl Curzon of Kedleston. July 11, 1919

-----

My telegram No. 996 of the 25th June.

I am informed through Military Attaché's department that Zenzai Bey, the Turkish Minister at Madrid, at present in Switzerland for reasons of health, has expressed himself as follows in conversation with an absolutely reliable informant:

The former pro-French enthusiasts were very disappointed at the result of the Turkish mission to Paris and were now more disposed than ever before to side with the Anglo-ophile party. In Zenzai Bey's opinion, the union so formed could dominate Turkish politics. This party, however, bitterly resented the policy of the partition of Asia Minor into various spheres of influence which must inevitably lead to anarchy. They would much prefer to remain under a single power. Should Smyrna be given to Greece, Turkey could not exist as she depended on that district for the greater part of her revenue. Hatred for the Greeks was so intense that the Turks would unite against them to a man and as soon as the military protection of the Entente troops was withdrawn the Greeks would be expelled from Asia Minor. Zenzai Bey admitted that the present veiled threats of revolution and of a Holy War were a mistake from the Turkish point of view but at the same time feeling against Greece and Italy was running very high and  
night/



might lead to incidents.

I merely report the above as indicating the views held by pro-British Turks in Switzerland and as possibly confirming what is reported from other sources.

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FILES ONLY.

Decypher. Lord Acton (Berne) July 17th 1919.

D. 7.0 p.m. July 17th 1919.

R. 11.30 a.m. July 18th 1919.

No. 1094.

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Mr. Craigie's telegram No. 1073.


Sezai Bey formerly Turkish Minister at Madrid who has arrived in Switzerland on a French safe conduct offers through Military Attache's Department, to transmit direct to Sultan any message from His Majesty's Government relative to future policy of Great Britain in regard to Turco- Greek conflicting interests. I believe previous to war this man distinguished himself by pro-Entente propaganda.

Repeated to Peace Conference 227.



Personal

Pa.



My dear General

X  
There has actually been no change of Cabinet since I last wrote! There has only been a change of two ministers that of the Interior and of War - there has been a great deal of party political intrigue which is not, however, of any interest to the outsider - The chauvinist element in the Government is slightly chastened and those in authority are genuinely alarmed at the decidedly "Communist" colouring which the so-called "Nationalist" movement has assumed -

The Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha, returned from Paris today and it is rather expected that there will now be a change of Government. <sup>(with his supporters)</sup> He has lost much popularity (as a result of his action at Paris; even Turks recognised that to ask for the "Status quo ante Bellum" was a



little strong after all that has happened.  
His enemies who are for the large part  
Anglophiles are very incensed at his  
reported pro French Expressions and  
actions.

It is, therefore, rather unlikely that he will  
be able to continue at the head of the  
Government, the members of which are  
likely, after the change, to consist of the  
"moderates" and/or those of Pro-British  
leanings.

In so far as we take any part in  
these matters (which is only done unoffic-  
ially) we encourage, at all times, any  
combination which will make for peace  
and security in the interior and <sup>for</sup> protection  
of the Christian Populations.

The "movement" in the interior continues -  
It is difficult to gauge its extent  
and gravity.

Afentain Mustafa Kemal Pasha  
who commanded an Army opposed to  
us in Palestine is now "out against  
the Government" in the Eastern Provinces.  
He was originally sent there as



Military Inspector; but as we suspected at the time and as events proved his real mission was to organize public opinion against the Greek Occupation of Smyrna. Against the possibility of further occupations elsewhere and against the present Government -

He demanded his recall. The Government were unable to effect it and dismissed him from the Army and now consider him an outlaw. He is reported to be forming a National Congress at Erzerum -

with him is associated (according to report) Raouf Bey late Minister of Marine and one of the Signatories of the Armistice.

An incident of a rather grave nature occurred the other day at Samsoun - There the Gen. III Turkish Army Corps is stationed. The military Control Officer that he had heard that a fresh Battalion of British troops was to arrive at Samsoun [N.B. It was a Relief] and that, as he, (the Gen) had received no orders from his Govern-



ment on the subject and as, moreover, public security was rather disturbed, he refused to accept any responsibility of the said British Troops proceeded into the interior (NB They were to go, in part, to a place about 50 miles inland) and added that if they did so he would withdraw his troops from Samson and oppose the British!

Upon this we at once despatched a destroyer to Samson with a Turkish Officer bearing orders to ~~send~~ the Goc Army Corps to return at once in the same destroyer.

We have not yet heard the result. but believe he will come.

Later reports show that the Goc soon realised that his zeal had got the better of his discretion and very soon abandoned his obstructive attitude.

It is pretty clear that he was acting under the orders of the Mustafa Kemal, above mentioned and the incident was significant as showing



how far that gentleman was prepared to go and the extent to which he had forgotten his hiding in Palestine!

In the Broussa Bali-Kesir Pergamos district there is, also, no little effervescence and a certain amount of actual organization of irregulars against further Greek advances in that area - The district is one very much given over to Brigandage and the irregular levies are for the most part forming themselves round the Brigand Bands - These latter observe very few of the rules of the game and on a recent occasion when they drove 800 Greek Soldiers out of Pergamos (only 200 survived, it is said) they ~~massacred~~ looted and pillaged Moslem, Armenian and Jew with complete impartiality!

It is not believed that this movement can, however, effect any very practical results in the way of opposition - The Turkish Army has been very effectively disarmed and although



It is true that there are many arms, the property of deserters, throughout the country; ammunition is short and the desire to fight not very widespread —

Further South round about Aidin, there has been, of course, pretty serious fighting with the Turks. The town <sup>of Aidin</sup> has been taken and retaken several times. The greater part of it is burnt and the surviving population destitute.

There the Turks have employed but very few regular troops (they have practically none) in spite of very exaggerated Greek reports estimating the "forces opposing them" at 60,000.

The Turkish <sup>regular</sup> forces have, no doubt, in those parts been very effectively reinforced by "Locals" who seem able to give a very good account of themselves —

The result of all this fighting is that agriculture of all kinds is at a standstill, villages burning and the population, both Christian and Moslem thrown into the greatest disorder and destitution.

And what is the



Cause of it all?

One is bound to confess that, until the Peace Conference, in its wisdom, threw down the apple of discord into the Aidin Villayet, by landing Greek Troops and occupying the town (which was subsequently extended to an occupation of the Sandjak), not only the Aidin Villayet but most parts of Turkey were moderately quiet.

No sooner however was Smyrna occupied (the ill effects of which, on the Turks, were by no means minimised by the incidents to which it gave rise) than the temporarily latent anti Greek (rapidly becoming again anti Christian) hostility was aroused and "incidents" began to occur all over the country -

The conditions in Thrace to day are highly unsatisfactory.

Even this, however, was not the end of the trouble - The Greeks were permitted, by the Conference at Paris, to send Troops to "quell disturbances" to



places beyond the limits of the Sandfak  
 of Smyrna, on condition that the  
 Senior Naval Officer (Commodore Fitzmaurice)  
 Concurred therein.

One is obliged to confess that they seem  
 to have used this latitude accorded them  
 solely to acquire more territory - nor  
 did they fulfill the condition to obtain  
 the permission of the S.N.O. before  
 advancing.

It is true that the occupation of one or two  
 places beyond the Sandfak limit was  
 justifiable on strategic grounds; other wise  
 the opposition that they claim they were  
 faced with was almost entirely one of  
 their own making and had they  
 remained within the limits assigned  
 to them by Paris there is no reason to believe that  
 the <sup>Turks</sup> would (and every reason to believe  
 they could not) have taken the  
 offensive -

All our efforts have, therefore, recently  
 been concentrated on attempting to  
 get the Foreign Office (or rather Paris)  
 to authorize us to tell the Turks



Exactly what are the limits of the Greek  
Occupation in which [are we confidently  
believe that the Turkish agitation would  
in large measure die down.

But Paris takes a long time to appreciate  
a situation and still longer to give a  
decision regarding it—

Meanwhile the Turks say to us "You  
put the match to the fire and you're  
not moving a hand to extinguish it—"

One would not, of course, mind how much  
the Turks were made to suffer for their  
misdeeds if only the means employed  
to that end reconciled themselves to one's  
conscience and to what one thought  
would serve the best interests of all  
concerned.

But one is unable to see how matters  
are improved by rousing national and religious  
animosities<sup>+</sup> and by supplanting a rotten  
Government by one which experience  
and present events prove to be not very  
much better.

Perhaps, however, one's point of view is too  
local!

Sincerely,

W. H. Woods

July 17

+  
which is all the  
Smyrna occupation  
has so far done



No. 429

~~Exempt~~



(115560/ME.)  
44A

THE Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments  
to His Majesty's Representative at *Cairo*  
and transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.

Foreign Office,

Aug. 20, 1919.

O.M.T.  
General *W. Well*  
*SAV*

*Copy 82. ✓*

Reference to previous despatch :

To the Secretary of State, No. , Commercial, of  
From

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Constantinople</i>  <i>No. 1321.</i>  <i>Aug. 1.</i>	<i>13<sup>th</sup> Turkish army corps.</i>



Copy.

No. 1321/M/1606.

(115560)

British High Commission,  
Constantinople.

1st August, 1919.

My Lord,

I have the honour to forward herewith for Your Lordship's information copy of correspondence which has passed between the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and myself, relative to the withdrawal of the XIIIth Army Corps from certain districts in Kurdistan and the conversion of the remnants of this Army Corps into a Gendarmerie Force.

I have, etc.

(Sd) A. Calthorpe.

HIGH COMMISSIONER.

The Right Honourable,

The Earl Curzon of Kedleston, K.G., P.C.,

etc.,                      etc.,                      etc.

Copy to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief,  
Army of the Black Sea.



SUBLIME PORTE.

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

le 14 juin 1919.

Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire,

Son Excellence le Ministre de la Guerre vient de m'informer, sur une lettre de Son Excellence Monsieur le Général Milne, Commandant en Chef des forces anglaises à Salonique, que Son Excellence Monsieur le Général Allenby demande la suppression du 13<sup>e</sup> Corps d'armée résident dans les Vilayets de Diarbékir, Mamouret-ul-Aziz, Bitlis et dans les Sandjaks d'Aintab, d'Ourfa et de Marache.

Comme Votre Excellence ne l'ignore point, la sécurité et le service d'ordre dans toutes ces vastes contrées qui, pour la plupart, consistent la résidence ou les terrains de parcours de nombreuses tribus nomades et de populations montagnardes et belliqueuses, ne sont assurés que par cette force militaire dont la présence même est le principal facteur du respect des lois.

L'organisation de la gendarmerie pourrait jusqu'à un certain degré dispenser le Gouvernement de maintenir ce Corps d'armée tel qu'il est actuellement; il serait cependant juste de considérer que cette organisation n'a pas encore acquis tant au point de vue de la quantité qu'à celui de la qualité, la capacité et la force nécessaires pour pouvoir dûment remplir cette tâche ardue et difficile.

Il sera encore juste de dire que, vu la grandé étendu des contrées où ledit Corps d'Armée est chargé de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité publique qu'il s'efforce d'assurer malgré la réduction qu'a subi son effectif, il ne parviendrait jamais à accomplir sa mission si son effectif venait à être réduit encore; et je suis en mesure d'assurer votre Excellence que la dispersion ou la suppression de cette force armée ne manquerait pas d'amener



11:  
d'amener dans ces parages une anarchie complète qu'il est dans l'intérêt commun de prévenir et dont la responsabilité retomberait, d'après les Articles 5 et 24 de l'Armistice, sur le Gouvernement Impérial.

Ce grave inconvénient est d'autant plus imminent qu'une grande effervescence régnait parmi les différentes tribus résident dans les dits contrées, qui interprétant mal l'avance des forces anglaises sur leurs territoires, se livrent, dans leur agitation, à des actes répréhensibles - comme celui du regrettable assassinat d'un officier anglais à Zaho.

Vu les inconvénients auxquels je viens de faire allusion je décline, au nom de la Sublime Porte, ladite responsabilité et j'ai l'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de vouloir bien informer Son Excellence Monsieur le Général Allenby que, vu les raisons impérieuses et les justes considérations exposées plus haut, le Conseil des Ministres a décidé de transformer en forces de gendarmerie le contingent du 13<sup>e</sup> Corps d'Armée et que cette décision a été communiquée aux Départements Impériaux de la Guerre et de l'Intérieur.

Je suis persuadé que Son Excellence le Général Allenby approuvera, dans ses hauts sentiments de justice, la solution qui vient d'être ainsi donnée à la question du 13<sup>e</sup> Corps d'Armée.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Haut-Commissaire l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Le Ministre ad interim des  
Affaires Etrangères.

(Sd)



Copy.

From :- The Commander-in-Chief,

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

To :- The High Commissioner.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

12th July, 1919.

Your Excellency,

In reply to your letter No. M.1606 dated 23rd June 1919, I have the honour to inform you that I have no objection to the proposal of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to convert the remnant of the 13th Turkish Army Corps into Gendarmerie, provided the strength of the armed Gendarmerie Force so created is limited to the present strength of the 13th Army Corps.

I have, etc.

(Sd)

Brig. General.

for General,

Commanding-in-Chief,

EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.



48  
SECRET

PRIORITY

POL. 1183

HIGH COMMISSION

800 1919

PARAPHRASE

48/37

From: BUTFORCE, CONSTANTINOPLE.

To : ADD TROOPERS, EGYPTFORCE, BAGHDAD,  
REPTD. ADBRIT AND GENL. SALEY. FLOOD

Despd. 2200. 4.10.19.

Recd. 1230. 5.10.19.

I.7283 Cipher 4th.

Following constitute New Cabinet.

Grand Vizier ALI RIZA a soldier, and rather colourless politician.

Minister of War KUTCUK Djemal.

" " Interior DAMAD SHERIF.

" " Foreign Affairs HAIDAR ZEDEH IBRAHIM  
SHEIK-UL-ISLAM. MUSTAFA RESHID.

Last three were in previous cabinet of TEWFIK.

Whilst there is clearly a desire to select steady men, a strong nationalist colour is given by these and minor appointments.


It is clear that TEWFIK Pash has declined ? to be Grand Vizier and also that he has assisted ALI RIZA in making appointments. The new Minister of War was lately G.O.C. at KOMIA. He conformed to terms of Armistice, and surrendered all his armaments in spring. Italian landing in June upset him, and he turned Nationalist, and was secretly responsible on evidence for recruiting of bands. My policy has been Polish Political struggles are not my concern, and I have given instructions that British commanders should adopt a neutral attitude with Turkish political parties, provided Allied interests in the railway safeguarded, and terms of armistice are observed.

The so called recruiting otherwise swearing in supply of men for future evnts will continue probably.

Copies to: C.P.O. (3)  
C.G.S. (2)  
Residency —  
B.G.G.S.  
G.S.I.  
File  
Ciphers.

VD





*Part I*

*For subsequent papers see Part II*